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INTRODUCTION 
Why Operations Research—The Problem of Decision Making 
Decision making is an universally applicable phenomenon. 
Everyone in the world is required to make decisions at every 
step of his life. Though we may not be particularly conscious 
of it, we make decisions every day and every hour of our 
active life. For example, a housewife has to decide not only 
what to feed the family tonight but also how to prepare the 
food to be served, what ingredients to use and furthermore, 
from where to purchase these ingredients, when and at what 
price, etc. Similarly, from the time he has taken that big 
decision to pursue farming for a living, a person has to make 
very many important initial and then day-to-day decisions of 
the following type: 
a. Where to start farming? What should be the size of 
the farm? What type of residential buildings are to 
be preferred or made on the farm? 
b. What type of farming should he have, viz. grain farm­
ing, hog farming, dairy farming, beef cattle, or some 
other type? 
c. I'fhat resources should he acquire and in what quanti­
ties? Whether should he have one tractor or two, 
small, medium or large in size. What attachments and 
special machines he should purchase for his business? 
d. How should he finance his farm? How much should he 
borrow and how much should be his own investment? Of 
the borrowed capital, how much should he take for 
long-term, how much for medium and how much for short 
term periods? When should he borrow and at what 
terms? What should be the source or sources of 
borrowing? 
e. Once acquired, what allocation of his resources is 
most efficient? 
f. What should he produce, when and how much of each? 
g. What level of technology should he use? What opera­
tions should he perform, at what time and in what 
manner? 
h. Once the produce has been obtained, he has to decide 
as to what to sell, and how much to sell, when, where 
and at what prices? 
Some of these decisions are taken after a good deal of 
time devoted to thinking; whereas others have to be spontane­
ous . Some decisions are relatively more important than others 
Some are long-term in nature implying thereby that the conse­
quences of these decisions are felt for a long time after they 
have been taken; e.g., decision to expand the size of the farm 
construction of a new elevator, an increase in the capital 
outlay of plant and equipment, etc. Other decisions have con­
sequences that are shorter in duration; e.g., whether to 
irrigate a crop today or tomorrow. 
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The basic components of decision-making problem can be 
broadly grouped into: 
1. objectives, 
2. a set of alternative courses of actions 
available, and 
3. uncertainty. 
Let the set of objectives be 
(j) = {Oj} 
Let the set of alternative courses of actions available be 
A = {a^} 
where i = l***n, j = l*'*m, and m and n are finite. Then 
given the objective of a firm 0 = {cy/OjE#}, the problem is 
reduced to the choice of suitable subset of A such that Aj^ 
optimises the objective function. 
When complete information about the future is available 
and there is no uncertainty involved in decision-making, 
choice of a suitable A^ is rather trivial. The problem of 
decision-making, in fact, arises due to the fact that one's 
knowledge of the future is not perfect. He has to take 
decision in the present for the future in the realm of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is a subjective phenomenon and the 
parameters of probability distribution cannot be established 
empirically. No two managers may visualize the future happen­
ings in the same manner and, therefore, given the same set of 
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circumstances, the decision of A may be different from B. As 
he tries to look into the future, a decision-maker forms 
expectations of the returns or outcomes or consequences of his 
decision. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that he 
does not maximize his utility or payoff, but maximizes the 
expected value of his utility function or payoff. Thus given 
an r X s matrix U = u^^ (i=l, •••r, j=l, •••s) where u^j is 
decision-maker's utility for the consequence associated with 
his action a^^ when nature is in state tj, his problem of taking 
a decision under uncertainty is finding a subset of actions 
which are expected to be optimal in some sense (based on his 
objective or criterion function). 
The Special Nature of Farming Enterprise 
Returns in any enterprise are a function of several 
variables, the more important being the quantity of output 
produced from a given set of resources, the cost of production 
per unit of output and the price at which the output is sold. 
Let 
q = quantity of output produced from a given 
set of resources, 
c = cost of production per unit of output, 
P = price per unit of output, 
ir = profits. 
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Then 
TT = f(q,P,c) 
However, q, P and c are in themselves dependent on other 
factors, e.g., location of the farm, climatic conditions, 
social conditions, nature of output, etc. Since farming is an 
out-of-door enterprise, carried on a relatively large area, it 
is affected by variations in climatic conditions. Moreover, 
the production of crops and livestock is not instantaneous. 
It is a biological phenomenon with a time lag between the 
initiation of the process of production and the realization of 
the output. Similarly, most farm products are comparatively 
perishable in nature and, therefore, (especially in less 
advanced economies where they are not processed, canned or 
frozen in quantities to be available on the shelf), their 
supply is seasonal which lends them susceptible to price 
variability. These are some of the peculiarities of farming 
that make it more liable to the phenomenon of uncertainty than 
other enterprises. Thus a farmer, like any other entrepreneur, 
faces uncertainty of several types when he commits his present 
resources to the production of a commodity forthcoming at a 
later time. Broadly speaking, these are: 
a. uncertainty of yield, 
b. uncertainty of prices of inputs and outputs, 
c. technological uncertainty. 
b 
d. uncertainty due to social, legal and political 
factors. 
However, unlike the other entrepreneurs, the degree of 
uncertainty faced by a farmer is greater than that in other 
enterprises due to the peculiarities of agriculture pointed 
out elsewhere. 
The degree of uncertainty can be gauged by looking at the 
probability density function (or distribution) of the expecta­
tions of the farmer with regard to the yields and prices. The 
greater the skewness, the smaller the degree of uncertainty 
and vice-versa. A leptokurtic distribution indicates that the 
farmer is more confident of the prices or yields being within 
a short range. On the other hand, a platykurtic distribution 
represents a greater degree of uncertainty on the part of the 
decision maker. (Please see Figure 1.) 
Decision Making Techniques 
The question then arises, "Given the objective function 
(reflecting the goals of the decision-maker), the functional 
relationships between dependent and the independent (decision) 
variables, the constraints, etc., what tools are available to 
the decision-maker to help him in choosing the appropriate 
values of the controllable variables which maximize the 
expected value of the objective function?" Simon (93, p. 8) 
has divided these techniques of decision making into 
(a) traditional and (b) modern as in the following table. 
I .or  1.0 
SKEWED TO LEFT SKEWED TO RIGHT 
EXPECTED PAY OFF 
LEPROKURTIC 
1.0 r MESOKURTIC 
EXPECTED PAY OFF 
1.0 
PLATYKURTIC 
Figure 1. Skewness, kurtosis and degree of uncertainty 
Traditional and modern techniques of decision making 
Decision making techniques 
Types of decisions 
Traditional Modern 
Programmed: 
Routine, repetitive 
decisions. Organiza­
tion develops specific 
processes for handling 
them. 
'1. Habit 
2. Clerical routine: 
Standard operating 
procedures 
3. Organization structure: 
Common expectations, 
a system of subgoals, 
well-defined informa­
tional channels 
1. Operations research: 
Mathematical analysis, 
models, computer 
simulation 
2. Electronic data pro­
cessing 
Nonprogrammed: 
One-shot, ill-
structured novel 
policy decisions. 
Handled by general 
problem-solving 
processes. 
1. Judgment, intuition, 
and creativity 
2. Rules of thumb 
3. Selection and training 
of executives 
Heuristic problem-solving 
techniques applied to: 
(a) training human 
decision makers 
(b) constructing heuris­
tic computer 
programmes 
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The most general and pervasive traditional programmed 
method, according to Simon, is habit with standard operating 
procedures and organization structure closely related to it. 
Proper judgment, creativity and selection and training of the 
decision-maker still remain significant constituents of 
success not only in decision making, but in every walk of life. 
However, these traditional methods have been inadequate and 
rather naive. Of these traditional methods, Mr. Simon (93, 
p. 13) writes, "We have not had, in the past, adequate know­
ledge of the processes that are involved in decision making in 
complex situations. Human thinking, problem solving, and 
learning have been mysterious processes which we have labeled 
but not explained. Lacking an understanding of these pro­
cesses, we have had to resort to gross techniques for 
improving nonprogrammed decision making; selection of men who 
have demonstrated their capacity for it; further development 
of their powers through professional training and planned 
experience; protection of nonprogrammed activity from the 
pressure of repetitive activity by establishing specialized 
organizational units to carry it on." These traditional 
methods had, perhaps, limited applicability and scope in com­
plicated situations, could not come to grips with complex 
logistics problems and required considerably more time and 
effort to put up the needed facts before the decision maker in 
the proper form. These difficulties with the traditional 
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methods coupled with the increasing use of quantitative 
methods in economics by the mathematicians and economists 
(econometricians) have been responsible for the emergence of 
the modern programmed techniques that have served to fill a 
void in the area of decision making. Of all the decision 
making techniques—traditional and modem—the methods 
referred to as 'Operations Research Techniques' constitute, 
by far, the most powerful tools available to the decision 
maker in helping and guiding him to take appropriate action 
through the use of mathematical, logical and scientific means. 
Operations research, its brief history, and definition and the 
reasons for undertaking this study of testing some selected 
operations research techniques to the special conditions of 
agriculture are the subject matter of the next chapter. 
il 
OPERATIONS RESEARCH—BRIEF HISTORY AND DEFINITION. 
WHY THIS STUDY? 
A Brief History 
The techniques of operations research owe their origin to 
the endeavour of applications of scientific, mathematical and 
logical principles to the solutions of the military problems. 
The birth of these methods may be traced to the writings of 
F. W. Lancaster, who, during the First World War, applied 
mathematical analysis to military operations. He studied 
relationships between victory of forces and their superiority 
in fire power and number. Presentation of a very simplified 
Lancaster model is interesting, if for nothing else, for its 
historical significance. 
Simplified Lancaster model 
Let there be two armies S and T fighting against each 
other. There are N soldiers in S and M in T with a fire power 
of n and m respectively. Lancaster assumed such an encounter 
of the two armies where n fire power of S was directed equally 
against members of T and vice versa. Then 
(1) Rate of loss of the army S = - ^  = cmT and 
dT (2) Rate of loss of force T = - " cnS 
where c is a constant and t is time. 
(3) He defines the equality of the strength of forces in 
this manner. According to him, S and T are equal in 
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strength if | • g= 1 . g. 
By (1) , (2) and (3), he got 
(4) nS2 = mT-2 
Therefore, if n>m, then S<T and vice versa. 
Thus he concluded that the strength of a force was 
proportional to its firepower multiplied by the square of its 
elements (i.e., soldiers). 
Subsequent developments 
Lancaster's work, in the nature of 'a priori* investiga­
tion, had little use for handling complicated problems and, 
therefore, no actual effect on operations in World War I. But 
it certainly was an useful prelude to the subsequently effec­
tive applications of operations research in World War II and 
later. During the Second World War, Professor P. M. S. 
Blackett (9), a Nobel Laureate, wrote two notes setting out 
some of the principles of operations research and the methods 
of analysis. Operations research groups were organized, first 
in Britain and then in the U.S.A., Canada and Australia. 
Operations research proved to be a valuable asset to the 
Allies in bringing them victory and, therefore, the U.S. 
military establishments continued and supported projects for 
the development of operations research even after the War was 
over. 
The association of military operations to the growth of 
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operations research does not mean that it can be or is exclu­
sively applied to military purposes. In fact. Professor 
Blackett (9), in his celebrated paper on 'Operational Research', 
clearly mentioned that operational research could "help us to 
tackle wisely some of the problems of peace". He was very 
much alive to the fact that in Economics techniques analogous 
to what he called 'Operational Research' were used and even 
said that the problems of analyzing war operations were nearer 
to problems in biology or economics than those in physics. 
However, it is not clear if at the time of its origin the use 
of operations research to the science of management was also 
envisaged. The increasing use of machines in the recent past 
has led to a rapid growth of enterprises, so much so that the 
task of management has become more and more complex and 
difficult. Hence, operations research has played an increas­
ingly important role in decision making in all fields of 
business activity such as transportation, manufacturing, 
purchasing and selling. Many big firms have their own cell of 
operation researchers. Operations research techniques have 
been used by government and social organizations for several 
widely varying purposes. The national planning in Puerto Rico 
is a case in point. "'Operation Bootstrap' has, in fact, 
transformed that country from an impoverished agricultural 
island to a thriving, semi-industrialized community with a 
standard of living which compares favourably with that of 
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other Latin American countries" (95) . By now operations 
research has established itself as one of the most important 
sciences in the field of business management. It not only 
helps in identifying different states and strategies of 
'nature'/ but also in listing alternative courses of action 
open to the decision maker and the outcomes associated with 
them, thus suggesting which strategy for him to choose and 
employ under a given set of circumstances. The question then 
arises, "What is operations research?" 
What is Operations Research? (Definitions and Concepts) 
Variously termed as 'Operational Research' (by Blackett 
and others in Britain), 'Operations Research', 'Operations 
Analysis' and 'Operations Evaluation', this science has been 
defined in different ways by different workers. Due to its 
diverse nature and wide variety of uses, it is difficult to 
find a definition which is simultaneously simple and 
satisfactory. One of the first definitions was proposed by 
Morse and Kimball (76) and was accepted in 1952 at the found­
ing meeting of the Operations Research Society of America. 
It is as follows: 
"Operations research is a scientific method of 
providing executive departments with a quantitative 
basis for decisions regarding the operations under 
their control" (76, p. 1). 
One of the conspicuous weaknesses of this definition is 
its failure to distinguish operations research from a number 
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of other disciplines related to business problems. The defini­
tion holds equally well even if we replace 'Operations 
Research' with 'Quality Control' or 'Cost Accounting'. 
Another definition of 'Operations Research' enumerates 
the various techniques like linear programming, nonlinear 
programming, theory of probability, queuing and inventory 
theories, PERT and CPM, etc. Some researchers do not agree 
with this and think that to define the science of operations 
research in terms of these methods is a mistake similar to 
that of defining 'medicine' as a collection of drugs used by a 
doctor to cure the illness. 
Still others have defined 'Operations Research' as a 
"quantitative commonsense", or "Operations Research is what 
operations research workers do". Needless to say that the 
latter definition, though technically correct, is rather 
ridiculous and fails to shed any light on the nature and con­
tents of the science of operations research. Simon (93) 
thought that a sociological definition of operations research 
was more understandable and defensible. According to him, 
"Operations research is a movement that, arising out of 
military needs of World War II, has brought the decision 
making problems of management within the range of interests of 
large numbers of natural scientists and, particularly, of 
mathematicians and statisticians." Regarding the place of 
operations research in Economics, he points out that, "The 
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operations researchers soon joined forces with mathematical 
economists who had come into the same area to the mutual 
benefit of both groups." Mr. Simon also found it hard to draw 
a meaningful line between operations research and management 
science. In my view, the former is a subset of the latter as 
the operations research techniques show us the ways but do not 
include act of final choice by the decision maker. The manage­
ment science includes both of these. 
According to Yates (111), "Operational Research consists 
of the application of scientific research to the problems 
arising in administration and planning....By 'methods of 
scientific research' I mean that combination of observation, 
experiment and reasoning (both deductive and inductive) which 
scientists are in the habit of using in their scientific 
investigations....Experiments form an integral part of 
operational research....'' 
Ackoff (1) defines an operation as a "set of acts required 
for the accomplishment of some desired outcome." He enumer­
ates four components of an organization, viz., communication, 
content, control and structure. According to him, "Control is 
a matter of directing the organization toward desired objec­
tives and it is obtained by efficient decision making by those 
who manage the operations. Assisting managers to control 
organizations (i.e., improving their decision making) has been 
an important objective of operations research. 
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To me, the science of operations research deals with 
attacking the problems, faced by the decision maker, through 
identifying the problem or problems in question, defining the 
alternatives available to him and also the various states of 
'nature', apprising him of the payoffs associated with each 
combination of the elements of these alternatives and 
strategies and then suggesting, to him, the best course of 
action obtained through the use of logic, mathematics and 
other sciences. This decision maker may be a business 
executive, a farmer, a physicist, an economist, a military 
officer, national planner or anyone else. This is illustrated 
in Figure 2. 
Components of Operations Research 
The important components (steps) of an operations 
research project are: 
1. Identification and formulation of the problem 
2. Defining the objective function to be optimized 
3. Construction of a mathematical model satisfying the 
constraints on the values of the variables 
4. Obtaining the empirical estimates of the parameters 
5. Solving the model and finding out the course or 
courses of action that would optimize the objective 
function 
Formulation of a mathematical model is perhaps the 
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Figure 2. Contents of operations research 
distinguishing component of operations research not found in 
the traditional methods of decision making. The form of a 
model may vary from a simple graph to a highly complex mathe­
matical relationship. According to Saaty (83), "The 
fundamental conceptual device which enables one to regard the 
operation as a whole is a model which is essentially a 
hypothesis. A model is an objective representation of some 
aspects of a problem by means of a structure enabling 
theoretical subjective manipulations aimed at answering cer­
tain questions about the problem. This representation which 
attempts to establish a correspondence between the problem and 
the rational thought, may be realized by forming a physical 
model, such as a wind tunnel for testing aircraft, or a 
theoretical model, such as equations immediately related to an 
operation." 
A model is an abstract formulation and, therefore, makes 
it easier to brood over and tackle the problem under considera­
tion. Perhaps the greatest utility of a mathematical model 
lies in its property of lending itself to generalization, i.e., 
a solution obtained in a given problem may well apply to 
another set of circumstances. The choice of the model to be 
used depends on several factors like the nature of the problem, 
available alternatives, objectives to be achieved, the nature 
and adequacy of data, types of tools available and the ability 
and competence of the worker handling these tools. 
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Important Operations Research Techniques 
The important tools used in operations analysis are: 
1. Mathematical programming 
(a) Linear programming 
(b) Nonlinear programming 
(c) Dynamic programming 
2. Game theory 
3. Probabilistic models 
(a) Queuing 
(b) Inventory control 
(c) Monte Carlo method 
4. Transportation models 
(special cases of linear programming) 
5. Simulation techniques 
6. Time-network analysis 
(a) PERT 
(b) CPM 
7. Sequential analysis 
8. Other methods 
(a) Input-output analysis 
(b) Capital budgeting 
(c) Forecasting 
(d) Theory of information 
(e) Searching processes 
The Study of Applications of 
Operations Research in Agriculture 
The work of Dr. Thornthwaite (100) 
One of the first, interesting and challenging applica­
tions of operations research in agriculture was by Dr. C. W. 
Thornthwaite on Seabrook farm during the years 1946-50. In 
1946, Seabrook farm had 7,000 acres of peas to be harvested 
for freezing and canning purposes. Returns from freezing the 
peas are greater than those from canning them. The best stage 
for freezing peas is to harvest and freeze them within a 
couple of days of their maturing. Those not harvested or 
frozen at the right time have to be canned thus bringing about 
a substantial reduction in profits of the farmer. The problems 
faced by the Seabrook farm were: 
(a) There was no scientific way to find out whether the 
peas had reached the right stage to be harvested for 
freezing. 
(b) At the time of maturity (i.e., whenever the manager 
thought that the peas were ready to be picked), even 
after using all the machine and manpower of the farm 
and working round the clock, the pickers could not 
keep up with the ripening peas. 
(c) During peak harvesting period, freezers could not 
keep pace with the pickers. Therefore, those peas 
which could not be frozen in time (within a couple 
of days of picking) had to be canned. 
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Dr. Thornthwaite tackled the first problem with the help 
of the evidence that the rate of growth and development of the 
plant depended on climatic factors. He calculated what he 
termed 'growth units' for each variety of peas. Further, on 
the basis of temperature, its intensity and duration, and 
other climatic factors, he calculated 'growth units' for a 
particular day, week or month. Thus when 'growth units' 
required for that variety of pea to mature had accumulated 
from the time of sowing, the proper stage of maturity of the 
peas to be picked had been reached. The last two problems 
were solved by establishing a planting schedule so that all 
peas on the farm would not mature at the same time. By sowing 
them in parts, at adequate time intervals, it was possible to 
harvest all peas at the proper time without undue strain on 
the labor since the peas matured on different dates. This 
example illustrates that it is observation, techniques, 
application and decision that are important for solving a 
problem of any nature. 
The work of Yates (111) 
In 1949, Yates (111) published a paper regarding the use 
of operational research made in the field of agriculture in 
the United Kingdom. 
During the Second World War, Great Britain had not only 
to expand its food supply through increased food production, 
but also to economize on its imports which included things 
n o 
like fertilizer needed to increase the agricultural production. 
These were conflicting situations and, therefore, it was 
necessary to cut down import to an extent that would not 
jeopardize agricultural production. Mr. Yates designed and 
conducted surveys with the objectives of finding out 
(a) the average response of different crops to different 
amounts of fertilizers and regional and other 
relevant differences in these responses; 
(b) how farmers actually used the fertilizers made 
available to them. 
Not only the amounts of various kinds of fertilizers to 
be imported were estimated, but account was taken of their 
availability, shipping, etc. 
The meaning and application of operational research in 
agriculture as given by Yates is rather narrow, limited to the 
sampling and surveys only, but it did serve the purpose of 
demonstrating that we can use methods in agriculture to give 
a picture of the situation on which sound action could be 
based. 
The Need and Scope of This Study 
Farming is quite different from the other conventional 
industries in many respects. Agriculture is an out-of-door 
occupation, greatly affected by natural factors like soil, 
climate, etc. The decisions have to be taken in a shorter 
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time in agriculture as compared to other industries. For 
example, a farmer is planning to hoe his crop tomorrow. All 
of a sudden there is a frost warning. He has to take immediate 
action to irrigate his crop to save it from damage by frost. 
Likewise, excess rain, severe draught and other natural 
phenomena may force him not only to take immediate decision, 
but also action. 
Farming is a biological phenomenon. The plants and 
animals are living and cannot be treated in the same manner 
as the output of industries like radio, books, tables, etc. 
In the United States and other developed nations, farming 
is commercialized and returns from agriculture may not be much 
lower than those in other industries. However, it is quite 
different in the developing nations. Farming is subsistence 
in nature, is a way of life and returns are lower than those 
in other industries. 
'Time-lag' is a peculiarity of agriculture tliat dis­
tinguishes it from other industries. Production is not 
instantaneous. After the crops have been sown, time must 
elapse before they can be harvested. In the case of young 
dairy cattle, other livestock and orchards, one has to wait, 
not for months, but for years before he can get any returns on 
his investment. The turnover is slower. 
Agricultural products are bulky and perishable in nature 
and, therefore, the problems of selling and storage in 
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agriculture are different from other industries. The produce 
has to be processed, in many cases, before it can be properly 
stored. Cold storage is required to keep fruits, potatoes, 
etc., fresh. Due to bulky nature of agricultural products, 
the size of storage plant has to be larger. 
All these and other peculiarities of agriculture are 
responsible for the difference in the nature of decision prob­
lems faced by a farmer and a company executive. For example, 
due to its being a biological phenomena and the time lag, 
there are cycles of over-production and under-production in 
agriculture. Hog cycles are an example of this. The price 
and yield variability is greater in farming. As pointed out 
elsewhere, the nature and extent of uncertainties in farming 
are quite different. 
The various operations research techniques mentioned 
above have been extensively used in solving widely different 
types of managerial and executive problems in military and 
business spheres. Some of these like linear programming have 
been applied to a considerable extent to farming as well. 
However, little has been done with regard to several other 
techniques to see as to how well they lend themselves to the 
decision-making process in agriculture, where problems are 
quite different from other industries as described above. The 
objective of this study is to examine the extent of suitability 
and applicability of some of the operations research 
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techniques to the special conditions obtaining in process of 
decision making in a farming enterprise. As it would be 
rather stupendous to attempt to test all the techniques, this 
study is confined to the following: 
1. Game Theory 
2. Mathematical Programming— 
Linear Fractional Functional Programming 
3. Network Analysis—PERT and CPM 
4. Queuing Theory 
Method of Study 
It is proposed in this study to give a brief summary of 
what has already been done in the field of application to 
agriculture of the technique or techniques under consideration. 
Then the techniques under discussion would be applied to the 
data both from the developed and developing countries. In 
some cases, hypothetical examples with realistic coefficients 
would be used. These applications would help us in finding 
the suitability of the different techniques for economies at 
different levels of development. Efforts will be made to 
indicate the special areas of farming enterprise where a 
particular technique of operations research could be applied 
with advantage. 
APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY IN AGRICULTURE 
Introduction 
Though the theory of games in its most elementary and 
rudimentary form can be traced back to the writings of Borel 
in the 1920's and some earlier papers written by J. von Neumann 
in 1928 and 1937, it was only in 1943-44 when that monumental 
work, "Theory of Games & Economic Behaviour", by J. von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgenstern (104) was published that the 'Game 
Theory' was put in its proper perspective. The book dealt 
with the development of a mathematical theory of games and its 
applications to the economic and sociological problems. Most 
of the-subsequent work in game theory has been an extension to 
and based on this work of von Neumann and Morgenstern. For 
example, in his "Statistical Decision Functions Which Minimize 
the Maximum Risk", Abraham Wald (105) drew heavily on the 
theory of 'two-person zero-sum game' to develop a theory of 
statistical decisions. Blackwell and Girshick (10), Dresher 
(30), Gale (34), Kuhn and Tucker (56), Luce and Raiffa (61), 
McKinsey (63), Wald (105) and Williams (110), to mention a few, 
have made significant contributions to the theory of games. 
Game theory models deal with the process of decision­
making by two or more opponents having conflicting interests, 
The success of one is the failure of the other. For example, 
in chess, as in any other game, the aim of each player is to 
defeat his opponent, to inflict on him the greatest loss or to 
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let him get away with the minimum of gain. There are a number 
of strategies available to each player of a game, but the 
choice of a strategy or strategies depends primarily on the 
existing conditions which, in part, are the functions of the 
strategies employed by the opponent. The common examples of 
games are chess, poker, bridge, matching pennies, checkers, 
tick-tack-toe, military confrontations, etc. 
The elements of a game are the players (having conflict­
ing interests), a code of rules for playing the game, and the 
pay-offs (gains or losses) associated with different combina­
tions of strategies or moves made by the players. 
Let A and B be the two players of a game. If S is the 
strategy space of player A and T the strategy space of player 
B and P the pay-off matrix, then game G = (S,T,P) is a triplet. 
S = (Sj^ Ii = 1,2,3* • «n) 
T = (tjIj = 1,2••«m) 
Then P matrix has elements p^^ (i = 1,2•••n and j = 1,2••«m); 
P is n X m matrix; and p^j is the pay-off to player A associ­
ated with his ith strategy when B employs his jth strategy. 
Illustration 1 
Two players A and B are playing this game. Each player 
can show either one or two fingers and both players are 
required to show them simultaneously. Further, suppose that 
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if the number of fingers shown by each player is identical, 
player A wins from B an amount (in pennies) equal to the total 
of the fingers shown by the two; otherwise, he is required to 
pay to B pennies equal to the total number of fingers shown by 
both. Thus the pay-off matrix from the viewpoint of player A 
is: 
B 
ti tg 
-3 
-3 
where Sj and s 2 are the two strategies of A such that when he 
employs Sj he shows one finger and if he uses s2 he shows two 
fingers. Similarly, tj and t2 are the two strategies of B 
in which he shows one and two fingers, respectively. So the 
strategy set of player A is (si,s2) and that of B is (ti,t2). 
If player A chooses to play s^ and B plays t^, A receives 
tv70 pennies from B. Therefore, pjj = 2. Similarly, P22 = 4, 
Pi 2 = -3, P21 = -3. 
Two Person Zero-Sum Game 
The simplest form of a game is a "two-person zero-sum" 
game. As the term indicates, the game is played only by two 
players. One player's loss is equal to the other's gain and 
that is why the name 'zero-sum'. If P (with elements Pj_j) is 
the pay-off matrix from the viewpoint of player A and Q (with 
elements q^^ry^s the pay-off matrix of the same game from 
player B's viewpoint, then p^^j = -q^j In our example, the 
pay-off to B would be of the following form: 
B 
A 
-2 
-4 
Clearly p^^ = -q^j. 
The importance of the study of a "zero-sum" game lies in 
that any game can be reduced to a zero-sum game. As p^^^ = 
-q\j, the study and analysis of game theory, in general, and 
any game in particular can be done by considering matrix P 
only. From now on throughout this work, unless otherwise 
specified, we shall always be writing a pay-off matrix from 
the viewpoint of player A, whose strategies are represented 
by the rows of P. 
The Maxi-min and Mini-max Strategies 
The pay-off to player A, as a result of his employing his 
maxi-min strategy is equal to'max min p... Similarly, the 
i j 
mini-max strategy for B results in the pay-off equal to 
min max p... 
4 i 
-5 1 
The logic of why a player employs his maxi-min or 
mini-max strategy can best be illustrated by an example. We 
will assume throughout our study of game theory (unless 
specified otherwise) that each player has full knowledge of 
all the previous moves of his own and those of his opponent 
at the time of making a decision for his kth move. We also 
assume that a player is rational and would therefore, try to 
play in manner as to make maximum gain or hold his opponent to 
a pay-off which represents the minimum loss to himself (i.e., 
minimum gain to the opponent). 
Illustration 2 
Let the pay-off matrix P be the following for a game 
between A and B. 
B 
ti tg t3 tij ts 1^ = min p^j 
Si 5 8 7 9 12 5 
S2 15 12 9 17 18 9 
S3 11 6 8 7 9 6 
Sif 8 4 - 2 5 15 2 
15 12 9 17 18 
The goal of A is to maximize his gains at the least possible 
risk to himself, whereas B's aim is to minimize his own losses, 
i.e., hold A to a minimum of gain. 
In our example, if A chooses to play his first strategy. 
Si, then the worst that B can do to A is to play t^, thus 
limiting the pay-off to 5 to A. In other words, min p.. = 5. j 1] 
Similarly, if A plays S2, B can minimize his (B's) loss 
by choosing tg and the corresponding pay-off would be 9. Thus 
if we denote 1. = min p.. = minimum over j in the ith row, we 
1 j 13 
have, 
1% = min p^ . =5 
j 
12 = min p,. = 9 
j 
13 = min p_. = 6 
^ j ^3] 
lit = min p^j = 2 
Now the question arises as to which strategy should A 
choose if he has to make the first move. If we look at it 
carefully, we will notice that A will choose to play s2 
because in this case he is assured of a pay-off of at least 9. 
If he plays any strategy other than S2, his gain can be 
reduced to as low as 5 (if he plays s^), 6 (if he uses S3) and 
2 (if he plays s^). These (5,6,2) are less than 9. Therefore 
9 is the maximum of the minimum (called maxi-min) and S2 is 
A's maxi-min strategy. 
Now let us look at this game from a different angle. 
Suppose now that B has to move first. If B plays t^, the 
worst that A can do to him is to play S2, thus inflicting a 
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loss of 15 on B; i.e., max p., =15. If we let h. = max p.. 
i ii ] i 
(i.e., maximum in the jth column), then 
hi = max p.^ = 15 
i 
h2 = max p^2 ~ 12 
h 3 = max p.- = 9 
i 
h:j = max p. . = 17 
i 
h5 = max Pj^g = 18 
For B, t3 is the safest (best) strategy because in that 
case, the worst that A can do to B is to play s2 and inflict 
on B a loss of 9. However, the choice of any strategy other 
than tg on the part of B may result in a greater gain to A 
and, therefore, a greater loss to him. For example, if B 
plays ti and A chooses to play s2 (which he must being 
rational), the loss to B would be to the tune of 15 (greater 
than 9). The same holds true for t2, ti^ and tg. Therefore, 
B tries to minimize hj over j and in our example, the 
min h. = hq = 9. This is the minimum of the maximum and to is 
B's mini-max strategy. Thus for A, the maxi-min strategy is 
s 2 and 
max min p.. = max 1. = 9. 
i i 1] i 1 
Similarly for B, mini-max strategy is t^ and 
M U •» 
min max p.. = min h. = 9. j i j 3 
Let 
max 1. = L and min h. = H. 
i ^ i ] 
In our example, L = H = 9 is called the value of the game. 
Note that 9 is the minimum in its row (row 2) and maximum in 
its column (column 3) and, therefore, P23 = 9 is a saddle 
point for the game. 
P(x,y) 
Figure 3. Diagram of a saddle point 
The strategies that result in a saddle point are called 
"optimal" or "equilibrium" strategies. In our example, 
(S2,t3) is a set of optimal strategies. It is interesting to 
note that the first subscript of the saddle point P23 is the 
same as the subscript of the optimal strategy of A and the 
second subscript 3 is the same as the subscript of the 
optimal strategy of B. It should always be kept in mind that 
1. < h. for all i and j. 1 - 3  
Finite and Infinite Games 
If the number of elements in S and T is finite, the game 
is also finite. If S and T contain infinite number of 
elements, the game is said to be infinite. 
Two finger morra, tick-tack-toe, stone paper scissors, 
etc., are the games of finite type. Missile race, war between 
two nations, some search type games are the examples of 
infinite games. In agriculture, for example, the states of 
nature in terms of climatic conditions can be broadly termed 
as finite. However, the game can be converted into an infinite 
game when the state of nature is subdivided into infinite 
number of categories if very minute differences in temperature 
prevailing on different days and different time, precipitation, 
length of the growing period allowed by nature in different 
years, duration and frequency of heat and cold waves and their 
intensity, etc., are taken into account to describe different 
states of nature. Thus, whether a game is finite or infinite 
also depends on the criteria by which the strategies are 
distinguished and the extent of (range of) tolerance limits 
describing a particular state of nature. 
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Pure and Mixed Strategies 
In Illustration 2 (pp 31-35) we noted that both A and B 
used only one of the strategies available to each of them. A 
used S2 and B tg. Also there existed a saddle point P23. 
Such games are called 'strictly determined games', 'games of 
pure strategy', or 'simple games'. 
However, it is not always necessary that a saddle point 
may exist. In such cases, the players do not have optimal 
pure strategies but rather a mixture of different strategies 
available to them with some probability attached to each (by 
some chance mechanism), If we define n-dimensional simplex 
S^ in n-dimensional Euclidean space as 
S n X 
n 
and similarly if we define m-dimensional simplex in E^ 
(m-dimensional Euclidean space) as 
T Y 
m 
Then these x^ and y^ can be interpreted as probability 
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distributions for different components of S and T. The point 
= (0,0,•••1,00,0) where x^ = 1 in the ith place and 
zero elsewhere is the pure strategy of player A. Similarly, 
the point y^ = (0,0,••^,1,0,•••O) in T^ is the pure strategy 
of player B. And 0(G) = (S^,T^,P(x,y)) is called the mixed 
extension of the game G = (S,T,P) where 
nm 
p(x,y) = IIx y p 
ij 1 : 13 
is called the expected pay-off if A plays his ith strategy 
with probability Xj^ and B employs his jth strategy with 
probability y^. Note that 
—m 
P(ifY) = I 
j=l ^ 
n 
P(x,j) = I XiPij 
i=l 
and, therefore. 
n m 
P(x,y) = I x.P(i,y) = I y.P(x,j) 
i=l ^ j=l ^ 
The pay-off matrix of Illustration 1 is an example of a 
game without a saddle point. 
B 
ti tg 
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Suppose that the rules of the game (in Illustration 1) 
require that one player shows his fingers first and then the 
other player shows his. Given this, if A is the maxi-
minimizer, he has to make the first move and plays his first 
strategy, i.e., s^. Since B has a knowledge of this before he 
makes his move, it is clear that he will employ his second 
strategy, t2. Likewise, if A uses S2, B would gain the 
maximum by using tj. Thus for A, 
min p . = Pi 2 = -3 
j 
min Pgj = P21 = -3 
and the 
max min p. . = L = p^2 = P 2 1  = -3 
i j 
Similarly for B, 
max p. = Pii = 2 
i 
max p^2 = P22 - 4 
i 
and 
min max p. . e  M = p, , = 2 
j i ^3 
Since L 5^ H, the game does not have a saddle "point and the 
players will mix their _sj^ategies with some probabilities 
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rather than using their pure strategies. 
The principle in the case of mixed strategies is the same 
as that in pure strategies. Let the value of the mixed exten­
sion of G [which we termed as 6(G)] be called V(8). Then A 
will try to mix his strategies in a manner that 
max min p(x,y) > V(0) 
X y 
Similarly, B will try to play his strategies with probabilities 
Yj such that 
min max p(x,y) < V(6) 
y X 
In a finite game, 
max min p(x,y) = min max p(x,y) = V(8) 
X y y X 
For our example let xj be the probability attached to sj 
and X2 to sg. In our example, as there are only two 
strategies, xj + X2 = 1 or X2 = 1 - Xj. If yi is the proba­
bility attached by B to t^ and y2 = 1 ~ Yi to t2, then 
(%l)(Pll) + (X2) ( P 2 1 )  =  (Xi)(Pi2) +  (X2) ( P 2 2 )  = V( 8 )  I 
and — 
(yi)(Pll) + ( Y 2 ) ( P 1 2 )  =  (Yl)( P 2 1 )  +  ( Y 2 ) ( P 2 2 )  =  V( 0 )  II 
Substituting (l-Xj), for X2 and values of p.. in I, we have 
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2xi + (l-Xi)(-3) = (xi)(-3) + (l-xi)4 
or 
Xi = , Xg = ^ and V(0) = - ^  
Similarly, 
Yl = ' Yz = V{6) = - ^  
In practice very few games have solutions with pure 
strategies. Generally a mixture of strategies has to be 
employed to reach a value of the game. 
Games in the Normal and Extensive Forms 
Games of the form G = (S,T,P) fall into the category of 
'normal' games. The components of this form of game, as we 
have seen, are a given set of players, sets of pure strategies 
available to each of these players and the pay-offs that 
result from the particular strategies employed by the players 
out of their strategy sets. 
The games in the 'extensive' form are represented by 
means of a game tree. A game tree has nodes, branches and 
terminal pay-offs resulting from a combination of moves by the 
players. Each node of the tree represents a move and is 
characterized by the fact that at each node a player has a 
certain amount of information available to him with regard to 
what has already happened up to the point this move is to be 
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made by him. These are, therefore, termed as 'information 
sets' of a player. A player may have all the information 
about the happenings just preceding his present move. In this 
case his move is based on what is termed as 'perfect informa­
tion' . His information set is called a "perfect information 
set" and the game where all the information sets available to 
all the players are 'perfect' is called a "perfect information 
game". Every perfect information game has a pure value and, 
therefore, a saddle point. 
However, in many cases, the player may not be aware of 
all the events to the point of making his present move. Then 
his move is not based on a perfect information. Such an 
information set is an 'imperfect information set' and the 
games involving such sets are called "imperfect information" 
games. 
Illustration of a perfect information game 
The following example, though very arbitrary, would serve 
the purpose. The game is as follows: 
a. Player F has two rectangular pieces A and B. The 
initial position of his pieces is such that A is on 
Square No. 1 and B on Square No. 3. 
b. Player G (his opponent) has two round pieces C and 
D with C on the 7th and D on the 9th square before 
the start of the game. 
c. F starts the game and has to make the first move. 
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Player F 
A 
1 2 
B 
3 
4 5 6 
© 
7 8 
© 
9 
Player G 
Figure 4. Initial positions of F and G 
d. Both players can move only vertically. They cannot 
move horizontally or diagonally. 
e. Jumping is allowed. If a piece belonging to a player 
jumps a piece of his opponent, the latter loses his 
jumped piece. 
fr The game is over as soon as a piece is mumped and the 
player whose piece jumps over the opponent's piece 
wins the game. 
g. The loser pays the winner $1. 
h. Each player, before he makes his ith move, has a 
full knowledge (perfect information) of all the 
previous moves that have been made. This can be had 
by looking at the position of pieces on the board. 
The following are the possible moves: 
I. Player F's first move will be one of the following: 
I.i. Move A to 4th square. 
I.ii. Move B to 6th square. 
II. G's first move will depend on the first move of F; 
i.e., whether F's move was I.i or I.ii. 
1. In case of I.i, G can either, 
(a) jump C over A to Square No. 1. Call it 
I.i.a. Then the game is over and won by G. 
or 
(b) move D to Square No. 6. Call it move I.i.b. 
2. In the event of move I.ii., G can either, 
(c) Move C to Square No. 4. Call it move I.ii.c. 
(d) Jump D over B to Square No. 3. The game is 
won by G. This is move I.ii.d. 
III. F's second move. It will depend on his initial moves 
I.i and I.ii and also whether G made his (a), (b), 
(c) or (d) move. 
(e) In case of I.i.a. No further move as the 
game won by G. 
(f) In case of I.i.b. F jumps B over D to Square 
No. 9. This is move I.i,b.f. The game won 
by F. 
(g) In case of I.ii.c. F jumps A over C to 
Square No. 7. Call it move I.ii.e.g. The 
game won by F. 
(h) In case of I.ii.d. No move by F as he has 
already lost the game to G. 
All the moves described above can be represented in the 
form of a game tree (see Figure 6). The pay-offs are shown 
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Figure 5. Possible moves by F and G 
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TERMINALS OF THE 
GAME WITH CORRESPONDING 
FAY OFF 
BRANCHES 
Xii)) 
NODE_ 
POINTS 
I |-F's MOVE 
O" G's MOVE 
Figure 6. Game tree with perfect information sets 
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from F's viewpoint. (If we want to show the pay-offs from G's 
point of view, the tree will remain the same, only the signs 
of pay-offs will be reversed.) 
"T~| , are the node points of the 
tree. The rectangles represent the possible moves that F 
might make and the circles represent the possible moves of G. 
Only one player makes a move at a given node point. A 'move' 
in a game tree consists of _going from one node point to 
another higher node points- The numbers in the node points 
represent the information sets of the two players as we shall 
explain later. 
Let us study the tree. At | 1 | (his first move), F has 
two alternatives—(i) or (ii)—available to him. Thus, 
alternatives open to a player at a given node point are repre­
sented by the number of branches that emanate from that node 
point. If F chooses (i), G has two alternatives, a or b, and 
that is why two branches from (^. If he chooses (a), he wins 
the game and, therefore, the pay-off to F is-$l. However, if 
G chooses (b) , then F makes his move (f) and wins $1. There­
fore, the pay-off is shown to be +1. Similarly we can analyze 
the game when F's initial move is (ii) . It would be worth 
noting that (1) if both players are rational and (2) if F 
makes the first move, player G always wins $1 and F always 
loses $1. 
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Information sets 
At (^ •/ the information set available to player G is 
different from that at (^ • At r G knows that F has made 
move (i) and at (^, G knows that F's move was (ii) which is 
different from (i), and that is why the difference in the 
information set. Similarly at 2 , F knows that while his 
initial move was (i), G's move was b; whereas at 3 , his 
information set consists of his knowledge that his initial 
move was (ii) followed by move c on G's part. Thus each number 
in the node point denotes a different information set. In a 
game of perfect information, the total of node points for each 
player is equal to the total number of his information sets. 
Since our example is of a perfect information game, we find 
that there are 3 node points representing 3 possible moves of 
player F and his information sets are also 3 in number. Like­
wise, G has 2 node points and 2 information sets. 
As we shall see later, in the case of 'games of imperfect 
information', the number of information sets of a player is 
less than the number of node points corresponding to his moves. 
At some of his node points the same information may be avail­
able to a player and then all such node points are assigned 
the same number denoting the same information set. 
From extensive to normal form 
All the games in the extensive form can be converted into 
those of a normal form. We shall show this for the game tree 
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drawn in our example. 
Since there are 3 information sets of F, his strategy set 
3~l ) . At would consist of moves ( 1 
has two alternatives, (i) or (ii); but at 
, he 
he has only 
one move, (f); and at 3 , he has only (g) open to him. 
Similarly, the strategy set for player G will consist of i(^ r 
(^) . At he can either make move (a) or (b) and at 
he can choose between (c) and (d). 
The strategies of F then are (i, f, •) and (ii, •, g) 
where • represents a void (not available) strategy. It means 
and, therefore. that if F chooses i at 1 , then 
alternative (g) is out of the question. If he chooses (ii) at 
and, therefore, (f) does not come into 1 , then move 
the picture. 
The strategies of G can also be found out in the same 
fashion. The 4 strategies open to him are: (a,c), (b,d), 
(a,d) and (b,c) . 
The strategies and the corresponding pay-offs are shown 
in the pay-off matrix P shown on the following page. 
According to the rules of the game, F always makes the 
first move and loses if player G is rational; if F uses s^, G 
will always employ t^ or t2 and win $1. If F plays S2, G will 
use either tg or ti^. It may be pointed out that if G started 
the game, he would always lose. 
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G 
ti tg tg 
\ (5) 
\© 
(I 1 1 2 1 3 |K 
"o 
fU fts 
"o 
À  
H = 
Si = (i,f, •) 
-1 -1 1 1  -1 
S2 = (ii,•,g) 1 1 -1 -1 -1 
max p.. = h. 
i 1] ] 1 1 1 1 
Illustration of an imperfect information game 
In an imperfect information game, either some information 
is withheld from the players or a chance move is involved. 
Most of the games requiring simultaneous moves by the players 
are games of imperfect information. The two-finger game 
described earlier is an example of such a game. Since both 
the players in that example are required to show their fingers 
simultaneously, they do not know about the move of the other 
player. The tree of such a game is given in Figure 7. 
It is worth noting that since B does not have any know­
ledge as to whether A will show one or two fingers, his 
information sets on both node points (representing his move) 
are identical. As pointed out earlier, if two node points 
belonging to a player have identical information sets, the 
game is an 'imperfect information game'. 
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-3 -3 +4 
0/ SIMILAR INFORMATION \(T» SETS 
CHANCE MOVE BY PLAYER A 
CHANCE MOVE BY PLAYER B 
Figure 7. Game tree with imperfect information sets 
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Symmetric Games—A Special Form of Matrix Games 
The games having the pay-off matrix P with the property 
that p.. = -p.. are called 'symmetric games'. Since such a 
1 J J 1 
matrix is known as 'skew-symmetric' matrix, the symmetric 
games are sometimes also called as 'skew-symmetric' games. 
The most important properties of a symmetric game are: 
(a) the value of a symmetric game is zero, and 
(b) the optimal strategy sets for both players of a 
symmetric game are identical. 
Therefore, if we can find out the optimal strategy set X® for 
player A, then we have automatically found out the optimal 
strategy set Y® for B. 
The usefulness of symmetric games lies in the fact that 
every game can be associated with a symmetric game. One of 
the most common symmetric games associated with a game having 
an n X m pay-off matrix P takes the following form. 
n m 1 
n 0 P -1 
II 3
 
-P' 0 1 
1 1 -1 0 
The pay-off matrix P of this symmetric game is of the dimen­
sions m+n+1 X m+n+1. 
The solution of the symmetric game is used in the follow­
ing manner to find out the optimal strategy sets and solution 
5? 
of the original game (with pay-off matrix P): 
Let the optimal strategy for symmetric game P be equal to 
(xO,YO,A ) such that 
X °  =  ( X i , X 2 , ' ' ' , X ^ )  
and 
= ( Y i r Y i , -  "  , Y ^ )  
if 
= IY-! = K>0 
i ^ i ] 
(because we know that x^ > 0 for all i, y^ > 0 for all j, and 
that the set of optimal strategies for both players A and B is 
the same). Then the game with pay-off matrix P has a solution 
v O  y O  
such that ~ is optimal for A, — is optimal for B, and K Ia  
^ / y 0 ^ 0 \ ^ 
•• is the optimal solution for the original game; i.e., i\ 
the optimal strategy set for game with pay-off matrix P is 
'• K ' K ' K • 
Some Basic Results (Theorems) in Game Theory 
The purpose of giving some of the fundamental results in 
game theory here is to help the reader find the reasons for 
using certain methods in solving games and to provide him with 
a greater insight to game theory. No attempt has been made to 
5 3 
provide the proofs, since this step is outside the scope of 
this study. These results presented are in terms of finite 
games only. Most of these results also hold for mixed exten­
sion of G. 
Let G = (SfTfP) where P has elements p. . with dimensions 
n X m. Let 
Then 
1. = min p.. 
j 
h. = max p. . 
H = min max p.. = min h. 
i i -1: i : 
L = max min p.. = max 1. 
i i 1] i "• 
1. 1^ < hj for all i and j. 
2. When L = H, the game has a pure value, V and L=H=V. 
This is called the mini-max theorem. 
3. If (s°,t°) is an optimal solution of G and G has a 
pure value V, then V = P(s°,t°). 
4. (s°,t°) is a saddle point of G if, and only if, 
P(s,t°) < P(s°,t°) < P(s°,t) for all ssS and teT. 
As would appear from the above, 
a. If (s°,t°) is an optimal solution for G, 
then it is a saddle point and vice versa. 
b. If (s°,t°) and (so,to) are saddle points of 
G, then (s°,to) and (so,t°) are also saddle 
points of G. 
5. Every perfect information game has a pure value. 
6. If G is a finite game such that 
n 
I Pi _) = a for all j (j = 1 , 2 ,  
i=l 
m) 
m 
b for all i (i = 1 , 2  ,n) 
then 
(a) (m) (b)(n) and b a 
n 
V .  
m 
7. Two games G = (S,T,P) and G' = (S',T',P') are equal 
if y and only if, 
a. Vg = Vg, and 
b. sets of optimal strategies in both games are 
identical. 
8. A perfect information finite game has a saddle point. 
Different Methods of Solving the Finite Games 
Method No. 1. Use of maxi-min and mini-max strategies— 
algebric solution 
Existence of pure mini-max and maxi-min strategies and, 
therefore, a saddle point Here both players start with the 
premise that their opponent knows their strategy before making 
his move and will, therefore, succeed in inflicting on them 
the greatest loss possible under the circumstances. Therefore, 
maxi-minimizer looks over the minimum gain or maximum loss 
that may be allowed to him by his opponent and then chooses 
either the strategy that allows him maximum of the minimum 
gains from different strategies (maxi-minimizer) or (in case 
he is a loser) the strategy which minimizes the maximum loss. 
This is done in the following fashion. 
Suppose there are two players A and B playing against 
each other. Let the pay-off matrix of the game from the view­
point of player A be P with elements p^^ (i = l,2,**',n; 
j = l,2f''',m). Further, if S = (sj,S2/•••,s^) is the 
strategy space of A and T = (tj,t2,•••,t^) is the strategy 
space of B, then A will first of all find out the minimum 
value in each row (ith row represents the pay-off to A when he 
employs s^). 
Let min p^^ = 1^, then (Ij ,l2, • • *1^1^, • • *1^) are the 
minimum values of payoffs in rows 1, 2, •••i, •••n, 
respectively. Then A examines the values of 1^ and chooses 
the strategy whose 1. is maximum in value. Suppose L = max 1. 
^ i ^ 
= I5, then under this method A will always play S5, his fifth 
pure strategy. The philosophy behind this sort of approach 
is that one starts to plan his play with the assumption that 
his opponent is going to do the worst to him. That is why he 
looks at the lowest payoff to himself for every strategy. 
He (A) then picks up the best of the worst, i.e., maximum of 
the minimum. 
The other player (B) tries to minimize his loss to A. 
Payoffs to A due to B's jth strategy t^ are given in the jth 
column of P and assuming that his opponent A will try to 
inflict on him the greatest loss, he finds out as to what 
would be the maximum that he will have to pay to A if he uses 
his jth strategy. 
Let h. = max p. ., then h^,h2,••«h.,••«h are the maximum 
J 1J ]  ^ 
of the payoffs (losses to B) in columns 1, 2, •••j, • • «m, 
respectively. Since he tries to minimize his payment to A, 
he chooses the strategy j*^ such that min h. = h.g = H. For 
j ^ ^ 
example, if j° = 2, then B can always be sure that if he uses 
t2r the maximum loss to him will be no more than the minimum 
of the maximum loss for each t.. Thus to is B's mini-max ] 
strategy. 
By our assumption of existence of a saddle point, H = L = 
value of the game and if s 5 is optimal pure strategy of A and 
t2 is optimal pure strategy for B, the value of the game will 
be the payoff at P5 2» Illustration 2 (given earlier) is a 
numerical example of using this method. 
Mixed strategies If P does not have a saddle point, 
the players mix their strategies with some probabilities. The 
principle is the same as for pure strategies. In fact, pure 
strategies are a special case of mixed strategies. In pure 
strategy case, the probability of using the mini-max and maxi-
min strategy is one and is zero for the other strategies of 
both the players. When strategies are mixed, positive 
J / 
probabilities are assigned by each player to more than one of 
his own strategies. (Please see page 37.) The algebraic 
method of calculating these probabilities has already been 
illustrated on pages 39 and 40. 
Dominated and dominant strategies The process of 
finding mini-max and maxi-min strategies, especially if the 
game does not have a pure value, becomes very cumbersome if 
the size of the pay-off matrix is very large. In most cases 
it is possible to reduce the size of the matrix by using the 
method of deleting the strictly dominated rows and strictly 
dominating columns from P. 
Definition: Row i' is strictly dominated by row i iff 
for all j, p.. > p.,.. Column j strictly 
^ J ^ J 
dominates column j' iff for all i, 
Pij' ^ Pi]' 
The reason for deleting the strictly dominated rows and 
strictly dominating columns may be illustrated by a simple 
example given below. 
Let A and B play a game with the following pay-off matrix 
from the viewpoint of A. 
B 
tz t3 
Si 15 16 10 
S2 22 19 5 
S3 12 3 9 
RP 
By using the conventional xnini-inax and maxi-min principles, we 
see that s^ is the optimal pure strategy of A, tg for B, and 
the value of the game is 10. 
However, on looking at the pay-off matrix more closely, 
we note that A will always prefer to play s^ over S3 since 
Pjj > Pgj for all j. By the same token, B will always prefer 
ta over ti as for all i, p^^ > i.e., his payment to A is 
always less in tg than that in t^ for all i. Therefore, S3 is 
obsolete for A and t^ is obsolete for B and both can be 
deleted from S and T without changing the outcome of the game. 
Thus the original matrix can be reduced to the following form: 
B 
16 10 
19 5 
As would appear, the value of the game again is 10. In fact, 
we could further delete t2 as t2 in the above reduced matrix 
dominates t3. Then the pay-off matrix will be reduced to 
B 
t3 
Si 
32 
10 
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F2 can again be reduced by throwing out s2 as it is 
dominated by s^ and the value of the game equal to 10 can thus 
be found out, in many cases, by successive deletion of dominat­
ing columns and dominated rows. 
The question then arises whether 'weakly' dominated rows 
and 'weakly' dominating columns could be dealt with in the 
same manner and whether this would deplete X° and Y°, the 
optimal mixed strategy sets of A and B. The answer to both 
questions is "yes". However, before giving any illustration 
of the deletion of weakly dominated rows and weakly dominating 
columns, it seems in order that they are defined here. 
Definition: Row i weakly dominates row i' if, and only 
if, p.. > p.,. for all j and p.. > p.,. for 
^ 1 3  -  x ' 3  ^ 1 ]  1 3  
at least one j for i and i' belonging to P. 
Similarly, column j of P is weakly dominated 
by column j' if p^j < p^j, for all i and 
p. . < p.., for at least one i. 1^] 1^]' 
We shall use the principle of deleting weakly dominated rows 
and weakly dominating columns for a 4 x 5 pay-off matrix P 
given on the next page. 
Steps in reducing the matrix P; 
1. Delete s^ as it is weakly dominated by s2 and Si+, and 
get Pi. 
2. We get P2 by deleting t2 and tg and both of them 
dominate tj. 
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tl t2 tg t n  ts 
Si 11 18 15 14 19 
S2 15 19 15 14 25 
S3 5 11 16 9 8 
s. 18 18 15 19 26 
3. P3 is obtained by deleting S2 from P2 as S2 is 
dominated by Si+ in P2. 
4. Delete ti^ from P3 as it dominates tj. 
By doing the above four operations on P we finally get P^ 
which is very easily solved with the following optimal 
solution; = (0, 0, , yO = {^, 0, 0, 0), and the 
213 
value of the game is -yg-. 
tl t2 
Pi 
t3 ti+ ts tl 
Pz 
ta tit tl 
P3 
ts tit 
P4 
tl t3 
S2 15 19 15 14 25 S2 15 15 14 S3 5 16 9 S3 5 16 
S3 5 11 16 9 8 S3 5 16 9 Sif 18 15 19 Sit 18 15 
S4 18 18 15 19 26 S4 18 15 19 
Still more useful application of the 'principle of 
dominance' lies in the property that if a matrix P can be 
partitioned in the following manner 
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where Pj, P2f P3/ P4 are the submatrices of P. Further, if 
every row of P2 is strictly dominated by some rows of P^ or 
some convex combinations of the rows of Pi and if columns or 
some convex combination of columns of Pi is strictly dominated 
by every column of P3, then P2, Pg, Pi^ may be deleted and the 
solution for Pi will also be the solution for the game with 
pay-off matrix P. For example, the pay-off matrix P does not 
have a saddle point and, therefore, mixed strategies will be 
used. Moreover, there are no dominated rows or dominating 
10 
3 
6 
5 
7 I 
- 4 -
5 I 2 
4 ' 18 
13 
7 
5 
1 
columns. Solving such a game is rather complicated. However, 
if P is subdivided into Pi, P2, P3 and P^ such that 
P i  =  
10 4 6 5 9 13 2 5 
P2 = P3 - P4 = 
3 7 5 4 8 7 18 1 
Let yjj) represent the element in the ith row and jth 
column of the kth submatrix. Then, for example, 
( 1 )  
Yll = 10 , 
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= 13 , 
= 18 , and 
= 4 . 
If we calculate, we find that 
and also > 
+ (^3(^22^ > yiV also > 
Thus some convex combination of rows of dominates every row 
of P2. Further, 
(Yl2^) > Yii^ and also > 
and 
+ (|)(Y22M > rjp and also > yji) 
Therefore, some convex combination of columns of P3 
dominates every column of P^. We can, therefore, delete P2, 
P3, Pi^ and just solve P^. This is much simpler than solving P. 
The optimal solution for Pj is 
^ ^ Value = ^ . 
The solution in terms of the game with pay-off matrix P can, 
then, be written in the following manner: 
, ( 3 )  
1 2 
Y  (4) 
''21 
y( 2 )  
' 2 2  
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~ (A' 
(Tn'TnT'®'®) -0 -
Value = -TTT 58 10 
Method No. 2, Solution of games in the extensive form 
If we have a tree set up for a game, the solution is 
obtained rather easily. Again the pay-offs are given from A' 
viewpoint. The algorithm for solving the game then can be 
stated as follows. 
Start from the terminal pay-offs and proceed down the 
tree in the following fashion: 
— (a) Maximize at the node point belonging to the 
maxi-minimizer, i.e., A. 
(b) Minimize at mini-maximizer's (B's) node points. 
Let us solve the problem whose tree is sketched on 
page 45. We start from the top of this tree and first come 
across node points 2 and belonging to A. As the 
pay-offs are shown for A (and he is the maxi-minimizer), we 
maximize at his node points and minimize at B's. Therefore, 
we maximize at and From there 
emerges only one branch (f) which terminates in a pay-off of 
+$1. So the maximum value at node point is +$1. 
Similarly at 3 , we have a value of +$1. 
Now comes B's turn, whose node points are and (^. 
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He minimizes at his node point. There are two branches from 
and two from . At , he has a choice between pay-off 
of -$1 and +$1 to A. Naturally he chooses the minimum of the 
two, i.e., -$1, which he does when he makes move (a). For 
he chooses (d) with a pay-off of -$1 to A. 
Again it is A's turn at from which emanate two 
branches—i and ii. He chooses one with the maximum, but 
since in our example the pay-offs at and node points 
(which are connected to 1 [ by i and ii) are the same (-$1 
in each case), A is indifferent between the two and the value 
at the lowest node point (root of the tree) is -$1. This 
value at the root of the tree is the value of the game. For 
our example the value of the game is -$1. 
If we denote the branches showing the strategies chosen 
by each player by, say, thick line (just for the sake of 
distinction), the sequence in this thick line—which is 
continuous from the root of the tree to the terminal pay-off— 
shows the set of strategies followed by the two players. For 
example, in our case, it is either (i,a) or (ii,d); i.e., if 
A uses i, then B uses a and if A employs ii, B will use d. 
In case of chance moves, we multiply the pay-offs by 
their respective probabilities and the values so obtained are 
then used for maximization at A's and minimization at B's node 
points in the manner described above. 
Figure 8 is an illustration of the game tree (page 45) 
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+ 1 +1 
F's MOVE 
(2) G's MOVE 
OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 
O VALUE OF THE GAME 
Figure 8. Optimal strategies and value of a game in extensive 
form 
6 6 
with the maximum and minimum values at different node points 
and the optimal solution (value) of the game. 
Method No. Geometric methods 
If the pay-off matrix is n x 2 or 2 x m, the game can be 
rather easily solved with the help of geometry. Geometric 
methods are most conducive to a matrix whose vectors (either 
rows or columns) belong to the space, though they can also 
be used for n x 3 and 3 x m matrix games. 
The two most commonly used geometric methods are: 
a. Line-envelop construction and 
b. Sliding wedge construction. 
The former is easier to picture and, therefore, is the more 
common of the two. 
Line-envelop construction Let us explain it by taking 
the illustration given on page 29. The pay-off matrix to A 
was: 
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A 
52 
Case (i). We will plot the lines from A's viewpoint. 
Let us assume that A attaches a probability x^ to Sj and l-Xj 
to S2 . 
B  
-3 
-3 
Define 1. = pu.Xi + p_.X2 where X2 = 1-Xi, then 
J  - ' • J  ^ 3  
11 = PiiXi + P2i(l-Xi) = (2)(Xj) + (-3)(1-Xi) 
12 = + P22(l-Xl) = (-3)(Xi) + (4)(1-Xi). 
Then we take an envelop of the lowest lines and choose 
the highest point (equivalent to a maxi-min). The envelop is 
NQR and the maximum is attained at Q. Draw a perpendicular PQ 
from Q on the x axis (see Figure 9). The height of PQ is the 
FP PG 
value of the game and Xi and = l-xj = X2. By measure­
ment, PQ = -Xi = and X2 = ^7 i.e., X° = 
which is the same as obtained by algebric solution. 
Case (ii). We can also plot these lines from B's point 
of view. In that case 1^ = pu^yi + pugYz where y2 - l-Yi and 
yi and y2 ^.re the probabilities of B's employing tj and t2. 
The only difference in this (from that described above for A) 
is that here we take an envelop of the highest contour lines 
and choose the lowest point in that envelop (equivalent to 
mini-max), It can be confirmed that V. (G) obtained by this D 
method is the same as that obtained by the diagram on page 68. 
The steps in the line-envelop construction method can be 
summarized as follows. Let 
P i  1 f P i 2 ' P i 3 ' " ' ' P i m  P = 
P 2 1 / P 2 2  f • • ' f P 2 m  
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PAY OFF 
0 
1=0"*/ 
0 
x^, 
-I 
-  - 2  —  - 2  
-3tN RJ-3 
Figure 9. Line—envelop construction 
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Step 1: Construct m lines Ij(x^) = x^p^j + (l-x^lpgj 
0 < x^ < 1, j = 1,2, • • • ,in 
Step 2: Define an envelop function 
(i) (j)(xi) = min l.(xi) for case (i) above. 
j ^ 
(ii) (j)(yi) = max 1. (yi) for case (ii) . 
i 1 
Step 3; Find point 
(a) x° such that (|)(Xj) = max (J)(x^) for case (i) and 
X 1 
(b) y^ such that (j)(yj) = min ^^y^) for case (ii) . 
Yl 
Step 4: Find z such that 
Z'll(Xi) + (l-z)«l2(Xi) = ({)(Xi) 
for case (i), or for case (ii) find h such that 
h'li(yi) + (l-h).l2(yi) = <j)(yj). 
As pointed out, this method is quite handy for problems 
with pay-off matrix of 2 x m or n x 2 dimensions. 
Sliding-wedge construction To explain this method 
also we shall use a 2 x m matrix. Let P = the same as given 
in line envelop construction example. Then 
Step 1: Plot m points in 2-space. The jth point is 
= (Pij'P2j)' i = 1,2,•••,m. 
Step 2: Construct a convex hull of these points. A convex 
hull of a set A is the smallest convex set that con­
tains set A. If CH(A) = convex hull of A S E^, then 
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CH (A) = 
1' /  
^ X. - 1, X. > 0 
i=l 
Step 3: 
X eA for all i = l*»*r and 
r can be any integer such 
that r c n 
Construct a translation of the negative quadrant 0, 
a q  
along the line a^ = a2 where 
0^ — a2<x) and 
Xq  = rain X such that 0^ A CH{A) ={= (p 
where # is a null set. 
Step 4: Construct a separating line L such that 
L = xjai + x°a2 = X o f (x^ , X 2)eA2 
and x° + x° = 1 
and where 
and 
x^a^ + x^ag < Xq for all a^, a^ e 
x°a^ + x^a > X q for all a^, ag e CHiA) 
Step 5: Find a point y£T (strategy space of B) such that 
(Piy°fP2Y°) e 0^ A CH(A)J . Then game 8(G) has a 
value equal to xO is optimal for A and yO is 
optimal for B. 
Figure 10 explains the above steps. 
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SET A= CDEFGH (FOR PLAYER A) 
CH (A) = CDEFH 
SET B = THE SHADED AREA 
(FOR PLAYER B) 
SEPARATING 
LINE IS CD 
TRANSLATION OF \ 
NEGATIVE QUADRANT 
Figure 10. Sliding-wedge construction 
Case I. 
(a) Separating line CD is unique XO is unique 
(b) Only one point K is common to A and B is 
unique 
Case II. 
(a) Separating lines not unique XO is not unique 
(b) Only one point common to both A and B ->• YO is 
unique 
Case III. 
(a) Separating line CD is unique ->• X^ is unique 
(b) There is a whole set of common points KL + YO is 
not unique 
Case IV. 
(a) Separating line CD is unique -»• X^ is unique 
(b) Only one common point K YO is unique 
Figure 11. Different types of sets available for Player A and 
the choice of strategy sets available to A and B 
for these different types 
sri 
a 0 
Zo 
, urn 
•p Q 0 
3= 
2d 
D • 
8 
'10 0^  
Z L  
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Other methods of solving games 
Method of determinants There may be cases (even in a 
3x3 matrix) where neither there exists any saddle point nor 
one can see any dominated rows and dominating columns to be 
deleted to make the job of solving a game easier. In such a 
case, we can calculate the probabilities by the use of 
determinants in the following manner. 
Step 1; Let P be nxm where n < m. If n < m, delete any m-n 
number of columns from P and convert it into a square 
matrix. Call this P^. If n=m, we have the required 
square matrix for succeeding operations. If n > m, 
then n-m number of rows had to be deleted from P to 
make it square. P„ is nxn. K 
step 2: Substract the ith row from the (i-l)th row of P^^. 
Call the resulting matrix P. P has elements p^,j, 
where i' = 1,2,•••n-1 and j = 1,2,•••n. 
Step 3; Leave the first column and take the determinant of 
the reduced n-1 x n-1 matrix. The figure thus 
obtained may be called D^. Similarly calculate D2 
by leaving the second column of P and taking the 
determinant. Do««'D are calculated in the same 
^ n 
manner. Then Y° = (y°,y2/*•*7^)/ the optimal strategy 
set for B, can be found out in the following manner 
(B is mini-maximizer and A is maxi-minimizer): 
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y? 
|Dl l  
n 
I |D j=l • 
yS = 
De D n ' 
n 
I |D. 
• n 
j=l 
and 
• 0  =  
|Dil 
n 
I |D. j=l -
D 
n ' 
Â ' ° '  
The optimum mixed strategy set for A can be found out in 
the same manner. In this case we take columns instead of rows. 
The matrix obtained by substracting the jth column of from 
its (j-l)th column is n % n-1. Call this matrix P. Its 
elements are Pj_ j i f i = 1,2, •••n, j = 1,2, •••n-1. 
Again we find out determinants by leaving out the ith 
row, i = 1,2,•••n and the optimal strategy set X° for A is 
calculated like this 
xO = 
n 
Î |C{ 
i=l 
n ' 
n 
I iCii i=l 1 
Illustration Let 
3 
4 
2 
-1 
- 2  
4 
3 
1 
3 
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P neither has a saddle point nor any such strategies 
which can be eliminated according to the dominance criterion. 
In such a case we resort to the method just explained (method 
of determinants). 
(1) For B 
Calculate P 
1 —1 —2 
-2 6 2 
From this we calculate the values of D2. D3 
Di = 10 Do = -2 and Do = 4 
Therefore, 
I — 10 f 1^2! ~*2 ând. | Dg | — 4 
The optimal strategy set for B 
'0 -
= ( 10 10+2+4 ' 10+2+4 ' 10+2+4 
•) = r l O  2  4 , 
^16 ' 16 ' 16-' 
Value of the game = = 2.5 
B 
(2) For A 
Calculate P 
-4 4 
-6 3 
2 1 
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From P we find the following values of . 
Ci = 0 f C2 = -4 , C 3  = 12 
therefore, 
|Ci| = 0 , jCgl = 4 , IC3I = 12 
and 
vO = { Q 4 12 1 _4_ 
'•0+4+12 " 0+4+12 ' 0+4+12-' I '16 '16 J 
Again V0(g)^ = 2.5. 
Thus we find that this method gives us consistent results; 
i.e., = V8(G)g' 
In our example P was a square matrix. If P is n x m 
where n < m, say m = n+1. Then we delete one column arbi­
trarily (say first column of P to find P^) and solve in the 
above described manner. It is possible that we may not get a 
consistent solution; i.e., if f ^ 0(G)g some X°, Y^, 
then we do not delete first column from P to get P , but X\ 
delete the second column. We go on trying in this manner till 
we finally reach a consistent solution. 
Applications of Game Theory Models in Agriculture 
Though von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published their 
book in 1943-44, it was more than a decade later that the game 
theory models were applied to agriculture. All the studies 
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relating to applications of game theory in agriculture have 
examined the usefulness of a few or all of the following 
approaches (excluding e) in the process of decision making by 
a farm firm: 
a. Wald's Maxi-min and Mini-max Criterion 
b. Laplace's Criterion of 'Insufficient Reason' - Naive 
_ Theory 
c. Hurwicz Optimism-Pessimism Criterion 
d. Savage's Minimum Regret Approach 
e. Savage's Subjective Probability Criterion 
f. The Theory of the Satisficer as given by Simon 
g. The Shackle Theory of Potential Surprise 
These models can be broadly classified into: 
(i) Probabilistic Models, and 
(ii) Strategic Models 
Whether a model is probabilistic or strategic depends on 
the assumptions made. If we know (or assume) that the para­
meters are not constants but random variables with a known 
probability distribution, we call it a 'probabilistic model'. 
In a 'strategic model', we know for granted that the parameter 
will take only one of a given set of values. These values are 
acquired from previous experiments or experience. As we shall 
see, in the former (probabilistic models), we arrive at a 
pay-off matrix (by using Bayesian methods) by the application 
of these probabilities and then apply to the pay-off matrix 
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thus obtained, the maxi-min, mini-max, minimum regret or 
other criteria to take a decision whose expected value (profit) 
is the highest. Thus the value of the criterion function 
depends on the values that the parameter takes as a random 
variable and on its probability distribution. In a 'strategic 
model' (also sometimes called as 'game theoretic model' in the 
sense of being strictly based on Neumann-Morgenstern approach), 
the value of a game depends on the strategy that a player 
adopts and the set of values that the parameter can take. 
The studies by Dillon and Heady (27) and Walker, Heady, 
Tweeten and Pesek (106) were of the first few to be in the 
direction of testing the usefulness of 'game theoretic models' 
in farmers' decision problems, especially with production 
decisions under uncertainty. Kelsey and Janssen (53) applied 
game theory approach in studying bilateral monopoly in farm 
leasing. The theory lends itself to policy matters in agri­
culture as has been shown by Langham (58) in his paper on 
'Game Theory Applied to a Policy Problem of Rice Farmers'. 
The game theory models can be applied to most of the 
types of decision making problems that a farmer has to face. 
Right from the time when he makes that big decision of choosing 
farming as a career, the agriculturist is required to take 
initial and day-to-day, big and small decisions—all of them 
important and many of them crucial in one way or the other—in 
the nature of, for example, where to start the farm? what 
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should be the size of the farm? should it be purchased or 
rented? how much investment must he make and in what forms? 
what should be sources of financing his business and what 
should be the contribution of each of these sources? what type 
of resources should he have and in what quantity? what enter­
prises should he choose and how should he allocate his 
resources among these selected enterprises? what techniques of 
production should he use and at what time should he perform a 
given operation (like sowing, fertilizing, irrigating, feeding, 
etc.) and to what extent? out of the farm produce, how much 
should he keep for his own consumption and for his farm and 
how much should he sell? when should he sell and at what price? 
Here it is proposed to describe in brief the important 
game theory criteria (mentioned on page 78) that are used in 
decision making and then demonstrate their application (of the 
first five criteria) to certain practical situations that a 
farmer faces. Since the last two criteria (i.e., Simon's and 
Shackel's) are highly subjective and their pay-off matrix 
rather imprecise in the sense that it is very difficult to 
write it accurately, we shall not apply them. In the light of 
the results of the application of the first five criteria 
[(a) to (e) on page 78], it shall be endeavoured to suggest 
the suitability of these criteria under different sets of 
circumstances, because these criteria do not necessarily 
suggest the same strategy for a given pay-off matrix. As we 
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shall see, there are some cases when every criterion gives a 
different result. Finally, the author will suggest a decision 
making model of his own 'Excess Benefit Criterion', which 
seems to combine the properties of the Wald's and Regret 
principles. I should hasten to point out that the applica­
tions of these criteria shall be made to only some of the 
farmer decision situations suggested above as it would be 
extremely difficult to anticipate and examine every possible 
situation. 
In these game theory models,- the other player (playing 
against the farmer who is to make decisions) can be weather 
conditions, social and political situations, market condition, 
insect, pests and diseases of plants and animals, persons or 
groups that he has to face in making his decisions, etc. This 
other player is commonly referred to as 'nature' and includes 
not only climatic conditions and pests and diseases, but also 
all other things, situations, groups and persons that affect 
the outcome of the decision taken by the farmer. This nomen­
clature is adopted for the sake of convenience of analysis. 
However, sometimes it may be rather confusing. Therefore, the 
term 'nature' shall be used to denote opponent of a farmer 
under all situations except when a farmer is directly in con­
flict with another farmer. For example, if there are two 
farmers vying with each other to purchase a piece of land from 
a third party and bid the price of that piece up, this we 
shall call as a game against a 'person'. However, the general 
price level of land in the market is a 'state of nature'. 
This distinction between nature and person, as an opponent of 
the farmer, seems to be necessary from the viewpoint that when 
two persons are trying to compete against each other (their 
interests are conflicting), each tries to do the worst to his 
competitor. However, in most other cases (which we have 
termed as 'states of nature'), this is not true. For example, 
the nature (in the sense of climate, etc.) does not always try 
to do the worst to the farmer and, therefore, cannot be 
treated in the same manner as the competing farmer, in our 
example, bidding up prices. In our applications and examples, 
the farmer will be playing games against nature (in the sense 
described in our definition), unless otherwise specified. 
One of the distinguishing features of game theory models 
with 'nature' as an opponent is that it is only the farmer who 
gains or loses and the outcome of the game does not make the 
'nature' poorer or richer. 'Nature' is passive in the sense 
of gains and losses to itself. Therefore, in these models, 
generally speaking, it is meaningless to operate on columns 
and find out the resulting pay-off to nature. The pay-off 
matrix in our examples will always be from the viewpoint of 
the farmer and, therefore, we shall be doing operations on 
rows only and not on columns unless required by the algorithm 
in the model or otherwise necessary. 
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Different criteria of choice 
Wald's model (maxi-min criterion) It is the conven­
tional criterion of solving a given pay-off matrix of a game 
directly by taking the minimum in each row and then choosing 
the strategy which provides the maximum pay-offs of these row-
minimums. 
Again, if P equals pay-off matrix of a game with n x m 
dimensions and G equals (S,T,P) with i = 1,2,•••n, 
j = 1,2,••«m, then min p.. e 1. for all i. Take max 1. s l.n. j 1 j_ 1 
Here the farmer chooses his i°th strategy. Playing in this 
manner, the farmer assures himself of a certain minimum under 
the worst circumstances. This i° is his pure strategy which 
is equivalent to choosing a single crop, raising only one kind 
of cattle, or feeding a single type of ration to his animals. 
However, as it is not always necessary for a pay-off matrix to 
have a saddle point, the farmer may be required to mix his 
strategies in order to arrive at a solution. Mixing strategies 
in farming will amount to choosing a combination of crops or 
livestock or both and is, therefore, completely relevant and 
meaningful in the context of decision-making in agriculture. 
The optimum solution of mixed strategies can be found by the 
geometric method (if there are either only two states of 
nature or if the farmer has only two strategies), or by the 
use of algebraic method described earlier. 
As would appear, this criterion is rather conservative. 
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but perhaps this is jumping the gun. We shall compare the- -
pros and cons of all the criteria after we have discussed them 
and examined their applicability. 
Laplace's criterion—the application of the law of 
averages One of the most naive and widely used models of 
selecting a strategy or strategies is called the Laplace's 
criterion, based on the 'principle of insufficient reason'. 
The argument for the application of this criterion is that 
since the decision maker does not have any knowledge of the 
'state of nature' that is going to prevail in the period for 
which he is to make a decision, it should be based on the 
assumption that each state of nature was equally likely to 
occur. In this criterion, equal probabilities are assigned to 
each state of the nature appearing in the payoff matrix and 
then the strategy with the maximum expected pay-off is chosen. 
In other words, this is the application of the law of averages 
and the strategy with the best average gets selected. As 
there are m possible 'states of nature', the weight assigned 
to each column ('state of nature') is 1/m. 
Let the expected pay-off (calculated by Laplace's 
criterion) to the farmer for his ith strategy be then 
m m 
ki = I = m-l I p^. 
1 j=l j=l 
Let max k. = k.g, then the farmer will choose i°th strategy, il 1 
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As pointed out, here the principle of arithmetic average 
is used. This has been the conventional method with the 
researchers and the extension workers in arriving at the con­
clusions of their experiments and making recommendations. The 
statistical tests of significant difference between treatments 
are also based on the averages of these treatment values. 
Hurwicz "Optimism-Pessimism" criterion This criterion 
takes into account only the highest and the lowest pay-offs in 
a given row and ignores the others. 
Let a constant r, 0 < r < 1, represent the optimism index 
of the farmer. This implies that the farmer attaches a 
probability of r to the highest pay-off in any row of the 
matrix; 1-r is the probability attached by the farmer to the 
getting of the lowest pay-off in any row. This 1-r is termed 
as the 'pessimism index'. The expected pay-off for each 
strategy (row) is then calculated in the following manner and 
the strategy with the highest expected pay-off is chosen. 
Let be the expected pay-off to the farmer for his ith 
strategy (row). Then 
C. = r»max p.. + (1-r) «min p.. 
j j 
Max C. = C.Q and the i°th strategy is selected by the farmer 
i ^ 1 
under this criterion. 
It is clear that at r = 0, Hurwicz' model is equivalent 
to that of Wald's. 
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This method reminds one of 'Range' as a measure of 
dispersion. Range takes into consideration only the highest 
and the lowest values and is not affected at all by the values 
other than these. Hurwicz' method does exactly the same. It 
takes into account only the extreme values and ignores other 
data completely. It should be pointed out that to get reliable 
and consistent results in this method, the coefficient of 
correlation between r and the 'state of nature' should be zero. 
However, the choice of r and, therefore, that of the strategy 
would depend on the degree of optimism or pessimism of the 
decision-maker. 
Minimum regret criterion of Savage The philosophy 
underlying the use of this model is that a decision-maker 
always tries to minimize his regret. The regret to a farmer, 
if he uses his ith strategy and if j°th 'state of nature' 
prevails, is defined as 
p. -0 - max p. .0 
Let R be the regret matrix with elements r.. and max p.. be 1J 1J 
equal to Pj^Oj for a given j, then 
^ij° ~ PijO - Pj_OjO • 
In other words, r^^j is the magnitude of difference between the 
actual pay-off to a farmer for following his ith strategy and 
the (maximum) pay-off that could have been obtained if the 
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farmer had known the true 'state of nature' that actually 
prevailed. So R is derived from the original pay-off matrix. 
Clearly, r^^ < 0 for all i and all j. 
For selecting the most desirable strategy, Wald's 
criterion is applied to matrix R. Let if = min r.. and 1 j 1] 
max if = ifq. The farmer selects i°th strategy. il 1 
This criterion allows for the use of both pure and mixed 
strategies and the interpretation for these is the same as in 
the case of Wald's criterion. 
We can also apply Hurwicz' and Laplace's principles to 
the regret matrix R. 
Illustration of the use of these models Let 
States of nature 
tz t3 
S i  11 3 7 
S2 5 5 14 
S 3  21 1 1 
Si f  10 13 4 
(1) Wald's criterion 
11 = 3 
12 ~ 5 
13 = 1 
14 = 4 
max 1. = I2 
i ^ 
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Result: choose S2 
(2) Laplace's criterion 
E ( s i )  =  k i  =  ( j )  ( 1 1 )  +  ( y )  ( 3 )  +  ( j )  ( 7 )  =  
E ( s 2 )  =  k z  =  ( 1 )  ( 5 )  + (j)(5) + (1 )  (14 )  =  ^  
E(S3) = kg = (y) (21) + (j)(l) + (j) (1) = ^ 
E { s n )  =  k ^  =  ( | ) ( 1 0 )  +  ( | )  ( 1 3 )  +  ( j ) ( 4 )  =  Ç  
max k. = ki^ 
i 1 
Suggested strategy: s^ 
(3) Hurwicz' criterion 
Let r = .7 = optimism-index of the farmer. Then 1-r 
is his pessimism-index. Expected pay-off for s^ equals 
Ci = (r)«max p.. + (1-r) min p.. j 13 j ID 
=  ( . 7 ) ( 1 1 )  +  ( . 3 ) ( 3 )  =  8 . 6 .  
Similarly, 
C 2  =  ( . 7 ) ( 1 4 )  +  ( . 3 ) ( 5 )  =  1 1 . 3  
C 3  =  ( . 7 ) ( 2 1 )  +  ( . 3 ) ( 1 )  =  1 5 . 0  
C i ,  =  ( . 7 )  ( 1 3 )  +  ( . 3 )  ( 4 )  =  1 0 . 3  
max C. = Co = 15.0 
i 1 
Recommendation: select S3 
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(4) Savage's minimum regret criterion 
First of all we have to get R from P, 
r.-0 = Pj.o - max p q 
-"•J J-J -LJ 
for a given 'state of nature' j°. 
r. = p. - max p. 
11 il ^ 11 
max p^^ = P31 = 21 
therefore. 
^il = Pil - 21 
ri1 = P11- P 3 1  = 11-21 = -10 
^21 =  P 2 1 - P 3 1  = 5-21 = -16 
^31 =  P 3 1 - P 3 1  = 21-21 = 0 
^41 = P41-P31 = 10-21 = -11. 
Similarly, 
max p. =13 and max p. =14 i 12 i 13 
and 
ri2 = -10 r22 = -8 r,32 = -12 r^j = 0 
ri3 = -7 ^23 =0 r33 = -13 r^3 = -10 
90 
The R matrix then is 
States of nature 
ti tg tg 
Si -10 -10 -7 
S2 -16 -8 0 
S3 0 -12 -13 
S4 -11 0 -10 
Note that r. . < 0 
-
= min r. . 
if = min r.. = -10 
j 
= -16 
= -13 
1^ = -11 4 
The maximum of the minimum (the least regret) is 1^ = -10 
which is obtained if the farmer chooses s^. 
Result: farmer should select Sj 
Summary of the results: 
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Criterion/model Suggested strategy 
Wald s2 
Laplace s^ 
Hurwicz S3 
Savage's Regret s^ 
It would be worthwhile here to recall a suggestion made 
earlier that it was not necessary that all criteria would 
suggest the use of the same strategy. One of the purposes of 
this illustration was to show this divergence in optimal 
strategies suggested by these four criteria. However, from 
this one must not rush to conclude that all these models will 
necessarily suggest different strategies for the same pay-off 
matrix. In general, this may not be true. As we shall later 
see in the applications to the problems of agriculture, in 
many cases, these criteria may come up with the same optimal 
strategies and in some other situations, completely different 
choices may be given by these different models. 
Savage's subjective probability theory One of the 
common features of the above four criteria is the underlying 
assumption that the decision maker is acting under 'complete 
ignorance', whereas in practice, this is not necessarily true. 
He, through past experience of his own or other sources or 
through just his belief, might have some vague idea of the 
expected state of affairs. For example, a farmer is planning 
to take a crop in the coming season. The region is wet, but 
once in a while drought also strikes. In such cases it seems 
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impossible to assign objective probabilities to these events 
(of rain and drought), but subjectively he may assign some 
probabilities to the events of 'rain' and 'no rain*. 
Suppose a farmer is faced with the decision as to whether 
he should take crop 'C' or crop 'D'. Further, assume that if 
it rains, taking crop 'C is the best proposition; but if he 
takes 'C and it does not rain, the crop fails entirely with 
no returns to him. The other crop, 'D', does not give as good 
returns as 'C' when it rains, but does give some returns even 
when there is 'no rain'. Suppose in utility terms his problem 
is reduced to the following form; 
State of nature 
Si 
(rain) (no rain) 
Ai (take crop 'C') 
A2 (take crop 'D') 
1 0 
Y Y (where 0<y<l) 
Here everything hinges on the way he appraises the 
relative possibilities of 'rain' and 'no rain'. If he assigns 
a subjective probability > Y to the event 'rain', he would 
choose crop 'C. In other words, from his behavior we could 
deduce whether the 'a priori' probability assigned by him to 
'rain' was > Y or < Y. 
Thus by processing one's information (whatever he has), 
one can generate an 'a priori' probability distribution over 
the state of nature, which is appropriate for making decisions. 
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This reduces the decision problem from one of uncertainty to 
that of risk. The a priori distribution obtained in this 
manner is called a 'subjective probability distribution'. 
To Savage goes much of the credit for developing the 
above view and, therefore, in the following lines shall be 
outlined, in brief, the postulates, premise, definitions and 
theorems as given by him for a personalist theory of decisions. 
It is important to note that he, without assuming any objec­
tive probability, has been able to develop a subjective 
probability measure. 
Savage's Theory: 
1. Let S be the set of states of the world with an infinite 
number of elements s, s', ••• (s, s' ••• are exhaustive 
and exclusive). 
2. Events E, E', ••• are the sets of states or events (E<^S, 
E'^S, . ..). 
3. Let the set of consequences be C whose elements are c, c', 
c " , • • •. 
4. Let a be a set of acts whose elements are A, A', The 
acts are arbitrary functions from S to C. 
5. Each act assigns a consequence to each state of the world. 
(A,s) are act-state pairs and a consequence A(s) from set 
C is assigned to each one of these pairs. Thus A(s) = c 
means that consequence 'c' is assigned to state 's' by 
act 'A'. 
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6. The binary relation > between a pair of consequences. 
> means ' is preferred or indifferent to '. 
With these, the postulates and 
definitions are given below: 
POSTULATE 1; > is a weak ordering of acts. In other words, 
it can be said that every pair of acts is comparable and 
transitive. Thus, initially > is applied to acts and not 
consequences. 
Definition 1: A > A* if and only if B > B' for every B and B' 
that agree with A and A' respectively on E and with each 
other on ~E. A agrees with B on E if and only if 
A(s) = B(s) for each s^E and B and B' agree with each 
other on ~E if and only if B(s) = B'(s) for each Sg~E. 
POSTULATE 2: For every A, A' and E, A > A' given E or A' > A 
given E, i.e., conditional preference is well defined. 
Definition 2: c > c' if and only if A > A' when A(s) = c and 
A'(s) = c' for every sc S. Thus, preference or indiffer­
ence between consequences is defined in terms of the 
preference or indifference between acts. 
Definition 3; An event (j) is null if and only if for every A 
and A', A > A' given cj) and A' > A given (|). In other 
words, an event ^ is null if an individual considers it 
impossible. 
POSTULATE 3: If A(s) = c and A'(s) = c' for every s^E and E 
is non-null, then A > A' given E if and only if c > c'. 
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This asserts that conditional preferences do not affect 
preference between consequences. 
Definition 4: Event E is said to be not more probable than E' 
if and only if 
(i) c and c' are two consequences such that c > c', 
(ii) A(s) = c for s^E and A(s) = c' for s in ~E, and 
(iii) A'(s) = c for s in E' and A'(s) = c' for s^~E', 
then A' > A. 
POSTULATE 4: Probability-wise any two events are comparable, 
i.e., for every E and E', E > E' or E' >E. 
POSTULATE 5: There is at least one pair of acts and, there­
fore, at least one pair of consequences, which are not 
indifferent; i.e., A and A*, A > A' or A' > A, and 
A(s) > A'(s) or A'(s) > A(s). 
POSTULATE 6: If A > A', then for every consequence c (no 
matter how desirable or undesirable it may be) there 
exists a partition of S (into a finite number of exhaus­
tive and exclusive events) such that if either A or A' is 
so modified on any one element of the partition as to 
take value c, other values remaining undisturbed, then > 
still holds between modified A and A' or between A and 
modified A* as the case may require. 
—This postulate, together with others, has two signifi­
cant implications: 
(a) It implies existence of a probability measure P 
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such that for every E, E', P(E) < P(E') 
if and only if E < E', and 
(b) It implies the existence of a unique utility 
function u. 
POSTULATE 7: Let A' be an act and let a' be the constant 
s 
which agrees with A' for the state s. Then: 
(a) A > Ag given E for all s^E -> A > A' given E, and 
(b) Ag > A given E for all s^E ->• A' > A given E. 
Below are given the two important theorems which have been 
proved by Savage in the framework of the above postulates. 
THEOREM 1: There exists a unique real-valued function P 
defined for the set of events (subsets of S) such that, 
(a) P(E) > 0 for all E. 
(b) P(S) = 1. 
(c) If E and E' are disjoint, then P(E U E') = 
P(E) + P(E') . 
(d) E is not more probable than E' if and only if 
P(E) < P(E') . 
This P is termed a 'personalistic probability measure'. 
It reflects the individual's reported feelings as to 
which of a pair of events is more likely to occur. 
THEOREM 2: There exists a real-valued function u defined over 
the set of consequences having the following property. 
If E^ (i = 1,2,•••n) is a partition of S and A is an act 
with the consequences c^ on and if E^^ (where 
i = is another partition of S and A' is an act 
with the consequence c^ on then A > A' if and only if 
n n 
1 u(c.)'P(E.) > Y u(c!)'P(E!). The u function is a 
i=l ^ 1 i=l 1 1 
utility function. 
It has thus been shown that no objective probabilities 
have been assumed and yet expected utilities reflect the 
preferences accurately. As pointed out by Luce and Raiffa 
(61), "A subjective probability measure arises as a conse­
quence of his (Savage's) axioms. This is in turn used to 
calibrate utilities, and it is established that it can be done 
in such a way that expected utilities correctly reflect pre­
ferences. Thus Savage's contribution—a major one in the 
foundations of decision making—is a synthesis of the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility approach to decision making and 
de Finetti's calculus of subjective probability." 
Application of Bayesian theorem—maximization (or 
minimization) of expected values With the application of 
Bayes' theorem to the 'a priori' subjective probabilities, 
one can arrive at a model (pay-off matrix) on which to base 
his decisions. In this procedure, the expectation is taken 
into account and the expected value of the gain (or loss) is 
maximized (or minimized). Suppose we begin with initial 
probability and gather new evidence and experience about the 
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world, we can obtain 'a posteriori' subjective probabilities 
by combining the 'a priori' probabilities with conditional 
(subjective) probabilities pertaining to that evidence. We 
then deal only with this 'a posteriori' model and form it as a 
basis of our decision. This is illustrated by the following 
hypothetical (but by no means impractical) situation faced by 
a farmer. 
A poultry farmer has four egg grading machines and 
supplies only A grade eggs to the market. Each machine can 
grade 100 packs of A grade eggs (each pack containing 30 dozen) 
in a work day of 12 hours. These machines are such that 
normally eggs graded A may have .5% of B grade eggs. 
The farmer has a contract for supplying 100 packs of A 
grade eggs a day to a food store and if the supply contains 
more than .5% grade B eggs, $100 are deducted by the store 
from payment to the farmer for each 100 packs supplied. He 
is also penalised to the tune of $100 if he fails to fulfill 
his contract to supply 100 packs a day. The rest of the 
graded eggs (300 packs) are sold by him in the open market 
daily as he has no storage facilities. Thus, at the beginning 
of every day he has no stock of eggs. 
At the end of a certain working day, after the eggs have 
been graded and four separate consignments of eggs graded by 
the four different machines have been made, it is discovered 
that one of the machines was adjusted such that it turned out 
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lots with 98% A and 2% B grade eggs instead of the usual 99.5% 
A and .5% B. Though the lots of 10 0 packs each turned out by 
each machine are kept separately, unfortunately, it is not 
known which lot was turned out by the defective machine. Due 
to the nature of his contract, the farmer has to immediately 
decide as to which lot to send to the food store. In such a 
situation he can apply the Bayesian theorems and use the sub­
jective probability method in the following manner. 
There are four consignments (lots) and one of them has 2% 
B grade eggs. 
Penalty for supplying a defective lot = $100. 
Therefore, expected penalty = $100/4 = $ 25. 
Suppose he decides to take a sample of two packs from one lot 
and runs it over a non-defective machine to test whether the 
pack has .5% or 2% B grade eggs. There are three possibili­
ties. He observes that 
(a) both samples have .~5% B grade eggs—Qj, 
(b) both packs have 2% defective—Q2, 
(c) one pack has .5% B grade eggs and the other pack has 
2% (this situation can happen because, though the 
good machine turns out lots having only .5% B grade 
eggs, overall, individual packs may have a greater or 
sm a l l e r  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  B  gr a d e  e g g s ) — Q 3 .  
Let 
t1 = consignment sampled comes from the lot having 
.5% B grade eggs 
100 
'1  
sampled consignment comes from the lot having 
2% B grade eggs, 
the decision of the farmer to supply the lot 
sampled. 
s 2 = the decision of the farmer to supply any lot 
other than that sampled. 
Let 
Yl = the probability of tj 'state of nature', 
Y2 = the probability of t2 'state of nature'. 
Then 
3 1 Yl = 4 and yg = 
Q. 
^ yj'Probability of (:g—] 
Probability of = Q. Q. 
^ I y j'Probability of (^) 
j = 1,2 
i = 1,2,3 
( a.l) P(|^) = (.995) 2  (.005) 0  = .990025 
(a.2) P[|^ ) = (.98) 2 (.02)° = .9604 
(b.l) P(|^) = (.995)° (.005)^ = .000025 
(b.2) P[||) = (.98)° (.02) 2 = .00004 
(c.l) P(|^) = (.995)^.005)^-2= (.004975)2 
(c.2) P(N = (.98) ^ (.02) ^-2= (.0196)2 
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Therefore, 
p [ îi-) = 
'  ( j] ( - 9 9 0 0 2 5 )  +  ( i ] ( . 9 6 0 4 )  
( | ) ( . 9 9 0 0 2 5 )  
t - ,  ( T ) ( - 9 6 0 4 )  
= 
( ! • ) ( . 9 9 0 0 2 5 )  +  ( i ) ( . 9 6 0 4 )  
( | - ) ( . 0 0 0 0 2 5 )  +  ( i ) ( . 0 0 0 4 )  
( | ) ( . 0 0 0 0 2 5 )  +  ( i ) ( . 0 0 0 4 )  
2 ( | ) ( . 0 0 4 9 7 5 )  +  ( i ) ( . 0 1 9 6 ) 2  
p ^ 2e^ )i.,i9e] 
2 ( | . ) ( . 0 0 4 9 7 5 )  +  ( i ) ( . 0 1 9 6 ) 2  
The pay-off matrix is given below; 
ti tg 
S i  0  -100 
100 0  S 2  3  
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For (S2,ti) we get a value of -100/3 because, if we decide 
to supply any of the remaining three (non-sampled) lots and if 
ti (the consignment sampled comes from .5% B grade) actually 
exists, the defective lot then is in the consignments not 
sampled and for s2 the probability of its being supplied is 
1/3. Thus the expected pay-off is -$100/3. 
(a) If Qj is observed, then 
E(si) = (0)(.756) + (-100) (.244) = -24.4 a.l 
E(S2) = (-100/3) ( .756) + (0)(.244) = -25.2 .. a.2 
Decision: As E(si) > E(s2), select s^; i.e., supply 
the sampled lot. 
(b) If Q2 is observed, then 
E(Si) = (0)(.16) + (-100) (.84) = -84 b.l 
E(S2) = (-100/3) + (0)(.84) = -5.33 b.2 
Recommendation: Use S2; i.e., supply any lot other 
than that sampled. 
(c) If Q3 is observed, then 
E(Si) = (0)(.43) + (.57) (-100) = -57 c.l 
Efsg) = (-100/3)(.43) + (0)(.57) = -14.3 c.2 
Suggestion: Play S2; i.e., supply any lot other than 
that sampled. 
Thus it has been shown as to how the concept of subjective 
probability can be used in taking decisions. Subjective 
probabilities, when transformed in the manner suggested above 
10 3 
(by Bayes' theorem), through experience, tend to approach 
relative frequencies. Thus, 'reasonable men' could be expected 
to have similar subjective probabilities for events for which 
they had similar experience (or belief). Some people raise an 
objection and say that an individual may not be consistent and 
may provide two different judgments concerning probabilities 
at two different times prior to implementation of a strategy 
and these two judgments may be found to be incompatible. But 
they should not forget that the individual acquires new 
information and experience in the period between two judgments. 
There may be still other reasons for this inconsistency such 
as the individual may not be careful in his judgment, he may 
be careful but vague about his true preference or his value 
system may have changed, etc. Hurwicz and Hodges and Lehman 
have given suggestions to partially cope with this problem of 
inconsistency. 
One of the advantages of this approach (of subjective 
probability) is that, in many cases, decision maker's sub­
jective probabilities will be determined by routine data 
collection and analysis methods. In that case, the determina­
tion of these probabilities can be left to the analyst and 
manager is freed for more difficult decisions. 
In several instances, the manager may be inexperienced. 
In such a case he can hire an expert having experience of the 
matter and associate him with the decision process. 
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One of the drawbacks of subjective probability, as 
pointed out by the objectivists, is that 'a priori* probabili­
ties raise empirical difficulties in the sense that it is not 
clear, and rather impossible, to estimate the postulated 
probabilities. The subjectivists' answer to this is that 
'relative frequencies' (sometimes called the objective proba­
bilities) are, in themselves, to a great extent, a result of 
considerable subjective judgment by the analyst. 
An objection raised by Roegen (80) against the theory of 
subjective probability is that, "If all events could be 
expressed as Boolean polynomials of some elementary events 
that need only to be mutually exclusive, the structure of the 
beliefs of any individual would be completely characterized by 
the manner in which he would distribute probabilities to these 
elementary events. This probability distribution is otherwise 
arbitrary and does not have to reflect any stochastic aspect 
of this material world." Mr. Roegen is not completely wrong 
in this criticism of the subjective probability, but he 
neglects the aspect of learning from experience. And once the 
initial belief is known, by Bayes' theorem, the future ones 
are all determined automatically. 
1 nq 
A summary statement showing the type of strategies (pure 
or mixed) suggested by the different criteria 
Assumption: The game does have a solution. 
Decision 
model 
1) Wald's 
Type of 
strategy 
suggested Remarks 
a. Pure When pay-off matrix has a saddle 
point. 
b. Mixed When pay-off matrix does not have 
a saddle point. 
2) Laplace's 
3) Hurwicz 
4) Regret 
Pure only 
Pure only 
a. Pure 
b. Mixed 
Only if one single row (strategy) 
dominates all other strategies in 
the original pay-off matrix so that 
maximum regret for the dominating 
strategy will be zero for all 
states of nature. However, in such 
a case, whatever decision model we 
use, the suggested strategy will be 
the same. Thus, when Regret 
criterion suggests a pure strategy, 
there is no need to apply other 
criteria. 
Whenever no single row dominates 
over all other rows in a pay-off 
matrix P, as is generally the case, 
regret models suggest a mixture of 
strategies. 
5) Subjective 
probability 
Pure only 
lOÇa 
Applications to actual data 
On the following pages are given the applications of 
these five models. All these examples have been taken from 
actual situations and contain actual data obtained on the 
field unless specified otherwise. These are only a few of the 
examples representing only a few sets of situations as it may 
be too unwieldly to cover all the decision making problems that 
a farmer faces. 
The method of application would be the same to all 
situations. For the use of Savage's criterion of subjective 
probability, we have already shown as to how we can calculate 
these probabilities. Therefore, in these applications that 
follow we shall just be taking the probabilities assigned by 
the farmer to the different 'states of nature' as given. 
Application 1. Choosing an enterprise A young person 
has made up his mind to take up farming for a living in 
Illinois. For reasons of economy and efficiency he decides to 
have a farm of at least 180 acres; but because of being a 
novice in farming, he does not want to take undue risks and 
also because of managerial limitations, he has put an upper 
bound of 500 acres on the size of his farm at least for the 
first five years. However, he is not sure as to which farm 
(of the farms for sale) he and his family would like to live 
on, so he does not know the size of his farm in advance. His 
goal is to maximize 'earning on capital and management per 
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Table 1. Average earnings on capital and management in 
dollars per acre (77) 
Size of farm in acres 
ti t2 ta 
180-259 260-339 340-499 
Si Grain farming North Illinois 33. 57 37 .76 38 .87 
South Illinois 17. 72 25 .95 26 .57 
S2 Hog farming North Illinois 23. 41 23 .53 25 .57 
South Illinois 26. 87 25 .18 25 .54 
S3 Beef cattle North Illinois 7. 39 19 .62 15 .44 
South Illinois 22. 16 16 .25 
S4 Dairy cattle North Illinois 25. 82 24 .79 29 .36 
South Illinois 31. 90 30 .57 28 .50 
acre'. Given the data in Table 1, he has to choose a type of 
farming out of grain farming, hog farming, dairy farming and 
raising beef cattle. 
The example has a rather peculiar characteristic in the 
sense that one single row dominates all other rows and, 
therefore, every criterion gives the same results. Grain farm­
ing in the Northern Illinois is the most paying proposition. 
Therefore, he must try to purchase a farm in Northern Illinois 
and select grain farming. 
In practice, however, it may either not always be possible 
for the person to be able to purchase a farm of his choice in 
the North or his family may have a preference for living in 
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Southern Illinois. As illustrated in Table 1, the average 
earnings on capital and management in Southern Illinois for 
each type of farming were: 
Type of 180-259 260-339 340-500 
farming acres acres acres 
Grain $17.72 $25.95 $26.57 
Hog 26.87 25.18 25.54 
Dairy 31.90 30.57 28.50 
Beef cattle 22.16 16.25 
Naturally he will choose dairy farming if he is to farm 
in Southern Illinois. Again a single row (dairy farming) 
dominates all other rows and, therefore, all criteria will 
suggest the same strategy. 
Once the farmer has decided on the nature of enterprises 
that he would follow, he has to take decisions regarding the 
technology to be used in raising the crops or feeding the 
livestock. These will consist of, for example, the number of 
ploughings to be given to prepare the field; the type and 
quantities of manures and fertilizers to be applied; the 
choice of varieties of crops; seed rate and the time of sowing; 
number of irrigations to be given, if any; cultural practices 
to be adopted; etc. 
Here we shall apply these criteria to the following three 
situations: 
(i) Selection of level of fertilizer or manure to 
crops 
(ii) Optimum sowing time 
(iii) Decision on when to sell 
Application 2. Which level of P^O.g will be most 
desirable for wheat The most common form of application of 
phosphorus to a crop is P2O5. A researcher in India has tried 
three levels of P2O5 (0 lbs, 20 lbs and 40 lbs per acre) to 
wheat on an experimental basis on which he will base his 
recommendations. Table 2 shows the yield of wheat obtained 
for these three levels of P2O5. 
Table 2. Average response of wheat to combinations of the 
dozes of N and P2O5 at Kotah (Rajasthan) — 
yield in mds/acre (66) 
Application of P2O5 
in lbs per acre 
Nitrogen levels 
ti tz tg 
51 
52 
53  
0 
20 
40 
13.60 
13.17 
14,80 
15.47 
14.37 
15.93 
16.90 
17.73 
15.93 
In order to apply the different decision criteria we 
calculate 1^^, C^, the different values for different sets 
of subjective probabilities (we have chosen three sets, viz. 
[.2, .5, .3], [.3, .2, .5] and [.1, .4, .5]) for the three 
states of nature, R (regret) matrix and 1^^. These are given 
on the following page. 
IC 2 
1. k. C. Subjective probability values 
r=.3 ^ r=.7 (.2,.5,.3) (.3,.2,.5) (.1,.4,.5) 
Si 13.60 15. 32 14.59 15. 91 15. 525 15. 624 15 .998 
S2 13.17 15. 09 14.54 16. 36 15. 138 15. 690 15 .930 
S3 14.80 15. 55 15.14 15. 59 15. 704 15. 591 15 .817 
Regret matrix 
tl t2 ts if 
Si -1.20 — .46 -.83 -1.20 
S2 -1.63 -1.56 0 -1.63 
S3 0 0 -1.80 -1.80 
Individual judgment (subjectivity) and farmer's attitudes 
do not affect the results given by Wald's, Laplace's and Regret 
criteria. In the case of the remaining two criteria, viz 
Hurwicz and subjective probability, the choice is affected by 
the optimism-pessimism index of the farmer and the variations 
in the subjective probabilities assigned to the occurrence of 
the different states of nature by the individual decision 
makers. Therefore, in this and most of the succeeding examples 
we have taken two values of r (r=.3, r=.7) and calculated the 
pay-offs for different s^ for three farmers who assign different 
sets of subjective probabilities to the states of nature. As 
the calculation of subjective probabilities has been demon­
strated earlier, we have only applied the criteria of subjective 
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probability to this example for illustrative purposes. 
The strategies suggested by the different criteria are 
given below: 
Suggested 
Criterion strategy 
Wald's S3 
Laplace's S3 
Hurwicz' - r=.3. . . . S3 
r=.7, . . . s2 
Regret criterion ... s^ 
Subjective probability 
(•2^.5/.3}. . • . . s3 
. . . • s 2 
(•lf«4/.5). # . . . s 2 
Wald's, Laplace's, Hurwicz' (r=.3), and subjective 
probability criteria with probabilities of .2 assigned to t^, 
.5 to 12f and .3 to 13 all suggest S3. 
Hurwicz' model (r=.7) and subjective probability set 
(.3,.2,.5) recommend S2. 
On the basis of regret model and subjective probability 
set (.1,.4,.5), Si will be selected. 
Application 2» Optimum level of farm yard manure for 
Bajra (Pennisetum typhoideum) Farm yard manure is the 
single most important source of organic matter to the soil in 
Indian farming. In the experiments conducted at the Indian 
Agricultural Research Institute, it was endeavoured to deter­
mine the effects of five levels of application of farm yard 
manure on the yields of 'bajra' crop. The five levels were 
0, 2.5, 5, 10 and 20 tons of farra yard manure per acre. The 
results are reported for five years, 1952-1956. 
The pay-off matrix is given in Table 3. 
Table 3. Bajra (Pennisetum typhoideum) yields in mds/acre at 
five levels of farm yard manure (67) 
Farm yard manure 
tons/acre. 
ti 
1952 
tz 
1953 
ts 
1954 
tn 
1955 
ts 
1956 
S i  0 15.4 16.1 15.1 16.1 6.4 
S2 2.5 15.7 17.0 15.9 16 .6 5.0 
S 3  5 16.1 15.9 15.8 16.8 6.3 
Sit  10 16.6 17.1 16.7 17.5 6.2 
S 5  20 15.7 21.7 18.9 21.0 5.5 
Strategies suggested by different models are shown below: 
Criterion 
Strategy suggested when: 
data for 1956 included data for 1956 excluded 
Wald's 
Laplace's 
Hurwicz' 
r = .3 
r = .5 
Regret 
Si 
S5 
S5 
S5 
Sit 
S5 
r < .175 Si^ 
r > .175 S5 
S5 
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Application 4. Choice of optimum time of sowing of gram 
(Cicer arietinum L.) The farmer must keep his fields ready 
to be able to sow the crop at the most appropriate time. The 
importance of this is enhanced by the very fact that sowing at 
the proper time will add to the returns to the farmer without 
any extra costs to him. 
The data in Table 4 were obtained as a result of trials 
conducted in West Bengal, India, to determine the effects of 
time of sowing on the yield of 'gram'. Gram is a winter crop. 
Six sowing dates, viz. October 13, October 28, November 12, 
November 27, December 12 and December 27 (interval of 15 days), 
were tried for a period of three years. 
Table 4. Optimum time of sowing gram (Cicer arietinum L.) in 
West Bengal—grain yield in quintals per hectare 
(96) 
ti tg tg 
Sowing date 1961-1962 1962-1963 1963-1964 
Si October 13 30.95 19.98 15.54 
s 2 October 28 36.81 24.10 17.77 
S3 November 12 37.11 16.13 15.04 
S4 November 27 17.87 19.29 10.85 
S5 December 12 12.96 10.80 2.74 
S6 December 27 5.88 3.96 2.59 
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Suggested optimum time of sowing gram (Cicer arietinum): 
Criterion Optimal date of sowing 
Wald's October 28 s2 
Laplace's October 28 s2 
Hurwicz' 
r>.878 November 12 S3 
r<.878 October 28 S2 
Regret October 28 S2 
But for Hurwicz* criterion at r>.878, all the criteria 
suggest October 28 as the optinum date of sowing 'gram' in 
West Bengal. 
Application Optimum time of sowing wheat Wheat is 
a winter crop in India and in most parts of the United States 
as well. Experiments were conducted in the canal irrigated 
area of Rajasthan state (India) to find out the difference in 
yields of wheat due to the differences in the time of sowing. 
Seven different dates of sowing, ten days apart, were tried. 
The pay-off matrix for these sowing dates (in terms of yield 
in maunds per acre) is given in Table 5. 
Optimum time of sowing wheat as suggested by different 
models 
Model Dates suggested 
Wald's November 4 S3 
Laplace's November 4 S3 
Hurwicz' 
r>.8 November 14 Si+ 
r<.8 November 4 S3 
Regret November 4 S3 
The pattern of suggested optimal strategy is similar to 
that obtained for 'gram' in application No. 4 on page 112. 
Table 5. Effect of time of sowing (and seed rate) on yield of 
wheat under canal irrigation in Rajasthan (102) 
Yield in quintals per hectare 
ti t2 ts 
Sowing date 1960-1961 1961-1962 1962-1963 
51 October 15 26.65 28.15 26.40 
52 October 25 28.25 28.80 30.25 
53 November 4 28.35 30.40 33.85 
Sij November 14 26.20 29.45 34.45 
S5 November 24 25.30 31.35 29.45 
S0 December 4 21.95 25.40 29.90 
S7 December 14 23.50 22.55 28.25 
S3 December 24 16.70 19.95 10.90 
At r>.8, Hurwicz' criteria suggests Si^ as optimal. According 
to all the other criteria, S3 is the best. 
Applications 6-12. When to sell? The most common 
goal of farm firms is profit maximization. It is precisely 
for this reason that after a person has decided to enter farm­
ing business, he makes decisions regarding the most profitable 
enterprises and the technology to be adopted in carrying out 
these enterprises in order to maximize the yields from a given 
set of resources and alternatively to minimize costs. However, 
profits are a function of not only costs, but also the price 
at which the farmer sells his produce. Decision models under 
study can be equally well applied to this problem. 
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In Tables 6-12 are given the prices of corn (in dollars 
per bushel), soybeans (in dollars per bushel), hay (in dollars 
per ton), oats (in dollars per bushel), hogs (in dollars per 
cwt.)f wheat (in dollars per bushel), and wool (in dollars per 
pound) for 1964, 1965 and 1966. They are the average prices 
that prevailed during different months of these three years. 
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the farmer has 
his own storage facilities and costs of storage are insignifi­
cant. Further, we also assume that there are no differentials 
in rates of interest for the receipts from sales for different 
months. To sum up, we assume that the greater the farm prices, 
the larger the profit to the farmer. Given these, the farmer 
has to decide as to in what month or months he must sell his 
crop to get maximum returns. The following statement shows 
the best time of selling for different farm products. Let Si, 
S2, S3, •••, S12 be the action of selling a crop in January, 
February, March, December, respectively. 
When to sell (pure strategy suggested) 
Criterion Corn Soybeans Hay Oats Hogs Wheat Wool 
Wald's S5 Si Si Si ,S2 
84,85 
Sg Si ,82 S 
Laplace's Sg s? S2 85 Se Si 8 
Hurwicz' r=.3 Sg Ss Si S5 88 Si S 
r=.7 Sg Sa S2 812 81 81 S 
Regret s? S7, Se Si ,82,83 81,82 Se 82,85 S 
S3,S^ 
85, 
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Table 6. Prices of Iowa farm products—corn (107) 
Dollars per bushel 
ti tg tg 
1964 1965 1966 
Si January 1.02 1.09 1.14 
S2 February 1.02 1.10 1.13 
S3 March 1.06 1.10 1.09 
S4 April 1.11 1.14 1.14 
S5 May 1.12 1.16 1.16 
S6 June 1.10 1.18 1.16 
S7 July 1.06 1.15 1.22 
S8 August 1.07 1.11 1.27 
sg September 1.10 1.11 1.28 
Si 0 October 1.05 1.05 1.23 
Sll November 1.00 .95 1.20 
Si 2 December 1.09 1.02 1.25 
Table 7. Prices of Iowa farm products—soybeans (107) 
Dollars per bushel 
ti tg tg 
1964 1965 1966 
Sj January 
s 2 February 
S 3 March 
Si^ April 
s 5 May 
Sg June 
Sy July 
s8 August 
sg September 
sjo October 
s N o v e m b e r  
Si 2 December 
2.60 2.70 2.62 
2.54 2.75 2.71 
2.51 2.81 2.66 
2.42 2.79 2.74 
2.31 2.65 2.86 
2.32 2.68 3.02 
2.31 2.65 3.38 
2.31 2.49 3.53 
2.45 2.43 2.90 
2.49 2.28 2.77 
2.54 2.34 2.82-
2.68 2.47 2.85 
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Table 8. Prices of Iowa farm products—hay (107) 
Dollars per ton 
tg tg 
1964 1965 1966 
Si January 19.50 19.50 23.50 
S2 February 19.00 19.50 24.50 
S 3  March 18.00 19.50 22.50 
Slf April 17.00 19.90 20.90 
S 5  May 17.50 21.50 21.40 
Se June 17.00 21.80 19.90 
S7 July 16.00 21.40 19.10 
Sa August 16.50 20.40 18.70 
Sg September 18.00 21.40 19.90 
Si 0  October 18.30 21.20 19.20 
Si 1  November 18.50 21.10 19.90 
Si 2  December 19.30 21.90 20.10 
Table 9. Prices of Iowa farm products—oats (107) 
Dollars per bushel 
ti tg tg 
1964 1965 1966 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Se 
s? 
Ss 
Sg 
Si 0 
Si 1 
Si 2 
January .68 .67 .67 
February .67 .68 .67 
March .66 .68 .67 
April .67 .68 .67 
May .67 .69 .67 
June .65 .68 .67 
July .62 .65 .66 
August .62 .63 . 66 
September .62 .63 .68 
October .62 .63 .68 
November .64 .64 .70 
December .65 .65 .70 
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Table 10. Prices of Iowa farm products—hogs (107) 
Dollars per cwt. 
ti tg tg 
1964 1965 1966 
S i  January 14.30 15.30 27.30 
3 2  February 14.30 16.30 27.20 
S 3  March 14.00 16.30 24.20 
Si t  April 13.80 16.70 21.90 
S 5  May 14.20 19.60 21.90 
S 6  June 14.70 22.40 22.90 
s? July 16.00 23.20 23.00 
S 8  August 15.70 23.60 24.70 
S g  September 16.10 22.20 22.20 
S i  0  October 15.00 22.80 21.20 
S i  1  November 13.90 23.50 19.00 
S i  2  December 14.50 27.10 18.50 
Table 11. Prices of Iowa farm products—wheat (107) 
Dollars per bushel 
ti t2 t3 
1964 1965 1966 
51 
52 
5 5  
56 
s? 
^8 
S g  
2% 0 
Si 1 
S12 
J anuary 1.95 1.44 1.43 
February 1.93 1.43 1.44 
March 1.85 1.40 1.40 
April 1.92 1.38 1.40 
May 1.92 1.37 1.44 
June 1.56 1.34 1.63 
July 1.37 1.33 1.78 
August 1.37 1.39 1.80 
September 1.42 1.40 1.80 
October 1.44 1.40 1.67 
November 1.46 1.40 1.67 
December 1.44 1.42 1.69 
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Table 12. Prices of Iowa farm products—wool (108) 
Dollars per pound 
ti tz ts 
1964 1965 1966 
Si January .43 .47 .47 
S2 February .48 .46 .48 
S3 March .51 .47 .51 
S4 April .53 .48 .53 
S5 May .54 .49 .55 
S6 June .55 .50 .52 
s? July .54 .46 .49 
S8 August .52 .46 .48 
sg September .48 .46 .48 
Si 0  October .47 .48 .48 
Sll November .48 .49 .47 
Si 2 December .47 .49 .46 
It is noted here that though Wald's and Regret criteria 
have suggested several strategies for oats, the best would be 
one which allows the farmer to sell his crop earliest. 
Therefore, if the oats are harvested in April, the farmer 
would do well to adopt Sg and Sg, the earliest that he can 
sell after harvest. 
Discussion of results 
Here we shall be discussing the five decision models in 
the light of the results suggested by these for different 
sets of circumstances. 
Wald's criterion The assumption underlying the use of 
this criterion is that the farmer is a rank pessimist. He 
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always thinks in terms of the worst that can happen to him and, 
therefore, finds out the minimum return (security level) from 
different possible strategies and then chooses the one afford­
ing him the maximum security level. Such a decision maker has 
a short-time horizon and wants to best protect himself under 
the worst circumstances. This may be due to several reasons. 
For example, he may have just started to farm and, therefore, 
will not like to take risks. Maybe, as is the case in India, 
the farmer is able to grow hardly enough to feed himself and 
his family at the subsistence level and, though yields afford­
ing him to live at a higher level than subsistence would be 
welcome and extremely helpful, yields lower than a certain 
level would spell disaster. Therefore, in Application 2 he 
would prefer using 40 lbs. P2O5 per acre, though if the state 
of nature would be tg, he could have got as much as 17.73 
maunds per acre with the use of only 20 lbs. per acre of P2O5 
instead of 40 lbs. Thus it is apparent that, in our example, 
a farmer employing Wald's criterion for decision-making can 
never achieve the maximum possible yield of 17.73 maunds per 
acre. Nevertheless, by choosing S3 (by Wald's model), he has 
protected himself against the possibility of obtaining low 
yields of 13.17 which he could very well get by using S2. It 
is worth noting that s2 Tias the peculiarity of having both the 
minimum (13.17) and the maximum (17.73) of the values in the 
matrix and, therefore, may be paying as well as hazardous. 
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A beginner, subsistence or a non-enterprising farmer, would be 
quite skeptical and even evasive in choosing S2. Wald's 
criterion is appropriate for such a situation. 
Application 3 brings out the conservative nature of Wald's 
approach rather prominently. From the data, it appears that 
1956 was an unusually bad year and the chances of such a poor 
state of nature occurring in the future (on the basis of our 
data) are only one in five. Therefore, if we ignore for a 
moment the figures for 1956 and consider the results for only 
the remaining four years, we find that s^ (no farm yard 
manure) is strictly dominated by not one but three strategies 
(viz. S2, s^ and S5) and would, therefore, be counted off 
under Wald's criteria. But as soon as we take into account the 
observations for that abnormal year 1956, this strictly 
dominated strategy s^ is suggested by Wald's model. Thus 
Wald's approach gives all weight to small values in a row and 
no weight to large values. This could perhaps be best illus­
trated by the following hypothetical pay-off matrix. 
51 
52 
Here s^ would always be preferred to s2 by Wald's model, 
though intuitively this seems rather unreasonable as long as 
the chances of occurrence of t2 are more than 1/249. 
ti t2 
2 4 
0 500 
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Moreover, it has been pointed out earlier that, as a player 
against farmer, nature is passive in the sense that it does 
not always try to do the worst to the farmer. In such cases 
of a single state of nature being entirely different from the 
other states of nature which are more like each other among 
themselves, it may be better to ignore that extreme state of 
nature in case the probability of its occurrence is small (say 
less than 20 percent). 
Another problem with this criterion is that addition of a 
constant to the pay-off for each strategy for a given state of 
nature t^ q may result in the suggestion of a different 
strategy. This implies absence of the property of 'column 
linearity'. For example, suppose we add ten maunds to each 
figure for 1956 (to make it look like more of a normal year) 
in Table 3, the pay-off matrix would then be: 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 li 
S i  15.4 16.1 15.1 16.1 16.4 15.1 
S2 15.7 17.0 15.9 16.6 15.0 15.0 
S 3  16.1 15.9 15.8 16.8 16.3 15.8 
S 4  16.6 17.1 16.7 17.5 16.2 16.2 
S 5  15.7 21.7 18.9 21.0 15.5 15.5 
For this pay-off matrix the choice of Wald's criteria is 
Si^ which is different from s^—the strategy suggested in the 
original matrix. 
This approach is suitable for a farmer who is either a 
novice in farming, or has little equity, or is a subsistence 
farmer or a risk-averter by temperament, or has some other 
heavy responsibilities (like a large family to support), or 
has no other source of income to fall back upon in rainy days. 
This would also adequately suit a farmer who has been con­
stantly undergoing a loss for the last few years. It is 
desirable, when the frequency of the unfavorable states of 
nature is more than that of favorable states. 
Laplace's criterion This criterion has long been used 
by researchers and extension workers to make recommendations 
in agriculture. They have done this by taking the arithmetic 
averages of the values for different strategies and then test­
ing whether the difference between these means is statistically 
significant or not. The difference in the two approaches 
(Laplace model as such and statistically testing the signifi­
cance of the difference in means) is that in applying the 
Laplace criterion we choose the strategy with the highest 
average expected pay-off; we do not care whether this expected 
average pay-off is significantly different from other expected 
pay-offs or not. This model gives smaller weight to extreme 
values and, therefore, has a tendency to iron out the varia­
tions due to abnormal states of nature. The expected pay-off 
given by this criterion is always greater than or equal to the 
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expected average pay-off given by any other criterion. This 
is simple to apply and has the property of 'column linearity'. 
A characteristic of this criterion is that it suggests 
the same strategy as optimal no matter on which matrix (whether 
P or R) it is applied. 
Of the 12 applications made in this study, Laplace's 
principle agrees with Wald's approach in six instances and 
with regret model in nine cases. 
For the most appropriate use of the criterion, one of the 
requisites is to list all the possible pertinent states of 
nature. Clearly this is not a finite set and creates problems 
in proper generalizations. Chernoff (17) has given an axio­
matic treatment in defense of this principle. 
Another objection to this model may be regarding assump­
tion of complete ignorance itself. Does a farmer act under 
complete ignorance? Does he not have even the vaguest idea as 
to what state of nature is more likely? 
For a farmer who has been in farming business at least 
for sometime now and wants to stay for a sufficiently long 
time (say 20 years or more), Laplace principle may be most 
appropriate because the longer the period, the better the 
operation of the 'law of averages'. This model always suggests 
that pure strategy which has the highest expected pay-off of 
all other possible strategies available to him. 
This approach would also be appropriate to apply to a 
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farmer who, though he has enough capital and experience of 
farming elsewhere, decides to farm in a new region about which 
he does not have much practical knowledge and experience. 
Regret criterion Savage's regret criterion is the 
least conservative of all the approaches. However, it should 
not be interpreted to mean that this model would always suggest 
a strategy different from the conservative Wald's criterion. 
Of the twelve examples given, the two criteria suggested the 
same strategies in six cases. For a pay-off matrix given on 
page 121, regret criterion gives more sensible results than 
Wald's criterion. 
51 
P 
52 
The R for the above P is 
51 
52 
Suggestion: Choose S2. 
The assumption underlying this criterion, as the name 
suggests, is that the farmer tries to minimize his regret. 
The minimum pay-off under this criterion is always equal to or 
ti tz 
2 4 
0 500 
ti tg 
0 —496 
-2  0 
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lower than that suggested by Wald's model (as the latter 
recommends the maximum of the minimum), but the former may 
also (though not necessarily) provide the farmer with the 
opportunity to take advantage of the highest prices or maximum 
yields. In Table 7 Wald's model recommends to sell soybeans 
in January, whereas regret approach suggests that the best 
time to sell it is July or August. If the farmer sells soy­
beans in January, he can expect to get at least $2.60 per 
bushel; whereas, if he sells in July or August, he might end 
up getting only $2.31—a loss of $.29 per bushel. But if he 
goes by the suggestion of the regret criterion and sells soy­
beans in August, he can get as much as $3.53 per bushel—$.83 
more than the price of $2.70 which was the maximum that he 
could expect to get in January. 
In case of wheat (Table 11), Savage regret approach gives 
inappropriate (and inferior to Wald's) suggestion of selling 
it in May. Not only the minimum price in May of $1.37 per 
bushel, which is less than the minimum of $1.43 in January as 
suggested by Wald's principle, but the maximum in May of $1.92 
is also less than the maximum of $1.95 in January. In this 
case, therefore, it would be unwise to use the regret 
principle. 
As pointed out, the basic assumption underlying this 
model is that the farmer minimizes his regret. In practice, 
there is no evidence to support this argument. In fact, 
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Chernoff (17) has seriously questioned the very definition of 
regret. According to him, "It has never been clearly demon­
strated that differences in utility do in fact measure what 
one may call regret (risk). In other words, it is not clear 
that the regret of going from a state of utility 5 to a state 
of utility 3 is equivalent in some sense to that of going from 
a state of utility 11 to one of utility 9." 
This criterion may give such a large weight to a small 
advantage in one state of nature that it may be preferred over 
a considerable advantage in another state. Another objection 
to this approach is that the presence of undesirable strategies 
may influence the choice among the remaining strategies. 
This criterion may be especially suitable for the young 
enterprising farmers who would always like to cash in on the 
opportunity of greater returns. It could be called a 'non-
conservative' criteria because it is based on the assumption 
of occurrence of largest possible regret. 
Hurwicz' criterion This principle will not satisfy 
those looking for complete objectivity as the recommendations 
of the criterion would vary with the degree of optimism or 
pessimism of the decision-maker. The more optimistic the 
farmer, the greater the weightage given to the maximum value 
of the strategy and vice versa. For example, in Table 2 at 
r=.3 the suggested strategy is the application of 40 lbs. per 
acre of P2O5, but if a farmer is more optimistic and has r=.7. 
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say, he would end up choosing the application of 20 lbs. In 
the example of optimum sowing time for wheat, a very optimistic 
farmer (with r>.8) would choose to sow his crop on around the 
14th of November. If he were not so optimistic, the choice 
would fall on the 4th of November. As the value of 'r' 
decreases, the suggested strategy conforms more and more to 
that given by Wald's criterion. At r=.3, Hurwicz' model gives 
the same result as Wald's criterion in eight out of 12 applica­
tions. At r=0, Hurwicz* criterion is the same as Wald's. 
However, the basic and rather difficult question to 
answer is the determination of 'r'. One of the methods to 
derive an appropriate 'r' has been suggested by Luce and 
Raiffa. The basic idea behind the use of Hurwicz' method was 
to strike a compromise between the extreme liberal and con­
servative criteria. Therefore, extreme optimism and pessimism 
suggest strategies similar to the most liberal and most con­
servative criteria, respectively, and the very purpose of this 
criterion (to examine a weighted combination of the best and 
the worst states) -will be defeated. 
One of the big drawbacks of this criterion is that it 
takes into consideration only the extreme values and com­
pletely ignores the rest of the data. For instance, given to 
choose between s7 and Sg as an optimum selling time of oats 
(Table 9), any rational decision maker would prefer Sy to Sg. 
But whatever the value of r, Hurwicz' criterion is indifferent 
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between the two strategies. 
Another objection to this model would be that any randomi­
zation over optimal acts done on the basis of Hurwicz' 
approach is not necessarily optimal for this model. Further, 
if a decision maker is easily vulnerable to outside influences 
and quickly changes his mind, he is likely to have a tendency 
to revise his 'r' rather hastily and may then impart wrong 
weights to the best and the worst outcomes. 
Subjective probability model The four decision 
criteria discussed above assume that the farmer is acting 
under complete uncertainty. However, this is rarely true. 
From his own experience or from the experience of others, or 
from his education or just his belief, he might form some 
expectations in his own mind regarding the state of affairs 
and assign the 'a priori' probabilities to their occurrence, 
assuming that these states of nature were random. Then 
through observations and experience and by applying Bayesian 
methods, 'a priori' probabilities can be transformed into 
'a posteriori' probabilities. The process of transforming 
these subjective (a priori) probabilities of the various 
states of nature into conditional (a posteriori) probabilities 
has already been explained on pages 91-104. The relative 
merits and demerits of this approach have also been discussed 
earlier on page 105 and, therefore, shall not be discussed 
here any more. It would, however, be worth noting as to how 
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the assignment of different sets of probabilities to different 
states of nature would result in entirely different recom­
mendations, In Table 2 (showing pay-off matrix with respect 
to response of wheat yield to the different levels of P2O5), 
we have applied three different sets of subjective probability. 
The set a = (.2,.5,.3) assigns a probability of .2 to ti, .5 to 
t2 and .3 to tg. The other two sets are b = (.3,.2,.5) and 
c = (.1,.4,.5). 
Let set 'a' represent the subjective probability set of 
farmer A, 'b' of farmer B and 'c' of farmer C. Given the pay­
off matrix in Table 2, A will choose S3 and apply 40 lbs. of 
fertilizer, B will select S2 and use 20 lbs., whereas C will 
go for Si and would not apply any fertilizer at all. The 
three sets, 'a', 'b' and 'c', suggest three different strate­
gies as optimum. Due care, therefore, has to be exercised in 
the calculation of 'a posteriori' probabilities, otherwise the 
criterion would lose all its utility and lead to inconsistent 
results. 
As we have seen, Wald's criterion is pessimistic, whereas 
the regret principle assumes optimism. The nature never tries 
to do its worst to the farmer. In practice, especially in the 
developing economy, the farmer looks at the worst that could 
happen for a given state of nature and feels that he is better 
off to the extent of getting more than the worst pay-off. For 
this reason, the author suggests the following 'benefit 
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criterion* which seems to blend the properties of the regret 
and maxi-min principles. 
The criterion of excess (surplus) benefit 
The criterion—what is it? The underlying assumptions 
regarding the behavior of the decision maker under this 
criterion are as follows: 
a. He has full knowledge of the strategies available to 
him and also of the possible states of nature that can prevail, 
b. He knows the pay-off matrix P. 
c. He looks at the pay-offs for a given state of nature 
and finds out his strategy (say i) which gives him the lowest 
pay-off for that state of nature. If that state of nature 
prevails, the worst decision that he could make would be to 
play his Ith strategy (sj). If he chose any strategy i other 
than i, he has definitely done better than the worst that he 
could do for that state of nature. How much better has he 
done? We assume that he can find the answer to this question 
by deducting the lowest pay-off for that state of nature from 
the pay-off that he would get (for that state of nature) if he 
follows his ith strategy. This difference can be variously 
termed as the 'benefit', 'excess benefit', 'surplus' or 
'surfeit' resulting out of his choosing a strategy other than 
the worst for a given state of nature. (The matrix thus 
obtained is his 'benefit' matrix). 
d. He tries to maximize the minimum benefit, i.e., he 
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applies the maxi-min principle to this 'benefit' matrix. 
Let P = Pj^j be the pay-off matrix of the 
decision maker. 
Let min p.^ = p?? for a given state of nature t-. i 1] ] 
Then if the prevalent state of nature is j, the worst 
that a decision maker could do was to play strategy ST. SO if 
X 
he chose to play any strategy i, i ^ I, and if the true state 
of nature was j, the pay-off to him would be p^?, i 7^ ï and 
p.? > pTT as pq-? = min p.?. The difference between p.? and 1 3 - 1 3  13 13 13 
p?j is the benefit to the player due to his employing ith 
strategy rather than Ith strategy. 
Let B with elements b^^ (i = 1,2,•••n), (j = 1,2,**«m) be 
the benefit matrix, then 
bij = P- - min p., = p. J - pjj 
After the excess benefit matrix has been calculated in the 
above manner, the maxi-min criterion is applied to B matrix to 
find out the optimal strategy. 
The following example will illustrate the mechanism: 
Example: Let the pay-off matrix P be the following 
t 3  
Si 7 13 5 
S2 10 9 6 
S 3  8 7 8.5 
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It may be noted that no single row is dominated by 
another row or any convex combination of other rows. Simi­
larly, no column is dominated either by a single column or a 
convex combination of other columns. 
The 'benefit' matrix is calculated as follows: 
Therefore, 
Similarly, 
and 
min = Pii = 7, 
bii = Pii-Pii = 7-7 = 0, 
^21 ~ P2l~Pll ~ 10-7 = 3, 
^31 = Psi-Pll = 8-7 = 1. 
bi2 = P12-P32 = 13-7 = 6, 
^2 2  ~ 9—7 — 2, 
f c > 3 2  -  0 ;  
^13 ~ 0, 
^23 ~ If 
bs 3 = 3.5. 
The B matrix then is 
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tl ts 
Si 0 6 0 
B = S2 3 2 1 
S3 1 0 3.5 
min b,^ 
j ^ 
= t>li 1
1 CO r—i X
I II 
min b,^ 
j ^ 
= t>23 = 1 
min bgj = h22 ~ 0 
Using the maxi-min criterion, we find that 
max min = b23 = 1 
i j 
and the decision is to choose S2. 
In case of a tie (the maxi-min criterion suggests more 
than one strategy), it is suggested that the tie may be 
broken by trying the next higher (than the minimum) pay-off 
for each row and then again applying the maxi-min criterion. 
For example, the minimum for both s^ and S3 is 0 in B and if 
we have to make choice between these two, we should look for 
the next higher value (than the lowest, which is zero in this 
case). For sj it is 6, whereas for S3 it is 1. As 6 >1, we 
choose Si. 
If we use Wald's criterion for P in the example, the 
decision maker chooses S3. The regret matrix calculated from 
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this pay-off matrix P is: 
tl t2 t3 
Si -3 0 -3.5 
CM CO 0 -4 -2.5 
S 3  -2 —6 0 
Applying the maxi-min criterion, we find that the choice 
falls on Sj. To sum up for the P in the example, the three 
criteria suggest the following strategies: 
Optimal strategy 
Criterion suggested 
Wald's S3 
Regret si 
Benefit S2 
In our hypothetical example each principle suggests a 
different strategy. 
The question then arises, "Why in some cases do these 
three criterion give different results?" The answer to this 
question lies in examining 'what happens when the original 
pay-off matrix P is converted to a regret or benefit matrix?' 
When P is reduced to a regret or benefit matrix, the position 
(in order of being highest, next highest, •••lowest) of the 
different strategies Sj, S2, «••s^ in relation to each other 
remains the same for a given state of nature t?. This is 
clearly brought out by Figure 12 drawn for the pay-off 
matrices P, R and B in the example. 
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Let 
p 
tj be the graph (curve) for t^ of the pay-offs (of the 
original matrix P) associated with Si, s2 and S 3 .  
This is DFE in the picture. 
P P t2 and tg be graphs for t2 and t^, respectively, of the 
pay-offs of P associated with s^, s2 and S3. These 
are GHI and JKL, respectively. 
Similarly, 
tf, tf, and tf are the graphs for t^, t2, and ts, 
respectively, of the pay-offs of R associated with 
Si, S2, and S3. They are D'E'F', G'H'I', and J'K'L', 
respectively. 
Likewise, 
t^, tf, and tf are the graphs for tj, t2, and ts, 
respectively, of the pay-offs of B associated with 
Si, S2, and S3. They are labelled as D"E"F", 
and J"K"L", respectively. 
PR g It can be seen that the graphs for t^, t^, and tj, 
i.e., DEF, D'E'F', and D"E"F", are parallel to each other. 
The same holds true for t2 and t3. That is to say that GHI, 
G'H'I' and G"H"I" are parallel to each other. Similarly, 
JKL, J'K'L' and J"K"L" are also parallel to each other. This 
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is indicative of the fact that relative position of the s^ 
within a given t is unchanged under all the types of matrices. 
What happens is that in benefit matrix when we deduct the 
minimum pay-off in a given tj from other pay-offs in the same 
column, we are only displacing the curve for that t^, pushing 
it down to the (tune) extent of minimum pay-off in that t^. 
Thus, DBF has been displaced to D"E"F" and every point on DBF 
is seven units farther (towards the higher side) from the 
corresponding point on D"E"F" relating to a given s^. The 
minimum over i in t2 is also 7 and, therefore, GHI and 
are parallel to each other at a distance of 7 units 
(whatever be the unit of measurement of pay-off, e.g., bushels, 
dollars, tons, etc.). 
Likewise, in the case of tg, the minimum in the column is 
5 and the two graphs JKL and J"K"L" are 5 units apart from 
each other at any given point on the s^ scale. 
In the case of a regret matrix, the original curve for a 
given tj is displaced in the downward direction by a distance 
equal to the maximum in that column (tj). Thus for tj the 
maximum is 10 and DEF is displaced to D'E'F' by 10 units. 
Similarly, GHI is shifted to G'H'I', the distance being 13 
units, and JKL moves to J'K'L', 8 units below its original 
position. 
The displacement in case of a regret matrix is always 
more than that in the benefit matrix because the maximum in a 
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column is always > minimum in that column. If the minimum in 
P B 
a column is zero, then t^ and t^ remain the same. For example, 
P if the minimum in t^ would have been zero, then DEF and D"E"F" 
would have coincided with each other. 
The reason for getting different results from different 
criteria (pay-off matrices) should be evident by now. As we 
just noted, the displacement of a given t^ is not uniform. 
For instance, DEF is displaced by 7 units to D"E"F", whereas 
the displacement in JKL to J"K"L" is of the order of only 5. 
The result is that, no doubt, the relative positions of pay­
offs for s^ in a given t^ remain the same, the positions of 
pay-offs for a given s^ (in a row) change in relation to each 
other due to this difference in the degree of displacement. 
This point can be well illustrated by referring to Figures 12 
and 13. 
P P P Let Si, S2, and Sg be the sets of pay-offs associated 
with Si, Sg and S3, respectively, for the pay-off matrix P. 
Let s^, Sgf and sf be the sets of pay-offs of the regret 
matrix associated with S], , Sg and S3, respectively. 
Let s^, s2 f and sf be the sets of pay-offs of the benefit 
matrix associated with s^, Sg and S3, respectively. 
First let us consider t^(DEF), tf(GHI), and t^(JKL) in 
p 
Figure 13. The set s^ consists of points (G,D,J). Since more 
is preferred to less and the height of the point directly 
p 
represents the pay-off, for the set s^ it is true that G>D>J. 
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P P Similarly, for Sg and S3 we have E>H>K and L>F>I, respectively. 
In P, for s^ the lowest point is J, for Sg it is K and for S3 
it is I. Since I is the highest of these, I>K>J, using the 
usual maxi-min principle, I represents the optimal pay-off and 
s3 is the optimal strategy. 
Now consider tf = (D'E'F'), tg = (G'H'I') and tf = 
(J'K'L'). The set s^ consists of (G'D'J*), which are dis-
p 
placed G, D and J of s^. However, note that the order of 
these elements in s^ is (G'>D'>J'), which is the same as 
P (G>D>J) obtained for s^. 
For s^, the order is (E'>K'>H'), which differs from 
p (E>H>K) in Sg. It is this change in the order of displaced 
elements which is responsible for the choice of a different 
strategy in the regret criterion as compared to the VJald's 
R R 
criterion. The minimum element of s^ is J', Sg is H', and for 
s^ it is I'. From Figure 12 we find that (J'>H'>I'). Hence 
we choose s^. 
Likewise, for s^, Sg, and s^ the elements in order of 
preference are (G">D"=:J") , (E">H">K") and (L">F">I") and the 
minimum elements of each set are D"=J", K" and I", respec­
tively. The order of these points in accordance with their 
relative heights is K">I"=D"=J" and the choice naturally falls 
on K", an element of Sg. 
All that has been described above can also be verified 
from Figure 13. This figure has graphs of different s^ for 
142 
ti, t2 and tg. The same nomenclature for two points in the 
two figures denotes that the two points are the same. For 
example, point J in Figure 12 represents (tg^Si), which is 
pi3 = 5. In Figure 13 J also represents (siftg), i.e., Pi3 
and the corresponding pay-off is 5. 
Characteristics of the benefit criterion and its 
comparison with Wald's and regret principles In the Wald's 
criterion we make use of the original pay-off matrix, whereas 
in the other two methods, P is transformed into R and B. The 
method of deriving R from P is different from that of calculat­
ing B. 
In all these cases (to all these matrices—P, R and B), 
the maxi-min principle is applied to find out the optimal 
strategy. 
In calculating the regret matrix it is the maximum pay­
off in a column which is considered. It is, therefore, rather 
an optimistic approach. In arriving at the 'benefit' matrix, 
it is the worst consequence for a given state of nature which 
is taken into account. The decision maker starts looking for 
what could have been the worst strategy that he could have 
chosen given a state of nature and then treats all pay-offs in 
excess of the lowest pay-off as the benefits accruing from his 
choosing that particular strategy rather than the worst. This 
is, of course, more pessimistic than the 'regret' principle. 
The benefit matrix is similar to 'regret' matrix in that 
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as is the case with the latter, it is arrived at by deducting 
a constant from other pay-offs for a given state of nature. 
However, it resembles Wald's criterion in the sense that the 
minimum of a row of P in Wald's criterion has to be in the 
same column as the minimum of that row in the B matrix obtained 
from P. That is, if 
mm p-r. 
3 
then it is necessary that 
min b-r. 
j 
In our example, for row 1 
and we see that 
mm p, . 
j 
min b, . 
j 
Similarly, in row 2 
pjj, 
bjj. 
=  P i  3  
= bi3 (also bjI) 
mm p„ • 
j ^ 
For row 3 
-  P 2  3  and min b 2] = b 2  3  
min p,^ = P3 2 and min b_^ = b3 2. j 3: . 
This is not necessarily true for regret matrix. Again in 
our example, in row 2 
min p„. 
j ^ -  P 2  3  
and mm r 2j = r 22 
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It must be re-emphasized that in each case (Wald's, 
Regret and Excess Benefit) we apply the same maxi-min principle 
to all the matrices, viz. P, R and B. The difference is only 
in the matrix derived from the original pay-off matrix under 
different assumptions. 
If min p.. = 0 for all j, then P = B and Wald's and 
i 3-J 
benefit principles give the same results. 
Laplace's criterion suggests the same strategy as optimal 
no matter on which matrix (P, R or B) it is applied. It is 
simply because of the fact that when we consider the averages, 
the variations in displacements are ironed out. 
Applications of benefit criterion in agriculture The 
following table gives the strategies suggested by this 
criterion for the twelve applications done elsewhere. The 
strategies suggested by Wald, Laplace, Hurwicz and Savage's 
regret principles are also given here for the sake of conveni­
ence in comparison of the strategies suggested by these 
criteria. 
Benefit and Wald criteria suggest the same strategy in 
five of the applications shown in Table 13. Regret and 
benefit principles agree on four choices. Three of these 
cases, viz. 1, 4 and 5, are such where the same strategy is 
suggested by Wald, regret and benefit models. In Application 3 
benefit criterion chooses Sij, application of 10 tons of farm 
yard manure per acre. This has not been suggested by any 
Table 13. Strategies chosen by different criteria 
Strategies suggested by criterion 
Application Hurwicz 
No. Benefit Wald Laplace (.3,.7) (.7,.3) Regret 
1 Si Si Si Si Si Si 
2 Si S3 s 3 S3 S2 Si 
3 S4 Si S5 S5 S 5  ss 
4 S2 S2 S2 S2 S2 S2 
5 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 
6 Sg S5 Sg Sg Sg s? 
7 Si 2  Si s? S8 S 8  S? /Ss 
8 S5 Sli S 2  Si S2 Si fS2 ,S3 
9 Si 2  Si ,S2 , Stt f Sg S5 S5 Si 2  Si /S2 /S3 fSit 
10 Sg Sg Sg Sa Si Sa 
11 Si 0 /Si 1 ,Si 2 Si / S2 Si Si Si S2 /S 5 
12 S6 SG S5 S6 Se S5 
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other criterion. If the state of nature is ts, the worst that 
a farmer could do was to apply 2.5 tons of manure to an acre. 
If he chose as suggested by benefit principle, he is 
better off than when he would have used s 5 as suggested by 
regret criterion. However, under tg, it is worse than the 
pay-off for Sj, which is chosen by Wald's principle. 
For Applications 3, 8, 9 and 11, the choice as given by 
the benefit principle is different from those by other of 
the four criteria. 
This criterion of 'excess benefit' combines Wald's 
criterion (for original pay-off matrix P) and regret principle 
in many ways. For example, look at sf, s^, and sf in Figure 
p 
13. Whereas S2 (EHK) has a kink on the upper side at H, for 
the regret criterion, s2 (E'H'K') has a kink on the lower side 
of the curve at H*. The graph of s2 for the 'benefit 
g 
criterion', i.e., S2, is a straight line (E"H"K") showing a 
compromise between the two criteria—Wald's (rank pessimist 
criterion) and Savage's regret (rank optimist) criterion—and, 
therefore, can be termed as neither too optimistic nor too 
pessimistic. Under the most favorable circumstances, it may 
be better than Wald's but poorer as compared to the regret 
principle. However, under unfavorable conditions, it may be 
inferior to Wald's but superior to the regret criterion. (By 
inferior and superior, we mean affording lower or higher pay­
offs, respectively.) Of course, it might be desirable to 
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further test its suitability to different situations, but 
the very fact that it is a hybrid of Wald's and Savage's 
criteria should render it more vigorous and productive than 
the above two for decision making in agriculture. 
Summary 
Efforts were made in the foregoing applications and 
discussion of the various principles of choice to suggest the 
suitability of different approaches to the farmer (decision 
maker) under different sets of circumstances. The desira­
bility and, therefore, the choice of a decision model would 
be largely governed by the: 
a. Goals of the farmer—whether he wants to maximize 
profits or satisfaction or family happiness, etc. 
b. His psychology and outlook. 
c. His financial status in terms of his equity, total 
investments in the farm and outside, the size of the 
farm, etc. 
d. The nature of the enterprises, with respect to their 
diversity and variability, or of returns. 
e. The variability in the states of nature. 
f. Farmer's resources. 
g. His education and age. 
h. His knowledge of technology, of states of nature, 
his standing in the farming business in terms of 
years, his experience. 
i. His family situation. 
The set of permutations and combinations of these and 
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other factors is infinite. Therefore, it is rather difficult 
to prescribe a rule of thumb, but the suggestions and observa­
tions of this study made in discussing the pros and cons of 
various criterion in the light of their applications to these 
examples would hopefully serve to provide a guideline to the 
farmer. Milnor (70), in his paper entitled "Games Against 
Nature", has laid down a set of ten properties of an accept­
able decision criterion (a criterion yielding a complete 
ordering for all acts is defined by him as acceptable) and has 
demonstrated that of the four approaches (Wald's, Laplace's, 
Hurwicz' and regret), no single criterion possesses all the 
properties. It would be interesting to test the criterion of 
benefit and see how many of the required properties are 
present in this principle. However, it appears to be more 
realistic and useful than any other criteria. 
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APPLICATIONS OF MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING IN AGRICULTURE 
If the structure of a system and the objective function 
can be expressed in terms of a mathematical model, the desired 
solution can be computed by means of the techniques grouped 
under a general heading of 'Mathematical Programming'. They 
include tools like linear programming (integer and non-integer, 
variable price and variable resource, perturbation techniques, 
etc.) and non-linear programming (e.g., quadratic programming, 
concave and convex programming) and dynamic programming. For 
special situations, techniques of recursive and parametric 
programming, etc. have been developed. Dantzig (23) has given 
the classification of the programming problems as shown on 
page 149. 
As the name suggests, like any other mathematical tool, 
mathematical programming is a mathematical technique without 
any economic content. Its sole purpose is to indicate the 
optimum solution to a problem for a given set of circumstances. 
It would be rather ambitious to attempt to deal with all 
classes of mathematical programming. Therefore, we shall con­
fine ourselves to the study of only the following aspects of 
linear programming: 
a. Characteristics of linear programming problems and 
the general results (theorems) of linear programming 
b. Connection between game theory and linear programming 
c. Linear fractional functional programming—a brief 
Classification of Programming Problems 
Discrete or Continuous 
Multistage or Non-multistage Special cases 
(Dynamic or Non-Dynamic) of these classifications 
DETERMINISTIC 
Linear 
General structures 
Special structures 
Non-linear 
Convex 
Non-convex 
PROBABILISTIC 
No Opponents 
Known probability distribution 
Unknown probability distribution 
Against Opponents 
Two person games 
Multi-person games 
Linear inequality theory 
Dynamic systems, Leontief 
models. Networks 
Decreasing pay-off. Chemical 
equilibrium. Convex programs 
Increasing returns to scale. 
Many local maxima 
Inventory control, Markov 
chains 
Sequential decisions 
Zero-sum games 
Coalition theory 
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description of a new algorithm to solve problems of 
linear fractional functional programming and its 
application in agriculture 
Linear Programming 
One of the simple but perhaps the most important and 
widely used techniques developed in the field of operations 
research is linear programming. Its applicability to the 
practical applications in the fields of management economics 
has been largely responsible for its development to the present 
level. The objective is to optimize (maximize or minimize as 
the case may be) the function f(x) where f(x) = FX + k is a 
vector function. It is linear. 
F is a functional, 
k is a constant, and 
X ranges over a convex polyhedral set of points. 
The maximization (or minimization) of the objective func­
tion is subject to certain linear constraints. The usual way 
of writing a maximization problem in a matrix form is: 
Maximize z = c'x, subject to 
Ax < b, 
X > 0 
where 
A is m X n matrix 
c is n X 1 vector 
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X is n X 1 vector 
b is m X 1 vector 
and 
c'x = Z is the objective function. 
This problem can be written as 
Maximize Z = c^Xi + c^Xg + ••• + c^x^ 
subject to aiiXi + 3^2X2 + ••• + a^^x^ < bj 
azixi + 322X2 + ••• + ^ 2n^n -
^1^1 + + ••• + a^x^ < b 
x i  >  0  
X2 > 0 
Xm % 0" 
In a compact form the problem is 
n 
Maximize Z = J c.x. j=l ^ ] 
n 
subject to y a.. X .  <  b. 1] ] - 1 
X  >  0 .  ] -
where 
i = (1,2, •••m) and j = (1,2, •••n) 
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The problem in the preceding form (maximization problem) 
is referred to as the 'primal problem* or 'primal form' of 
linear programming problem. A maximization problem can be 
quickly converted into an equivalent minimization problem in 
the following manner. 
Write down the objective function as 
- (- maximize c'x) 
subject to 
Ax < by 
X > 0. 
The statements - (minimize - c'x) and - (- maximize c'x) are 
equivalent. Therefore, the problem can be written as 
- (minimize - c'x) 
subject to 
Ax < b 
X > 0. 
First the problem is solved for the objective function 
(minimize - c'x). Then the negative of the solution gives the 
value of the objective function in the original problem. A 
minimization problem can be converted to a maximization prob­
lem in exactly the same manner. 
A linear programming problem arises primarily due to the 
following two reasons: 
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(a) The number of constraints is not equal to the 
number of variables (i.e., m n) and, therefore, 
matrix A does not have a full rank. 
(b) The inequalities of the constraints. 
The basic assumptions underlying a linear programming 
model are those of 
1. Additivity of the resources and activities 
2. Linearity of the objective function 
3. Non-negativity of the decision variables 
4. Divisibility of activities and resources 
5. m and n being finite 
6. Resource supplies, input-output coefficients, prices 
of resources and activities, etc., known with 
certainty 
One of the essential parts of a linear programming problem 
is building up the model. Dantzig (23) has given the following 
five steps of model building in linear programming. 
Step 1: Define the 'activity set'. This involves a decomposi­
tion of the system into its basic components called 
activities and choosing a unit for each activity in terms 
of which its quantity or level can be measured. 
Step 2: Define the 'item set'. The items that are either 
produced or consumed (negative production) by the 
activities are determined and a suitable unit of measure­
ment chosen for each of these items. One item is 
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selected such that the net quantity of it produced by the 
system as a whole measures the 'cost' (or such that its 
negative measures the 'profit') of the entire system. 
Step 3: Determine the 'input-output coefficients'. These 
coefficients are the proportion of activities and the 
item flows. Commonly speaking, they refer to the 
quantity of each item produced or consumed by the opera­
tion of each activity at its unit level. 
Step 4: Determine the 'exogenous flows'. This step requires 
determination of the inputs or outputs in 'net' terms of 
the items between the system, taken as a whole, and the 
outside. 
Step 5: Determine the material balance equations. Unknown 
(non-negative) activity levels Xj, X2, ••• are assigned 
to all activities in the system and then 'material 
balance equation' for each item is written down. The 
equation asserts that the algebric sum of the flows of 
that item into each activity (given as the product of 
the activity level by the appropriate input-output 
coefficient) is equal to the exogenous flow of the item. 
All these steps result in a set of mathematical relation­
ships characterizing all the feasible programs of the system. 
This set is termed as the 'linear programming model'. 
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Primal and dual 
Every linear programming problem comes in a package of 
two, i.e., 'primal' and its 'dual'. For every primal problem 
there exists an equivalent dual problem. 
where A, b, c and x have the same dimensions as given on pages 
150-151. In this illustration y is a vector with dimensions 
m X 1, i.e., y = (y^, y2, •••, y^). The dual variable is y 
(dual of x). If the primal is a maximization problem, its 
dual would always be a minimization problem and vice versa. 
A 'primal' is the 'dual' to its own 'dual', i.e., the dual of 
a dual of a primal problem is the primal problem itself. 
Further, if there are n variables and m constraints in the 
primal problem, in the dual we shall have m variables and n 
constraints. Solving one (either primal or dual) would give a 
solution to both. 
The utility of duality lies not only in the fact that it 
yields a number of powerful theorems in linear programming, 
but also because it has very important economic interpretations 
in terms of shadow prices, etc. Further, if m is much larger 
than n, it would be rather easy to solve the dual rather than 
Primal problem 
Maximize c'x 
subject to Ax < b 
Dual problem 
Minimize b'y 
subject to A'y > c 
y > 0 x > 0 
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the primal problem. 
Applications of linear programming in agriculture 
Linear programming has been used in agriculture almost 
since its very inception. In 1951 Waugh (109) applied this 
technique to the problem of minimization of costs of feed for 
dairy cows, Koopmans' "Activity Analysis of Production and 
Resource Use" has a paper entitled, "On the Choice of a Crop 
Rotation Plan" by Hildreth and Reiter (42). "Linear Pro­
gramming Methods" by Heady and Candler (39) deals exclusively 
with applications in the field of agriculture. Boles (11) 
has written on "Linear Programming and Farm Management 
Analysis". Perhaps the most extensive use of linear pro­
gramming in agriculture has been in the field of feed-mixing 
with the object of minimization of cost of feed. Even 
stochastic programming models have been used and in some 
states services are available to the farmer to advise him (on 
an individual basis) on the least-cost-feed-mix on his farm 
with the use of computer. For example, Doan Agricultural 
Service has used linear programming as a management service 
to the farmer in the United States. Several land grant 
colleges have undertaken programs for farm planning, on a 
limited scale, as a part of their extension activity. Use of 
linear programming for individual farmers is commonly referred 
to as 'program planning' and has been widely used in Europe 
and Japan and to a limited extent in the U.S.A. Barker (4) 
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conducted a study on the use of linear programming in making 
farm management decisions and came to the conclusion that, 
"linear programming can be of value in farmer decision-making 
by providing quantitative estimates of returns for specified 
alternatives and levels of resource use" and the larger the 
size of the farm, the larger the number of alternatives and 
the greater the likelihood of benefits from linear programming 
exceeding its costs. 
In addition to their use at the micro-level, i.e., cost 
minimization and profit maximization on an individual farm, 
linear programming techniques have been applied with advantage 
at the macro-level for solving the problems of agricultural 
marketing and spatial analysis. Studies in inter-regional 
production and adjustments for major crops have been made 
through the use of 'spatial linear programming' technique. 
Transportation models are the simplest of linear programming 
models applied in agriculture. 
Since simple linear programming techniques have been 
extensively used in agriculture and it is virtually impossible 
to touch on all types and phases of linear programming applica­
tions in farming, it is proposed to limit the treatment of 
linear programming in this study to 
(a) general characteristics of the feasible set of a 
linear programming problem, 
(b) important theorems and results in linear programming. 
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(c) relationship of game theory to linear programming, 
and 
(d) application of a relatively new technique of linear 
fractional functional programming in agriculture. 
We shall be dealing here only with the problems of maxi­
mization. Problems of minimization can be handled in a 
similar manner by converting them to those of maximization in 
the manner given on page 152. 
General features 
Once again the general format of a maximization problem 
is 
Maximize Z = c'x 
subject to Ax < b, 
X > 0 
where 
A is m X n matrix, 
X is n X 1 vector, 
b is m X 1 vector, 
c is n X 1 vector. 
Clearly, we shall be operating in the positive orthant with 
dimension of n-1. 
As we have m rows and n decision variables, the total 
number of half spaces is (m + n). These half spaces are 
closed. Thus the power set of a linear programming problem is 
159 
a closed convex polyhedron since it is an intersection of 
m + n half spaces and because a half-space (whether it is open 
or closed) is always convex. 
If F is a function on Euclidean space (the members of 
X being x^,X2/•••,x^) and b = (b^,b2,•••,b^) is a vector of 
numbers, then 
FX < b and FX > b 
are closed half spaces in Euclidean space X^ and 
FX < b and FX > b 
,n 
are open half spaces in X . 
For a two-dimensional case in our example, say 
aiiXi + 812X2 < b , the diagram will be something like Figure 
14. In the diagram line PQ is a set with the property that 
PQ = a^1X1 + ai9X9 = b 1 2^2 
Note that PQ divides the positive quadrant (whole space) into 
two parts. 
N and M are half spaces. If M contains PQ, then M is 
closed half space, otherwise open. Similarly, if N contains 
PQ, N is then closed. If not, it is open. 
a. If M contains PQ, then set M is defined as 
M = 
^11 xi + ai 2X2 > b] 
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a,| X| +0|2 
Oil x, + a|2 X2^b| 
Figure 14. Open and closed half-spaces in a two-dimensional 
space 
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b. Without PQ being in M, 
M = aiiXi + ai2X2 > bi 
Likewise, 
a. If N contains PQ, then 
N = aiiXi + aigXz < b] 
b. If PQ is not contained in N, 
N = OJ ^11^1 ^12^2 ^ b2 
The problem in solving a linear programming problem is to 
find efficient set (determined by the objective) of extreme 
points of this closed convex polyhedral set, as every extreme 
point is a basic feasible solution to the set of constraints 
and also that every basic feasible solution is an extreme 
point of the convex set of feasible solutions. If K is this 
power set defined by Ax < b, then is an (kth) extreme point 
of K if 
a. e^ belongs to K, and 
b. e^ is the intersection of the bounding hyperplanes. 
The property of the extreme points e^ is that every point in K 
can be expressed as a convex combination of the e^/s. For an 
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n-simplex, the number of extreme points is n + 1, i.e., if 
j = 1,2,•••n, then k = 1,2,•••n+1. As every extreme point 
is a basic feasible solution to the set of constraints and 
also as every basic feasible solution is an extreme point of 
the convex set of feasible solutions, the optimum (maximum or 
minimum as the case may be) value of c'x, as x varies over K, 
will be at one or more of the extreme points of K. Therefore, 
the answer to the linear programming problem lies in 
a. finding values of the objective function at the 
extreme points, and 
b. choosing the optimum. 
The simplex method is a technique of finding out these 
corner positions (extreme values). In this method, the slack 
variables, introduced to convert the 
inequalities to equalities and the coefficients of these slack 
variables in c vector are zero. The original problem is then 
transformed into the following new problem: 
Maximize Z = c^x^ + C2X2 + + Ox 
n+m 
subject to 
aiixi + ai2X2 + ••• + a^^x^ + Ix^^^ 
b 
m 
163 
x i  >  0  
X2 > 0 
^n+m - ^ 
Let us call 
/Xi 
X 
n 
^^n+m I 
A I 
m 
/X xi>0 
= b , 
X 
n+m 
X 
n+m>0 
C E ,m+n 
where is m x m identity matrix and E^^^ is euclidean space 
of dimension n+m. 
Then there is 1 - 1 correspondence between extreme points 
of K and L. As the value of the objective function Z would be 
equal to that of Z, the two problems—original and transformed 
—are equivalent and solving the new problem would automati­
cally give the solution to the original problem. Simplex 
method takes advantage of this property of 1 - 1 correspondence 
and deals with the transformed problem. The method enables us 
to go from one extreme point to another directly and then to 
another until an optimum is reached. The problem of finding a 
starting extreme point (initial basic feasible solution) is 
handled in the simplest manner by starting with all the 
activities at the zero level. In a two-dimensional case. 
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Figure 15, this starting point is 'E'. 
A 
E 
Figure 15. Initial basic feasible solution 
At E, Xi =0 and X2 = 0. Starting from E, we go to A, B, 
C or D (as may be necessary) in steps and testing at every 
step whether we have reached the optimal solution. 
Some basic results in linear programming 
A problem in the dual form is converted to that in a primal 
form by simply changing the signs of all parameters and vice 
versa. 
Before some results are stated, it would be helpful to 
define 'lagrangian form' and its 'saddle point'. 
Primal form (problem) 
Maximize c'x 
subject to Ax < b, 
X > 0 
Dual problem 
Minimize b'y 
subject to A'y > c 
y > 0 
y is the dual variable 
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Definition: f(x,y) = c'x + y(b-Ax) is called the lagrangian 
form of the primal problem. 
g(y,x) = - (y'b) + (yA-c)x is called the lagrangian form 
of the dual. 
It should be noted that f(x,y) = -g(y,x). 
Definition: x*,y*, a pair of vectors, is a saddle point of 
f(x,y), if 
(a) X* > 0, y* > 0, and 
(b) for all X > 0, y > 0, f(x,y*) < f{x*,y*) < f(x*,y). 
Result 1: If x* is feasible for primal and y* is feasible for 
the dual, then y*b > cx*. 
Result 2 : x* is a solution to the primal if there exists a y* 
such that (x*,y*) is a saddle point of f(x,y). 
Result 3: If the primal and dual problems have feasible 
vectors, then both problems have solutions and all pairs 
of solutions X* and y* are such that y*b = cx*. This is 
called the 'existence theorem*. 
Result 4: If x* is optimal for the primal and y* is optimal 
for the dual, then y*b = cx*. This is sometimes referred 
to as the 'fundamental theorem of linear programming'. 
Result 5: If 
(a) X* is feasible for primal, 
(b) y* is feasible for the dual, and if 
(c) y*b = cx*, 
then 
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(a) X* is a solution to the primal, 
(b) y* is a solution to the dual, and 
(c) (x*,Y*) is a saddle point of f(x,y). 
Result 6: If the primal problem has a solution x*, then 
(a) the dual problem has a solution y*, and 
(b) y*b = cx*. 
This is called the 'duality theorem'. 
Result 7: If x* and y* are solutions to the primal and the 
dual respectively, then 
(Ax*) . < b. »- y* = 0, and 
x  1  - ^ 1  '  
(y*A)j >  c j  ) •  x j  =  0. 
The property of y*b = cx* can be used with advantage to 
derive the following results with the help of calculus under 
the assumption that the first and second order derivatives 
exist. 
(a) If we attempt to evaluate (x*,y*), we 
find that 
3f(x,y) 
3b^ x=x* 
y=y* 
y*. 
(b) Similarly, 
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(c) In the comparative static analysis sense: 
(i) ^ 0 ^ f(x,y) is a concave 
non-decreasing function in b, i.e., if we hold 
others constant and vary b only, the objective 
function takes a concave non-decreasing shape 
as shown in Figure 16.i. 
f (x,y) 
Slope of ) 
A b 
Figure 16.i. Concave non-decreasing function 
0 < <- y* < . 
(ii) Likewise, > q  ». f(x,Y) is a convex 3c. 
non-decreasing function in the c space as can 
be seen in Figure 16.ii. 
C, 
g ^(^^if^)+=Slope of BC 
y* at B 
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f (x,y) 
Slope of )_-
X* at B 
B 
D 
+Slope of BC=[*f 
Figure 16.ii. Convex non-decreasing function 
Here 0 < (M^)_ < 
] ] 
Relationship of game theory to linear programming 
It would be interesting and useful to note that the game 
theory and linear programming are closely related. Here the 
equivalence of and connection between game theory and linear 
programming shall be demonstrated in brief. 
1. The method used below for illustrating the connection 
between game theory and linear programming has been given by 
Karlin (50). 
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Let A be the coefficient matrix for the usual primal 
linear programming problem and let its size be m % n. Matrix 
A is then enlarged in the following manner and let this 
enlarged matrix be called P. 
n m 1 
0 -A' -c n 
p = A 0 -b m 
c ' b' 0 1 
where 
m, n and 1 denote the size of the columns or rows, 
c is n X 1 vector (same as in primal problem), 
b is m X 1 vector (same as in linear programming 
problem) , 
0 in the top left corner is an n x n matrix with 
all its elements being zeros, 
0 in the middle is m x m matrix with all elements 
being zeros, 
0 in the bottom right corner is a scalar, 
P is a skew-symmetric matrix with dimensions 
(m+n+1) X (m+n+1). 
Therefore, the value of the game represented by P is zero and 
the optimal strategy sets X° and are identical for the two 
players. 
Let 
X* = (x*, X*, • • • X*) 
be the optimal probabilities attached to first 'n' rows/columns 
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Y* = (Yi, y*' '' -y*) 
be the optimal probabilities attached to the next 'm' 
rows/columns, and where x* is a column vector and y* is a 
row vector. Then 
xO = Y° = (x*,y*,A) 
where 
X is the probability attached to the last row/column. 
It may be recalled here that P is skew-symmetric and, there­
fore, the game with pay-off matrix P is a symmetric game. 
The connection between game theory and linear programming 
is then given by the following result. 
If symmetric game with pay-off matrix P has a solution 
with X > 0, then both the primal and the dual linear pro­
gramming problems have solutions. 
c ' The solution for the primal problem is —^—. 
The solution to the dual problem is and À = 1 - ^xt - ^y^. 
Since optimal solution to a primal is equal to optimal 
solution for its dual, we have 
c'x* _ y*b 
X X 
and 
c'x* = y*b. 
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This demonstrates how game theory is related to linear 
programming and how can we get a solution to one from the 
solution to the other. Unfortunately, solving for (x*,y*,X) 
is no easy task in itself if the size of P is large. There­
fore, it might not be out of place to point out that a game 
problem can be converted into a linear programming form with 
great ease in the following manner. 
2. Let there be two players P and Q with the pay-off 
matrix A, the dimensions of which are m x n. Further, let P 
be the maximinimizer and Q be the minimaximizer. Also let 
y* = (yif yh • • -y*] 
be the optimal strategy set for P, and 
X* = [x*, x*, ••-x*) 
be the optimal strategy_set for Q. Further, let V be the 
value of the game. 
Then if P uses his strategies with optimal probabilities 
y*, his expected pay-off will be at least V no matter what Q 
does. Similarly, if Q uses his optimal strategy set x*, his 
expected loss would, at most, be V regardless of P's play. 
Let 
"i = IT = v-
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As Xj and y? are probabilities. 
ZXj = 1 and = 1. 
Therefore, 
Zz. i and 
Since P is a maxi-minimizer, he would try to maximize V 
or minimize Thus his problem can be written as follows; 
Minimize Ew^^ 
subject to y*aii + + + > V 
ri^in + ^2*2* + + y a > V •^m mn 
yT > 0 
= 1 
Dividing both sides of the constraint inequalities by V we 
have 
Minimize Ew^ 
subject to w^aii + W2a2i + + w a > 1 
m ml 
w a + w a + 1 In 2 2n 
w. > 0 1 — 
+ w a > 1 
m mn 
call it 
G 
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This is just in the form of the usual dual problem. 
Similarly for player Q, the problem is to 
Maximize Zz 
subject to ajix* + 3^2%* + ••• + a^^x* < V 
a X* + a X* + • • • + a x* < V 
mi 1 m2 2 mn n -
xT > 0 1 -
ZxT = 1 
Dividing both sides of the constraint inequalities by V we 
have 
Maximize Zz^ 
subject to aiiZi + 3.12^2 
z .  >  0  1 — 
Call it 
H 
This can be easily verified that H is 'dual' to G and vice 
versa. 
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Linear Fractional Functionals Programming and 
Its Possibilities of Being Applied to Agriculture 
The problem here is to optimize the objective function 
which is a ratio of two linear functions of the decision 
variable. Of course, the constraints are linear. 
If X is the decision variable, the format of the problem 
would be 
Optimize (maximize or minimize) (j)(x) = ^ ^  
subject to Ax = b 
x > 0 
where 
c, X, b and A are the same as in the ordinary 
linear programming problem, 
r and q are scalars, and 
d is n X 1 vector. 
Charnes and Cooper (16), in their paper on "Programming 
with Linear Fractional Functionals", solved the problem by 
resolving it into two linear programming problems in the 
following manner. 
Let us assume that the problem given above was solved. 
Let 
K = |^x|Ax = b , x>oJ 
be non-empty and bounded. 
Then they transformed the problem (broke it up) into two 
linear programming problems as shown below and solved them. 
(a) Maximize c'Y + rt 
subject to AY - bt = 0 
d'Y + qt = 1 
Y > 0 
t > 0 
(b) Maximize -c'Y - rt 
subject to AY - bt = 0 
-d'Y - qt = 1 
Y > 0 
t > 0 
As would appear, the transformation used is Y = tx in 
such a way that the denominator of the objective function is 
reduced to unity. 
Kanti Swaroop (98) has proposed a more direct approach in 
his paper on "Linear Fractional Functionals Programming". He 
has established conditions for the optimality criterion, 
starting from the basic feasible solution and demonstrating 
conditions under which the solution can be improved. The 
utility of the method lies in its similarity to the 'simplex' 
method. First of all, algorithm given by him shall be 
described in brief and then applied to a hypothetical example 
in agriculture. 
He has assumed that the denominator is always positive 
for all feasible solutions (i.e., d'x + q > 0). In his paper 
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he proves that the maximum of ^(x) will be at the basic 
feasible solution. He then proceeds to enunciate his 
algorithm. The problem is 
Maximize 4(x) = ^ ^  
subject to Ax < b 
X > 0. 
First of all, slack vectors are added in the usual 
fashion and A is enlarged to [A I^] = P with columns p^ 
(j = 1,2,••«n+m). 
If Xg is the initial basic feasible solution such that 
(1) BXg = b, where B = (bi,»««,b^) is m x m matrix as 
each b is m X 1 vector, then 
(2) Xg = B-lb and Xg > 0. 
Let c' be those components of vector c that are coefficients 
associated with and let d^ be the components of vector d' 
that are coefficients associated with X„. 
(3) Let f = c^Xg + r. 
(4) Let g = d^Xg + q. 
(5) Let h = f/g. 
It is also assumed that for this X_ 
(6) Uj = Bpj, 
(7) f. = c'u., and 
3 ° J 
(3) Sj = 
are known for every column Pj of P not in B. 
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Let the new basic feasible solution be called . Also 
let us represent basis and other things associated with this 
new solution by a superscript of 1, except for B for which we 
shall use the subscript 1 rather than superscript for conveni­
ence. Thus, (rather than B^) is associated with X^. Then 
(9) = Bjl b 
where Bj differs from B only in that the kth element of Bj is 
Pj and not b^; i.e., if 
(10) B = (bi, • • • ,bj^, • • • ,b^) , then 
(11) Bi = (bl.-".Vl'Pj'''k+l''"'V • 
Let refer to that element of X^ which is in the ith 
row and the jth column of X^, then 
(12) xl., = Xg.. - XgkjfUij/Ukj) for i / k, and 
(13) i = k. 
Let us call as 6. 
(14) Pj =|Lu.jb.. -
A cursory inspection of (12) and (13) immediately brings 
out the fact that in the simplex method we find out the new 
basic feasible solution from the old basic feasible solution 
in exactly the same manner as above. 
Let the value of the new objective function be h^ = 
(15) fl = f + XBkj(Cj-fj) = f + 8(Cj-fj) 
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(16) gi = g + 0(dj-Çj) 
preferred to X if 
C JD 
(A) > h; i.e., 
(B) f1 . f. . g' 
(C) gfl > gif; i.e., 
(D) gf^ - fg^ > 0; i.e., 
(E) g f+0 (c.-f.) ] ] - f|g+0(dj-gj) > 0; i.e.. 
(F) g(Cj-fj) - f(dj-gj) > 0; i.e., 
(G) 6j > 0 where 6^ = g(Cj-fj) - f(dj-gj). 
It is then shown that if we start with a basic feasible 
solution and if there is a vector a^ (in A) not in the basis 
and for which 6^ > 0, then there exists another basic feasible 
solution such that h^ > h. In the absence of degeneracy, the 
number of steps involved in moving from initial feasible basis 
to the optimal basis is finite as long as m and n are finite 
because no basis shall be repeated in these iterations and it 
is impossible for the same basis to have different values of 
the objective function. 
How do we know that we have reached the optimum? The 
optimal solution to this maximization problem is obtained when 
for the columns of P not in the basis, the corresponding 
Ô . < 0. ] -
At the optimal point, for the columns of P in the basis. 
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dj, and 
cj, and 
therefore 
(19) g(c.-f*) - f(d.-g*) 0 .  
Applications of Linear Fractional Functionals 
Programming in Agriculture 
The linear fractional functionals programming technique 
has applicability wherever the objective function is a ratio. 
For example, at the macro-level, one of the objectives of 
economic planning may be to maximize the rate of growth of 
income in agricultural sector, to increase per capita income 
of farm families in a country, etc. Both of these examples 
are ratio concepts. 
agricultural sector) at time t+1. 
The rate of growth of this income in terms of current income 
is then equal to 
Clearly this is a ratio. 
Let 
= national income of an economy from 
agriculture at time t. 
Y 1 = national income of that economy (in 
180 
Likewise, if is that population of the country that is 
dependent on agriculture for a living at time t, then 
is the per capita income of that economy in agriculture at 
time t. 
There are many situations in agriculture where the 
objective is the optimization of a ratio. A farmer where 
there is a shortage of labor may be interested in maximizing 
returns per hour of man labor used on the farm. A beginner 
farmer or one who is financially in a tight situation may be 
interested in maximizing profits per dollar of investment. 
Several measures of farm profits such as farm labor income, 
family labor income, farm business income, net returns, etc., 
can be converted into a ratio by an appropriate denominator. 
In all these situations the techniques of linear fractional 
functionals programming can be used with advantage. Given 
below is a very simple example of the application of linear 
fractional functional programming in agriculture. 
A farmer proposes to put 100 acres of land under cultiva­
tion this year. He has a choice of raising corn and wheat. 
Given below is the basic data for these two crops on his farm 
(based on his records from the previous years). 
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Name of the crop Corn Wheat 
Yields per acre (bushels) 40 
2.5 hours 
20 
3.0 hours Total labor requirements (per acre) 
(a) Labor for preparation of 
bed and sowing .8 hours 
.9 hours 
.8 hours 
$40.00 
.8 hours 
(b) Cultivation 
(c) Harvesting, etc. 2.2 hours 
$30.00 Expected returns per acre 
We assume that all costs (except for labor requirement) 
are identical for both crops. We further assume that whether 
the farmer raises any crop or not, he has to devote four hours 
during the crop season to the maintenance and upkeep of the 
equipment such as tractor, combine, etc. The farmer has 300 
hours of labor available for the crop season and he is inter­
ested in maximizing returns per hour of labor. 
Let Xj be the acreage under corn. 
The problem is to find out as to how much area he should 
have under corn and how much under wheat. In other words, 
the decision variables are x^ and X2 and we have to determine 
their desired values. 
As the return from one acre of corn is $40.00 and that 
from wheat is $30.00, the total return from cropping, i.e., 
the denominator of the (j)(x) , is 40xi + 30x2. 
Since 2.5 hours are required for growing an acre of corn 
and three hours of labor are required for producing an acre of 
X2 be the acreage under wheat. 
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wheat and four hours of labor are required for the maintenance 
of machinery irrespective of the crops, the total number of 
hours of labor required to be used up on the farm in the 
process of taking these crops is 2.5xi + 3x2 + 4. The farmer 
wants to maximize returns per hour of labor used, the denomin­
ator of the objective function cj) (x) is 2.5xi + 3x2 + 4, and 
the objective function is 
40xi + 30x2 
2.5xi + 3X2 + 4' 
The problem is to 
Maximize 
40xi + 30x2 
2.5xi + 3x2 + 4 
subject to Xj + X2 < 100 
2.5Xi + 3x2 + 4 < 300 
or 2.5xi + 3x2 < 296 
x i  >  0  
X2 > 0. 
By adding the slacks in the usual fashion, the problem is 
transformed as 
40xi + 30x9 + Oxq + OXi. 
Maximize 2.5xi + 3x2 + 0x3 + Oxi^ + 4 
subject to Xj + X2 + X3 + Oxi^ = 100 
2.5xi + 3x2 + 0x3 + Xit = 296 
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x i  >  0  
xg > 0  
X 3  >  0  
X4 > 0 
The initial tableau is set up on page 184. 
The initial basic feasible solution has X3 and x^. The 
coefficients of these, i.e., X3 and Xi^, in c and d vectors are 
zeros. Therefore, 
"0' 
'B 
X. 
B 
B 
P = 
B = 
- 1  -
0 
0" 
0_ 
100 
296_ 
' 1 1 
2.5 3 
P3f P4 
1 
0 
0 
1 
Let Xg^Q denote the element in the ith row and the 0th 
(zeroth) column for the basic vector. For this initial 
tableau, 
f = Ox 3 + Oxij = 0 
The initial tableau: 
40 30 0 0 
2.5 3 0 0 
Activity at 
non-zero 
level 
Level 
(Po) 
Xl 
(Pi) 
X2 
(P2) 
X3 
(Ps) 
X4 
(Pit) "ij 
-£- 0 0 X3 (land) 100 1 1 1 0 100/1 6=100 
0 0 X4 (labor) 296 2.5 3 0 1 296/2.5 
II f=0 and h=^=0 
c . -f . ] 3 
dj-Sj 
40 
2.5 
30 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
160 120 - -
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g = 0x3 + 0x4 +4 = 4, and 
h = — = ^ 0 
g 4 
<5j = 9(Cj-fj) - f(dj-gj), j = 0,1,2,...n, 
f j = 0 for ail j 
gj = 0 for ail j 
Therefore, 
Similarly, 
(ci-fi) = (40-0) = 40 
(cg-fz) = (30-0) = 30 
(di-gi) = (2.5-0) = 2.5 
(dg-gz) = (3.0-0) = 3.0 
61 = 4(40-0) - 0(2.5-0) = 160 
62 = 4(30-0) - 0(3.0-0) = 120 
Ô 3 = 0 
ôit = 0 
To go to the second tableau (from one basic feasible 
solution to another better basic feasible solution), we choose 
the largest value of 6^ which 160 = Sj. Therefore, j = 1 and 
p. = Pi is the activity that comes in the basis. Now the 
D 
question as to which activity goes out, X3 or Xi^. 
"11 «11 1 
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X. B20 
U21 U21 
2 9 6  
2 . 5  
= 118.4 
6 = min 
X BIO X B 2 0  
u 11 ' ^21 
= min(lOO, 118.4) = 100 = 
X BIO 
Ull 
As 0 = the outgoing activity is Xg which is in the first 
row of the initial tableau. Therefore, k = 1. So we know 
i = 1, k = 1. 
Now the values in the next tableau can be calculated in 
the following manner. Let the superscript 1 refer.to the 
items belonging to the new (next to the initial) tableau. 
vector X 1 
X Xr 
Bkj 
Bkj _ Blj 
u kj uii 
Now i.e., the first row in the old basis (initial 
tableau) is X3, i.e., k = 1 
tableau. 
^Bkj = ^Blj 
xio 
X 3 0 
Ull 
100 
= 100 
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These are the values for the ist row in the new tableau, 
i.e., for i = k = 1. 
For i ^  k, we have only one more row, i.e., i = 2. We 
u. . 
know that for i ^ k, x^. . = x . . - x . .(—-3-). In the second 
oXj J oKj j 
row of the initial tableau we have Xi^. So x^ . = x^. as the 
second row in the new tableau belongs to x^ and, therefore, 
Xit is in the new basis also. 
Therefore, 
1 1 
1 - „ ,.l "2' 
^40 = X40 - ~ 296 - 100(2.5) = 46 
= 2.5 - 1(2.5) = 0 = u^i 
x^2 ~ ^22 = 3 - 1(2.5) = .5 
xj^ g = U23 = 0 - 1(2.5) = -2.5, and 
= 1 - 0(2.5) = 1. 
So the next tableau is as shown on page 188. 
fl = (40) (100) + (30) (0) + (0) (0) + (0) (46) = 4000 
gl = (2.5) (100) + (3) (0) + (0) (0) + (0) (46) + 4 = 254 
cl-fl and dï-gl have been calculated in the same manner 
as the u%j. 
The final tableau: 
40 30 0 0 
2.5 3 0 0 
Activity at 
r, 1  non-zero Level X l  X g  X 3  X 4  
level (Po) (Pi) ( P 2 )  ( P 3 )  (Pit) 
»• 2.5 40 Xi (corn) 100 1 1 1 0 
0 0 (labor) 46 0 .5 -2.5 1 
g=254 f=4000 and h 254 
0 -10 -40 0 
0 .5 1 to
 
c
n
 
0 
- -4540 -160 -
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- ' i  =  4 0  -  ( 4 0 )  ( 1 )  =  0  ~  
4  - 4  =  3 0  - (40) (1) = -10 
4  
1 Hi
 
CO
 =  0  - ( 4 0 ) ( 1 )  =  - 4 0  
4  - 4  
=  0  - ( 4 0 ) ( 0 )  =  0  
Similarly, 
4 -4 = (2.5) - (2.5)(1) = 0 
4 - 92 = 3 - (2.5) (1) = .5 
4 -4 = 0 - (2.5)(1) = -2.5 
4 -4 = 0 - (2.5)(0) = 0 
and 
Ô2 = (254) (-10) - (4000) (.5) = -2540 - 2000 = -4540 
Ô3 = (254) (-40) - (4000) (-2.5) = (-10160 + 10000) = -160 
6 J and need not be calculated as we calculate ô ^ only 
for those j's that are not in the basis. 
62 < 0, 6] < 0 >• we have reached an optimal solution. 
The optimal solution as given by the last tableau is: 
xi  = 100 
X2 = 0 
X 3  =  0  
Xit = 46 
This means the farmer should raise corn on all the 100 
acres of land. He should not grow any wheat. 
X3 is land disposal activity and, as all the land has 
been suggested to be taken under corn, X3 is zero in the final 
solution. 
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Xif is labor disposal. As one acre of corn requires 2.5 
hours of labor, 100 acres will need 250 hours of labor for 
growing corn. In addition, the farmer would spend four hours 
for maintenance. Thus the total labor requirement for this 
program comes to 256 hours. In all, 300 hours of labor are 
available and, therefore, unused labor (x^) is to the tune of 
46 hours in the final tableau. The value of the objective 
function is h = 
Complete solution is obtained by putting the two tableaus 
together as given on page 191. 
One of the salient features of this algorithm is its 
close resemblance to the simplex algorithm. Calculation of 0, 
determination of the outgoing row and the incoming column are 
all similar to those in the simplex technique. In addition to 
the slack variables, which were used in the above example, the 
artificial variables can be taken care of in this in the 
manner similar to the one in simplex method. If the problem 
is not degenerate and m and n are finite, the solution to the 
problem can be obtained in a finite number of steps. 
An important drawback of this algorithm is that it can 
not be used in case the values of r and q, the scalars in the 
objective function, are zero at the same time. We start with 
an initial basic feasible solution where c^ and d^ are zero 
vectors; and if r = q = 0, then f = 0, g = 0 and the values of 
6. = g(c.-f.) - f(d.-g.) = 0 irrespective of the values of 3 ] ] ] ] 
Combined tableaus; 
40 30 0 0 
4 
2.5 3 0 0 
Activity at 
non-zero 
level 
Level 
(Po) 
Xl 
(Pl) 
X2 
( P 2 )  
X3 
( P 3 )  (Pit) *ii 
-f--—-
— 0 0 X3 (land) 100 1 1 1 0 100/1 0=100 
It 0) 0 0 (labor) 296 2.5 3 0 1 296/2.5 1—1 
rQ (ti 
-P 
g=4 f=0 and h=^=0 
I 1 (d 
•H 4J 
H 
G 
H 
c.-£. 40 
2.5 
160 
30 
3 
120 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.5 40 xi (corn) 100 1 1 1 0 
g 0 0 X4 (labor) 46 0 .5 -2.5 1 
<u 
iH 
+j 
g=254 f=4000 and h 254 
1—i 
n j  C 
•H 
^j-'j 
0 
0 
-10 
.5 
-4540 
-40 
-2.5 
-160 
0 
0 
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(Cj-fj) and (dj-gj). This would imply optimal!ty of the 
solution in the very initial tableau which suggests that the 
optimal solution lies in having all the real activities at the 
zero level (i.e., producing nothing) and this may be far from 
truth. However, this drawback may not be so serious (or even 
relevant) for agriculture as there are some costs involved in 
most cases even when the farmer does not produce anything and, 
therefore, g is positive. As we noted in the above example, 
whether the farmer grew any crop or not, he would have some 
labor for upkeep of machines. Similarly, if the farming is 
carried out with the help of draft animals, whether the 
animals work or not, farmer has to spend some time to look 
after them. The same holds good, for example, when the farmer 
is interested in maximizing returns per dollar of capital 
(fixed and variable) invested in the farming business. Again, 
the machines like tractors, combine, cotton picker and cob-
sheller will depreciate at least a little with the passage of 
time even when they lie completely idle for the whole year. 
Similarly, an Indian farmer will have to spend money to feed 
his bullocks even when they are not in use. These are in the 
nature of fixed costs and would, therefore, not allow q to go 
to zero; q would remain strictly positive. 
Though the example given above is rather simple, it 
serves to bring out the utility of the linear fractional 
functionals programming. The size of A matrix was 2 x 2 in 
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our example. When m and n are quite large and there are a 
number of decision variables involved, it would be much easier 
to find an answer to the problem by this method. The linear 
fractional functionals programming technique holds great 
promise in its application to agriculture when the objective 
is to maximize returns per hour of family labor or hired labor 
or both, or the farmer is interested in optimizing things like 
returns per dollar of capital invested. 
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APPLICATIONS OF NETWORK ANALYSIS IN AGRICULTURE 
The last few years have witnessed a growth and improve­
ment of the old and emergence of the new management planning 
and control tools. Many of these tools are rather complex 
and demand a high degree of sophistication in mathematics on 
the part of the technician. However, during the period 
1956-58, powerful yet relatively simple techniques have been 
developed and are being widely used by the industry, govern­
ment, businessmen, etc. for planning, scheduling and also 
controlling their projects. Grouped under the head of 
'network* or 'flow' plans, these were independently and 
concurrently developed by the military and the industry and 
include PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique), 
CPM (Critical Path Method), CPS (Critical Path Scheduling), 
etc. The 'network' is composed of a series of related events 
and activities and their relationship is sequential. PERT 
was developed by the U.S. Navy Special Projects Office in 
connection with the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program. CPM and 
CPS were developed under the auspices of the industry in the 
United States. 
Before proceeding any further, it would perhaps be 
helpful to define some terms that would be frequently 
encountered in connection with the 'network analysis'. 
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Activity: It is a time-consuming element and occurs between 
two events. In other words, an activity represents a 
'thing' that is required to be done in order to go from 
one event to another. The activities are represented 
in a network diagram by an arrow. 
Events ; They are meaningful accomplishments, goals or mile­
stones. As two events are connected by an activity, they 
are at the beginning as well as at the end of it. In a 
network diagram they are denoted by a node or a box. 
Positive Slack; It is the amount of additional time available 
to the firm to perform the series of activities in a 
given slack path and still allows the activity to be 
completed within the required time. 
Negative Slack: It is the amount of time which is not avail­
able to the firm to perform the series of activities in a 
given slack path and still allow the activity to be com­
pleted within the required time. 
Critical Path; Critical Path, in a network, is a path having 
the largest amount of negative or the smallest amount of 
positive slack. 
Fragnet: It is a part of a project network. 
Interface; It is the relationship between activities and 
events that constrain their completion between two or 
more fragnets. 
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A network consists of a series of related activities and 
events. It is a flow plan, a graphic or a pictorial repre­
sentation of the activities and the events which lead to the 
attainment of the ultimate goal and also depicts a plan with 
activities and events arranged in order of precedence. The 
plan also includes the time scheduling, i.e., time taken by 
one activity in going from one event to another. Thus 
'network' helps the decision maker in defining the critical 
path and then, in making decisions consistent with his 
resources and requirements. It not only enables the manage­
ment to plan ahead, but also to take stock of the situation at 
every stage of planning and production and may even alert him 
in time to obviate future sources of trouble. With proper 
modifications, the technique can be used for the purposes of 
determining the least cost schedules. Thus with the use of 
this rather simple tool, given the objective, the management 
may be in a position to plan the best possible use of 
resources in a way that the milestone is reached within the 
appointed time and given costs. See Figure 17. 
A Brief History 
CPM technique was a result of the efforts made by the lEC 
(Integrated Engineering Control) group of E. I. Du Pont de 
Nemours and Company. The company faced a problem of increas­
ing time and costs involved in bringing new products from the 
EVENTS 
= ACTIVITIES 
Figure 17. A network diagram 
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research laboratory to the production line. The management 
realized that, by proper planning and scheduling, a level of 
co-ordination could be obtained and a shift from research cell 
to the production department of the company would be less time 
and money consuming. To find out improved methods for 
planning and scheduling, lEC decided on exploring the scope 
of using electronic computers. As a consequence of the joint 
efforts of Mr. Morgan R. Walker of Du Pont and Mr. James E. 
Kelly, Jr., of Univac Applications Research Center, CPM and 
MCX (Minimum-cost Expediting) techniques came into existence. 
The tests of these methods conducted by Du Pont in collabora­
tion with Remington Rand Corporation proved successful in 1957. 
At about the same time, PERT was developed as a result of 
a research project of the U.S. Navy relating to the Polaris 
Fleet Ballistic Missile program. The objective of the Project 
PERT (Program Evaluation Research Task and later rechristened 
as Program Evaluation and Review Technique) was to develop, 
test and implement a methodology for providing management with 
integrated and quantitative evaluation of: 
(a) progress to date and the outlook for accomplishing 
the objectives of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program, 
(b) validity of established plans and schedules for 
accomplishing the program objectives, and 
(c) effects of changes proposed in established plans. 
The essential features of PERT were developed by July 1958 
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and its application to the Fleet Ballistic Missile program is 
reported to have resulted in the completion of the program two 
years ahead of schedule. 
The applications of these techniques has been extended to 
several areas other than time. To mention just a few, these 
are areas of costs, manpower and capital requirements. CPM is 
widely used in the construction industry, A relatively new 
technique called 'inter-project scheduling' will make it 
possible to allocate resources and also assign priorities for 
a number of fragnets of the principal project with regard to 
the variables like costs, time, labor, machinery and equipment. 
There are still other techniques like MCX (Minimum-cost 
Expediting) and RPSM (Resource Planning and Scheduling Method) 
which are either a part or an extension of CPM and PERT 
techniques. Of these, PERT is perhaps the most widely used. 
It is proposed to briefly describe PERT technique and then 
compare it with CPM. Finally, the applicability of the 
'network' analysis in agriculture shall be examined. 
PERT System 
Though the PERT technique was originally conceived to 
cope with the problems related to time (i.e., planning and 
scheduling of the project), its applications in the areas of 
costs and performance are also proving useful. The team of 
Malcolm, Roseboom, Clark and Fazar (65) was largely 
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responsible for the development of this technique. The group 
laid down the following requirements for the evaluation 
purposes. These may be considered, in a way, to be the 
requirements for PERT. 
1. To obtain a reliable estimate of time needed for each 
activity in the project. This estimate was to be 
provided by a competent person who had a thorough 
knowledge of the nature and type of work involved. 
For best results, the probability distribution of the 
time estimated to be required by each activity was to 
be found out. 
2. To have an exact idea of the sequence of activities 
and events. There will be some activities that can 
go on concurrently, whereas, in other cases, it would 
be necessary to complete an activity before the other 
could be undertaken. 
After the required information has been obtained, it is 
translated into a graph in the form of a 'network' of a 
sequence of activities and events to be achieved in a certain 
order. This is called a 'flow plan' and its format is shown 
in Figure 18. Ej, E2, •••E7 are the events and , A2, •••As 
are the activities joining them in a specified manner. 
Circles represent the events and the arrows indicate the 
activities. Initially, a flow plan is made up of activities 
and events, but it may also show the time required to complete 
A| 
A. 
A-
Figure 18. 
i\> 
o 
A flow plan 
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an activity, i.e., to go from one event to the other. 
Suppose a new machine is to be designed and put in the 
market and the company wants to know as to how much time will 
it take? The problem may be tackled by making a diagram in 
the manner of Figure 18. may be taken to be the starting 
point and E3, for example, may be the procurement of raw 
material like steel. may represent the testing of the 
model of the machine and E7, being last, is the milestone of 
the project, say the new machine reaching the market. 
Similarly, A2 may represent the activity of procuring the raw 
material. These activities must be performed in the order 
shown in the network. For example, A3 has to succeed Aj, i.e., 
A3 cannot be taken up until A^ has been completed. Similarly, 
Ai^ cannot precede A2. Of course, Aj and A2, according to the 
diagram, can be carried out simultaneously as they are not 
directly related to each other. Looping in the network is not 
permitted, i.e., the circularity between the preceding and 
succeeding events is not allowed. In drawing this network, it 
is assumed that resource needs for each activity are known 
with certainty. The status of a development program at a 
given point of time is a function of resources, technical 
performance and the period of time. Given the resources and 
technical performance, PERT approach deals with the time 
variable only. 
The question then arises that 'once the sequence of 
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activities and events is laid out, how is the expected elapsed 
time for each activity found out?' The problem was tackled by 
the PERT team in the ensuing manner. In order to formulate 
a probability distribution of expected time required to com­
plete an activity, each engineer responsible for that activity 
was asked to provide his three estimates of elapsed time— 
'optimistic', 'pessimistic' and 'most likely'. This furnishing 
of three estimates by every engineer helped in taking into 
account the difficulties that may be encountered in carrying 
out an activity and variability within the activity, thereby 
allowing a more precise formulation of expectations. 
Optimistic estimate was based on the assumption that 
there were no hold-ups in the project plan at any stage and 
that each activity was completed in the shortest possible time, 
i.e., everything went right the very first time. 
Pessimistic estimate of elapsed time was taken under the 
assumption of maximal potential difficulties faced in the 
completion of an activity, i.e., when nothing seems to go 
right. 
Most likely estimate was based on the assumption of 
everything going normally, i.e., in a manner that would be 
usual. 
Given these estimates, the formulae for calculating the 
expected elapsed time and the uncertainty involved in these 
expectations were developed on the following assumptions: 
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(a) The extremes, i.e., optimistic and pessimistic 
expectations are realized less often as compared to 
the 'most likely'. 
(b) The probability distribution will have its peak at 
the 'most likely' estimate. 
(c) The peak of the distribution can be anywhere between 
the optimistic and the pessimistic estimates. 
(d) This probability distribution is a Beta-distribution. 
Given these assumptions, the following equations were 
developed to calculate the expected elapsed time and the 
uncertainty involved. 
(1) tg = |[2m + i(a + b) ] 
a + 4m + b 
(2) = [|(b - a)]2 
where 
tg = expected elapsed time, 
^ = variance of the expected elapsed time—this 
T-e 
variance is a measure of uncertainty involved 
in tg, 
a = optimistic estimate, 
b = pessimistic estimate, and 
m = most likely estimate of elapsed time. 
205 
The distribution is given in Figure 19. 
If we define mid range as —g—' if the distance 
between the mid range and most likely estimate is d, then t^ 
will be at a distance of ^ from m and at a distance of ^  from 
the mid range. The line k t^ divides the area under the curve 
into two equal parts. 
If 
a = 24 days, 
b = 42 days, and 
m = 30 days. 
then 
" K" 2(30) + i(24 + 42) 
60 + 33 
= 31 days 
and 
^(b - a) 42 - 24 = 9, 
Let t 
tg are obtained. 
of the elapsed time for the ith 
8. Suppose the following values 
r
t 
CD
 = 5 weeks 
CM 
zz 4 weeks 
'e3 
= 3 weeks 
= 7 weeks 
= 12 weeks 
Ce 6 
= 3 weeks 
f (te) 
m te b+a 
ELAPSED 
TIME 
START OF 
ACTIVITY END OF ACTIVITY 
Figure 19. Distribution of elapsed time 
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t =6 weeks, and 
e? 
t =1 week 
eg 
On including these in the flow plan of Figure 18, we get the 
diagram shown in Figure 20. 
Once these estimates of time have been calculated, the 
data are organized for convenience in analysis. A table is 
prepared with the events being listed in some sequence. Then 
the analysis is done to determine the 'critical path', the 
path taking the longest time to go from the start to the 
finish. If the sequence is small and simple, this can be done 
manually. Through experience it has been found that plans 
involving up to a hundred activities can be handled in this 
fashion without much trouble. If the sequence is too big and 
complex to be handled manually, the analysis of the data and 
determination of the critical path is done with help of the 
computers. For the network represented on page 197 (Figure 
17), the data can be organized and the network compressed as 
shown in Figure 21. The events are placed on the list called 
the 'list of sequenced events'. The ordering is backward, 
starting first with the milestone. The preparation of this 
list shall be demonstrated in the example of the application 
to agriculture. 
The critical path is the one that takes the longest time. 
For the network on pages 197 and 208, it is very simple to 
determine the critical path which is shown in Figure 22 with 
Figure 20. Flow plan with estimates of elapsed time 
M O \o 
Figure 21. Diagram depicting sequenced events 
CRITICAL PATH CRITICAL EVENTS 
N) 
M O 
Figure 22. Critical path and critical events 
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heavy lines. 
In our example, the duration of the critical path is 24 
weeks. The events lying on the critical path are the critical 
events and are shaded in the diagram. Here they are , E3, 
Eij, Eg, and E7. If any of the critical events is delayed 
beyond its expected date of accomplishment, the delay in 
achieving the ultimate goal may be expected to be of the same 
magnitude. There may be events in the system which may be 
completed before they are needed. Slack is the difference 
between the time when they are actually needed and the time of 
their completion. Clearly, activities on the critical path 
have zero slacks. It is always useful to examine the path 
with the largest slack for bringing about improvement in the 
present plan. The uncertainty factor of the critical path is 
found by adding the variances for each activity along this 
path. 
The probability of meeting an existent schedule is 
approximated with the normal distribution, utilizing the 
property of the 'Central Limit Theorem'. 
Let 
T^g be the existing scheduled time, 
T be = Tt . where t . relates to the ith activity, 
oe V ei ei 
and 
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Then the probability of meeting an existent schedule is equal 
^ aistribu. 
tion to be normal, we 
T - T 
(a) calculate —, and then 
^e 
(b) use the table of the area under the normal curve to 
find out the probability. 
It has been mentioned elsewhere that military and the 
industry simultaneously developed similar techniques. The one 
developed by the former is called the PERT system and the one 
developed by the latter is referred to as the CPM (critical 
path method). Both these methods are similar to each other. 
Like PERT, CPM is also a network analysis in which the network 
depicts the relationship of the activities in the system. 
Lately, extensions of these two techniques have gone to the 
extent of making them look alike. For example, PERT is being 
applied to the problems of cost and manpower. However, there 
seem to be some basic differences between the two as given 
below: 
(1) CPM is activity-oriented, whereas PERT is event-
oriented. 
(2) In CPM, only one time estimate is used, in PERT we 
use three. 
(3) CPM and its extensions like MCX and RPSM were 
concerned with resources-manpower, equipment. 
f (T )  
TIME Tos 
Figure 23. Approximate probability of meeting an existent schedule 
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working space, etc., whereas PERT took only the time 
variable into account. 
Because of these differences, researchers and adminis­
trators have found CPM to be more satisfactory for controlling 
projects (due to its being activity oriented) and PERT has 
proved more useful for the purposes of project evaluation due 
to its being event oriented. Resource Planning and Scheduling 
Method (RPSM) is a special extension of CPM through which 
resource limitations can be considered and availability and 
limitations of capital, working space, material, etc., may be 
specified, MCX (Minimum-Cost Expediting), as the name 
suggests, is a technique that helps management in choosing the 
least costs operations. 
Applications in Agriculture 
Though quite young, 'network analysis' has been exten­
sively used in industries for planning, scheduling and evalua­
tion of the projects. Very few applications of this analysis 
have been made in agriculture. Perhaps the most detailed 
application of this has been done by Heiland, Jaendl and 
Kastner (40) who applied this to the problem of labor. In 
1964 Morris and Nygaard (73) used modified critical path 
algorithm to find out the solution to the problem of selecting 
a machine for corn production and also in making the compari­
sons in the costs of different systems of hog production. In 
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his paper, "PERT: a prospective aid to better management', 
Schroeder (89) applied the technique to a rural community 
development program. 
An illustration 
A farmer in India decides to follow a one-year rotation 
of green manure—wheat. Leguminous crops like sunnhemp are 
grown in the 'KHARIF' season and ploughed in the soil at their 
appropriate stage of growth to serve as a green manure for the 
ensuing wheat crop. Usually, this has to be done from the 
middle of August to the first week of September. At this time 
the green manure plants are succulent enough to quickly 
release nutrients in the soil and also there is enough time 
for soil to absorb these nutrients. The farmer can plough in 
the green manure either with the help of a tractor, which he 
can get on rent from the co-operative society of which he is 
a member, or by using bullocks. Ploughing in by the tractor 
takes two days, whereas ploughing in by the bullocks is 
expected to take six days. However, due to the heavy demand 
for the tractor, it may not be available immediately at the 
required time but is expected to take eight days to be avail­
able after the demand for the same has been put before the 
co-operative society. He cannot prepare his land properly 
till he has ploughed the green manure in. Further, sowing can 
be done only at least after six weeks of ploughing in the 
green manure and at the latest by the 23rd of October. He can 
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either sow with the bullock-drawn seed drill or in rows behind 
the plough, but again he does not own the seed drill but has 
to obtain it from the co-operative, which may take up to three 
days. Suppose his starting point is the 21st of August when 
his green manure crop is standing in the field and needs to be 
ploughed in the next 10-day period. It means that between 
now (August 21) and the completion of sowing (October 23) he 
has, in all, 62 days in which to complete all these activities. 
The events, activities and the expected time required by each 
of the activities are given in Figure 24. His activities are: 
Aj = procuring the tractor 
A2 = ploughing in the green manure with the help 
of bullocks 
A3 = ploughing in the green manure crop by tractor 
Ai^ = preparation of the field for sowing by 
bullocks 
A5 = procuring the drill for sowing 
Ag = sowing behind the plough 
Ay = sowing by the seed drill 
The respective events are: 
El = start (August 21) 
E2 = tractor procured 
E3 = field green manured 
Eit = field prepared and ready for sowing 
E5 = drill procured 
Eg = sowing completed (October 23) 
Figure 24. Flow plan of the farmer with expected time required for each activity 
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By organizing and compressing the network we get the 
diagram of the sequence of events as shown in Figure 25. The 
sequencing of these events is listed in Table 14. 
Table 14. Sequencing of events 
Immediately preceding 
event 
Immediately following 
event 
Event Event No. 
Mean tg 
(days) Event No. 
Mean tg 
(days) 
6 
5 2 
4 7 
5 4 3 6 2 
4 3 42 
5 3 
6 7 
3 
2 2 
4 42 
1 6 
2 1 8 3 2 
1 
2 8 
3 6 
From this list of sequenced events we compute the expected 
time for events by starting from the bottom (starting point) 
and examining the activities emanating from here. We then 
choose the longest time and prepare a table of 'outputs from 
Figure 25. Sequenced events for Figure 24 
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Table 15. Outputs from analysis 
Expected time Latest time Slack 
ToL-Te 
Event (days) (days) (days) 
Eg 59 62 3 
Es 55 60 5 
E^ 52 55 3 
Eg 10 10 0 
E g  8  8  0  
E1 — - -
analysis'. Table 15 is prepared in this manner. For example, 
from El sprout two activities, and A2. Only Aj goes to E2 
with t^ = 8 days. Therefore, we enter 8 against Eg in the 
'outputs from analysis' table under column T^. From E^ to E3 
we can either go through a combination of A^ and Ag or by A3 
alone. The former involves 8 + 2 = 10 days and the latter 6 
days. Since we choose one with the longest expected time, 
this value is 10 and we write 10 against E3 under T^ and so on. 
As already mentioned earlier, 
-e = 
Therefore, the number in the first row against Eg under T^ 
indicates the time of the critical path. 
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A look at the output from analysis table will show that 
the farmer could take three days more in preparing the field 
and would still be in time for sowing the crop. Further, the 
delivery of the drill could take five days longer without 
delaying the sowing. If the farmer is sowing behind the 
plough, he can afford to take another three days and still be 
able to finish sowing by the 23rd of October. Figure 26 shows 
the critical path for this example. 
Discussion and Suggestions 
This is just one example of how 'network analysis' can 
help the farmer in scheduling his operations. There are 
several areas in agriculture where it can be used with advan­
tage. There is an acute shortage of labor in agriculture in 
many parts of the world. Even in regions where labor is in 
surplus, its demand far exceeds the supply during certain 
periods of the year, especially during the sowing and harvest­
ing seasons. This is largely due to the nature of agriculture. 
Farming is an out-of-door occupation and greatly depends on 
weather conditions over which man has practically no control. 
The optimum time for given operations may be of a very short 
duration. This is especially true for sowing and harvesting. 
For the best germination to start with and proper growth later, 
the ideal sowing conditions for a crop may be just for seven 
to eight days and the farmer must complete the job during this 
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time of the existence of the optimum conditions. Thus these 
seven to eight days are critical. The same holds good for 
harvesting. If, for example, wheat is harvested too early, 
there may be excessive moisture in the grain resulting in poor 
quality product. If the harvesting is done late, the ears 
may wither with a loss in yield. Therefore, for a good yield, 
it is necessary that the harvesting be done within a certain 
time of the crop reaching the critical stage of maturity. 
Due to the simultaneous need of labor on farms in the 
area, the demand for labor at these times is great. Planning 
and scheduling can help the farmer a great deal in this 
respect. In fact, crop raising is only one area. Feeding and 
care of the livestock can be planned in a similar fashion. 
There exists a great potential for the use of network analysis 
in the fields of processing and marketing of agricultural 
products. These industries operate on a very large scale with 
billions of dollars of investment and sales, and have problems 
of the same nature and dimensions as other industries. The 
problem of harvesting, freezing and canning of peas on the 
Seabrooks farm was solved largely by proper planning and 
scheduling of sowing. Time and motion studies in agriculture 
which have existed for a long time resemble these techniques. 
CPM has proved quite helpful in the construction industry and, 
therefore, can be used with advantage for construction of 
huge elevators for storage of agricultural commodities. In 
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places where farmers depend on cooperative organizations for 
the supply of fertilizers, and rent machinery and equipment 
from these for cultivation, a plan can be drawn up to allow 
the most efficient use of the machinery by larger number of 
members in a given period of time. There are regions where 
the farmer has to wait for days and even weeks for his turn to 
get water from canals or tuble wells to irrigate his crops 
where this tool could be used to improve the situation. One 
of the assets of network analysis techniques, when not used 
on a very large scale, is their simplicity of being concep­
tualized. No special training is required on the part of the 
farmer for letting him involve himself in the use of this 
analysis. In fact, with his practical knowledge, if the 
number of activities is 50-60 or even 100, a farmer, with some 
hours of effort, can set up the network of schedule for his 
farm. 
As mentioned elsewhere, this analysis is not limited to 
time only, but has been extended to the areas of resource 
allocation and cost minimization. If an equipment can be used 
for several activities, those activities cannot be scheduled 
to be performed at the same time. Tractor is a good example 
of this kind of equipment in agriculture. It can be used for 
ploughing, fertilizing, sowing, cultivating, irrigating and 
even transporting the produce. If a farmer has only one 
tractor, he cannot use it for ploughing the field and fetching 
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fertilizer from the market at the same time. There can be 
only one path connecting all those activities that are to be 
performed by the tractor. Again network analysis would be 
extremely helpful in drawing up the schedule providing for the 
most efficient use of the tractor. 
Analogous to the time minimization is the problem of cost 
minimization. Replace 'time' with 'cost' and the tool called 
PERT/time technique becomes PERT/cost technique. A time net­
work has the time listed on the arrows indicating the time 
taken by that activity. In a cost network, instead of time, 
the cost of that activity is indicated. However, it is not 
necessary that the least time consuming path is also least 
costly and vice versa. In most cases, the reverse is true. 
Some extensions of PERT analysis have been done in the 
direction of time-cost to determine an optimum mix of these 
two variables. Thus the analysis allows taking decisions with 
respect to both planning and control. However, these exten­
sions of cost and time-cost have not been so successful as 
the original PERT/time analysis because the calculations are 
quite involved and iterations are so large that it becomes 
necessary to seek the refuge of the computer. Moreover, time-
cost relationships are discrete and non-linear. 
Perhaps the best use of this analysis at the macro-level 
could be made by the states and the nations for the purposes 
of economic planning. Time is important in national planning 
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both for the developed and the developing nations, but for the 
latter it is rather critical. Let us take the case of India. 
The efforts of the Indian government are directed towards a 
long range planning and all round development of the country 
at a reasonable cost and within a reasonable amount of time. 
However, its immediate goal is to increase production in the 
agricultural sector, especially food production, in the short­
est possible time to combat the acute food shortage faced by 
the nation. The problem is being attacked from all directions. 
For example, emphasis is being given to the increased use of 
fertilizers. However, before a fertilizer can be increasingly 
used, its availability in required quantities is necessary 
which can be achieved through opening of new factories and 
increasing imports. Likewise, more area is being brought 
under improved seeds for which new seed multiplication farms 
are being started. Network analysis can help not only in the 
planning and scheduling of the projects needed for increasing 
agricultural production and assigning priorities to these 
projects, but also to take stock of the situation after the 
program has been in existence for sometime. As pointed out 
earlier, it can help in pinpointing weaknesses and diffi­
culties in the program well in time so that they can be taken 
care of before it is too late. 
Since 'human element' plays such an important role in 
planning, scheduling, estimating time, and evaluating the 
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project, PERT, CPM and other network techniques may suffer 
from weaknesses of this element. Some participants may be 
too conservative while others may be too liberal. Critical 
premises are based on personal estimates and, therefore, are 
susceptible to human error, whether the error is in judgment 
or outlook. As mentioned elsewhere, time-cost analysis has 
not been successful so far and the present system fails to 
correlate expenditure and progress. Some researchers have 
questioned the very assumption of the Beta distribution and, 
therefore, the formulae derived to calculate expected elapsed 
time and its variance. According to Hartley and Wortham (36), 
"Although some currently used PERT computations take account 
of variation in the completion times of individual operations, 
the methods used are approximate and are known to lead to 
(a) optimistic project completion times and (b) misidentifica­
tion of 'critical paths'." 
In spite of drawbacks, these techniques have been enjoy­
ing wide applications in industrial, governmental and military 
activities and have made significant contributions to the 
improved planning and control of the projects. Efforts are 
being made to modify these in a manner that would allow mean­
ingful coordination of time, cost and function. The analysis 
is simple to comprehend and the operator is very much a part 
of the system. These virtues have led to its wide acceptance 
by scientists, administrators and technicians. It not only 
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presents the project as an entity in its entirety in a diagram 
laying bare the relationships of activities and events and 
identifies the critical path, but also enables the adminis­
trator to control the activities and evaluate the results of 
the action in a comparatively short time. Its simplicity 
makes it all the more amenable to be used by farmers and small 
industrial organizations. 
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APPLICATIONS OF WAITING LINE PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF QUEUES 
Everyone is familiar with the problem of having to wait. 
It may be for purchasing tickets to a baseball game, making 
payments at the counter for goods purchased in a supermarket, 
paying toll at the booths on the highways, getting machines 
serviced at a repair facility, depositing or withdrawing money 
from the bank in person, travelling on a road with signal 
lights or landing at a busy airport. While many times one has 
to wait at these facilities, at other times these facilities 
remain idle. The common features of the waiting problems are: 
a. Someone or something which requires the use of some 
facility or service. This someone or something is 
commonly referred to as the 'customer'. 
b. The service or the facility. 
c. The idleness of (or waiting by) 
(i) the customer to be serviced. 
(ii) the service or the facility. 
d. The actual act of providing the facility or service 
to the customer. 
Irrespective of whether waiting is on the part of the 
customer or the service facility, there is always a cost 
associated with waiting, because waiting involves consumption 
of time. While waiting at the traffic lights or toll, the 
automobiles consume fuel. If there are long queues at the 
bank, the customer may get annoyed and perhaps switch to 
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another bank. However, if there are too many windows at the 
bank, most of the time they may remain idle and involve 
service cost. The problem is to strike a balance as to 
minimize the waiting costs both to the customer and the 
service agency. 
The problems of this nature are attacked by what may be 
grouped under the broad term of 'Queuing Theory' or 'Waiting 
Line Models'. The origin of this theory can be traced to the 
pioneer work of Erlang (14) for the Copenhagen Telephone 
Company. The use of queuing has not been confined to the 
problems of operations of telephone systems. It has been 
widely used for solving problems such as determination of 
optimum number of clerks that should be placed in a company's 
factory tool cribs, flow of scheduled air and train traffic, 
traffic delays at toll booths, determining optimum worker-
supervisor ratio, problems of loading and unloading, repairs 
and maintenance of equipment, etc. These problems are also 
termed as 'servicing problems' because the queuing is for 
getting the service or facility. 
The queues may be single-channel or multi-channel. In 
the former only one customer can be serviced at one time. In 
the latter, more than one can be taken care of at the same 
time. In a simple servicing system we have the following; 
a. Arrival of the customer into the system. 
b. Waiting by the customer before getting service. 
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c. Actual servicing. 
d. Departure of the customer after being serviced. 
These have been illustrated in Figure 27. 
First of all the customer arrives at the service station. 
The system cannot provide facilities or services to an 
arbitrarily large number of customers. This implies waiting 
if the service is being rendered to others. In some cases 
the departure may be immediately after the service has been 
rendered. In others, some time may have to elapse between 
actual service and departure (e.g., some stations would like 
to check over again after they have serviced). After it has 
entered the system, how long will it take for the customer to 
get service and then leave? The answer to the question 
depends on several factors. The important of these are: 
A. Rate of arrival of customers into the system. 
B. Rate of servicing and departure. 
The latter depends on, 
(i) Nature of service required. 
(ii) Types of facilities available, e.g., whether 
they are modern or old, personnel are quick or 
slow, etc. 
(iii) Number of facilities in the system. 
A and B can be called as the elements of a queuing model. 
These determine the (expected) average number of customers in 
a queue waiting for service, average time required by them 
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Figure 27. Components of a queuing system 
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before they actually start getting the service, the time taken 
in getting the service proper, and finally leaving the scene. 
Let 
W be the waiting time—time interval between the 
arrival of the customer at the station and 
actually start getting the service, 
A be the arrival rate of customers, and 
S be the servicing rate, 
then 
W = f(A,S). 
A and S, in themselves, depend on: 
1. probability distributions of arrivals, 
2. number of servicing facilities and servicing policy 
(i.e., whether first come first served or served in 
order of magnitude of work or some other criterion), 
3. queue discipline (for example, in a bank, a customer 
may switch from one line to another if the latter is 
shorter), and 
4. probability distributions for servicing time. 
Let 
be the time taken by the service station, only 
to render the service to the ith customer (it 
does not include any waiting time on part of i) , 
t^ be the time when the ith customer arrives at the 
station, and 
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be the waiting time for the ith customer. 
Let us assume that the variables S.. t. and W. are i' 1 1 
randomly and independently distributed with finite means 
(because if the expected values of servicing and waiting time 
are indefinite, the problem would be unrealistic and meaning­
less) . Let us further assume that the first customer arrives 
exactly when the service station opens and, therefore, has not 
to wait. Then 
W i  =  0  
#2 = - (t2-ti) + Si. 
W3 = W2 - (t3-t2) + S2 
In general, 
=  +  " i - 1  -  ( ^  "  
< 
= 0 for W. - - ft.-t. ,1 + S. - <0. 
1—1 ^ 1 1—1' 1-1 — 
Three cases of this could be: 
(i) -(t^-t^_^) + = 0 for all i. 
Then we have a balanced situation and neither the customer nor 
the servicing facility shall have to wait. This is because 
= (t^-t^_^) for all i. It means that the servicing time 
for the (i-l)st customer is equal to the difference in the 
times of arrivals of the ith and the (i-l)st customer. 
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Thus = 0 for all i and no customer has to wait. 
(ii) -ft.-t. + S. T < 0 for all i or S. , < [t.-t. 1 1-1^ 1-1 1-1 1 1-1^ 
There is no waiting on the part of the customer. It is the 
service that remains idle. 
(iii) -(t.-t. -") + S. > 0 for all i, i.e., S. , > ft.-t. 
^1 i-l-* 1-1 1-1 ^ 1 1-1-' 
As servicing time of (i-l)st customer is greater than the 
difference in the time of arrivals, the ith customer has to 
invariably wait. This is just the reverse of (ii). 
In practice these three cases do not exist in isolation 
(i.e., no single of them is true for all i). We observe a 
combination of these. At times the facility is idle. At 
another time the customer waits, while in some cases a 
customer arrives just when his predecessor is leaving the 
station. 
If we know the probability distribution 
-Cti-ti.i) + s._i 
the most likely value of fs.-t.+t. ,] can be found out. From 
*•1-11 1-1' 
this we can draw inferences about the behavior of the waiting 
lines. 
Let E\(z) be the probability that < z, i.e.. 
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P(W. < z) = P {W._i - + S._^} < 
= IP w. i-1 - ^ ^ 'P ^i-
i-1 + fti-ti-i] - Si_i df ^i-1 ^i-: 
This is a montonically increasing function. 
The most common frequency distributions observed for 
arrivals and servicing time are: 
(a) gamma distribution—also called Erlang distribution 
(b) Poisson distribution, and 
(c) negative exponential distribution. 
(a) gamma distribution and its properties; 
——r- ^ e ^ for 0 < z < 00 
f (z;i,G) < 
r(i)6^ 
= 0 for z < 0 
r(i) = (i-i)i 
Therefore, 
f (z) 
(i-1) 13-
z^ ^ e ^ for 0 < z < 00 
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Let 8 = then 
i-1 -6z f(z) = -T-:—YTT z e for 0 < z < °° (1-1)1 — — 
F(z) = I^(i) is called incomplete gamma function. 
F'z) = r l ir z^ ^ e ^ dz for 0 < z < 0° 
r,(i) r,(i) 
TO) (i-1) ! 
The mean of gamma distribution = ^ 
Variance of gamma distribution = 1 
8% 
When i—x», gamma distribution tends to a constant servic­
ing time distribution. 
(b) Poisson distribution: 
e"®e^ f(z) = — ; 0 < z < 0° 
Mean of the distribution = 6 
Variance of the distribution = 6 
Poisson distribution has only one parameter, 0. 
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(c) negative exponential distribution; 
[ 1 - e for z > 0 
F(2) = { 
0 for z < 0 
The probability density function is of the form 
]6e for z > 0 
f(z) = < 
0 for z < 0 
The mean of the distribution = ^ 
U 
Variance = 
Negative exponential distribution is a special case of 
gamma distribution with i = 1. 
As we shall see later, in all the above distributions, 0 can 
be interpreted as the arrival rate. 
A Simple Single-Channel Queue Model 
Assumptions 
(1) Only one customer can be serviced at a time. 
(2) The customers are serviced in the order in which they 
arrive. 
(3) The arrivals and servicing are randomly and independently 
distributed. 
Let 
0 = average rate of arrivals. 
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Y = average rate of servicing, 
A^(t) = the probability that i customers arrive 
in time period t, 
S^(t) = the probability that i customers are 
serviced in time 't*. 
If, for example, arrivals follow a poisson distribution, 
then 
A.(t) = 
^ i! 
Similarly, if servicing follows a negative exponential 
distribution, then 
S^ft) = ye'Yt 
(4) e > 0, Y > 0. 
(5) Y > i.e., servicing rate is bigger than arrival rate. 
T = ^ is termed as 'traffic density' or 'traffic 
intensity'. 
The assumption implies 0 < x < 1. 
If X—>-1, as we shall see, the length of the waiting 
time approaches infinity. 
(6) There is no possibility of two or more arrivals or servie-
ings at the same moment of time. 
(7) During a small period of time At, the probabilities of 
arrival of more than one unit or its being serviced are 
insignificant. 
Let P^(t) (i = 0,1,2, •••) be the probability that i 
customers are waiting in the queue at time t. Then P^(t) 
is the probability of n customers waiting at time t. 
P\(t) are called 'state' probabilities. Let be 
the 'steady state' probabilities. 
P. = lim P.(t) 
t-H» 
This means that after sufficient time there will be little 
or no fluctuation in the probability of the system having 
'i' individuals in the queue, i.e., 
lim ~ P.(t) = 0 
t-w 
Thus P^(t) is a function of time, whereas P^ is not. 
Steady state probabilities are derived from state 
probabilities in the following manner. 
Consider the time interval between t and t + At. The 
waiting line would not increase during At under one of the 
following conditions. 
Condition or events occurring 
Case No. during t and t+At 
1 no arrivals 
2 no arrivals, one departure 
3 one arrival, two departures 
4 two arrivals, three departures 
Let 0At be the probability of one new customer arriv­
i n g  a t  t h e  s t a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t  a n d  t + A t .  
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Let yAt be the probability of one customer being serviced 
between t and t + At. Then the probability that no cus­
tomer arrives during this time interval is 1 - 0At, and 
the probability that no customer is serviced during this 
period is 1 - yAt. 
Let Po(t + At) be the probability that there are no 
customers waiting at time t + At. 
Po(t+At) = ^PQ(t) "Probability of Case 1 
+ Pi(t)'Probability of Case 2 + ZO^(At) 
where O^(At) are terms of higher order in At and have been 
assumed to vanish when At—>0. We shall, therefore, drop 
EO^(At) from subsequent equations. Ignoring SO^(At), we 
get 
P o (t+At) = P o (t)(l-8At) + P i (t) yAt(l-0At)J 
In general, P^(t+At) is the probability that i 
customers are waiting in queue at time t + At. For i > 0 
P^(t+At) = P^{t) (l-0At-yAt) + P^_^(t)8At + P^_^^{t)yAt^ 
P. (t+At) -P. (t) 
or = P^_^(t)-0 + P.^^(t) .y - (e+Y)P^(t) 
By taking the limit as At—>0, the following differ­
ential equation is obtained: 
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Ap^(t) = Pi_i(t)8 - (0+Y)Pi(t) + Pi+l(t)'Y 
For i > 0, the steady state probability equation has 
the form 
APi = 0 = p._^.0 - (e+Y)p, + Pi+i'Y 
because P^ does not change with time. It remains 
steady and, therefore, rate of change, i.e., = 0 
For i = 0, we have 
0 = yP 1 — 8P 0 
or 
and 
^0 -
Pi = TPq. 
Similarly, 
P2 = tPi = T^Pq 
P3 = TP 2 = T^Pi = T^PQ 
Pi = t'-Po 
=  t " P o -
Knowing that ^ P. must equal to 1, we have 
i=0 ^ 
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P. = 1 = PoZt^ 
i=0 ^ 
and 
i Pn POZT = = 1 
or 
PQ = 1 - T  
and 
Pj^ = t^(I-T) .  
Thus the probability that i customers would be waiting 
in the queue is t ^ ( I - t ) .  
It is important to note that P^ does not depend 
on absolute values of 8 and y as such, but solely on 
their ratios, i.e., t .  
The mean length of waiting line is equal to E(i). Call 
it I. 
00 
E(i) = I iP. 
i=0 ^ 
= % iT^(l-T) 
i=0 
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If we change an assumption and consider i to be the total 
number of persons in the system, i.e., waiting and being 
serviced, then I becomes the average number of persons in the 
system. 
Let 
w be the average number of customers waiting in the 
line, 
s be the average number of customers being serviced 
such that 
s < 1 for a single-channel queue, 
then 
i = w + s 
or 
w = 1 - s. 
The rate of service = x. 
As Pq = (1-t) >• P- = 1 - (1-t) = T 
In a single channel queue only one customer can be 
serviced at a time. Therefore, 
s = 0 Pq + 1 P-
= 0(1-t) + 1(T) = T 
and 
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Multiple-Channel Queues 
So far, we have dealt with the problems of single-channel 
queues where there was provision for servicing only one cus­
tomer at a time. In many cases, facilities exist to provide 
service to a number of customers at the same time, e.g., 
several check-out lanes in a super market, ticket windows at 
railway stations, or tellers at a bank. These are multi­
channel phenomena. 
Let 
0 = the arrival rate in the system, 
Y = the rate of servicing per channel, and 
c = the number of channels or servicing facilities. 
0 Then T = — is the 'traffic intensity' per channel and the 
traffic intensity for the whole system is equal to Call 
it T. 
Let i be the number of customers in the system, i.e., 
those being serviced plus those who are waiting. 
Under the assumptions 2, 3, 4 and 7 of single-channel 
queues and the assumption that x < 1 (this is a practical and 
realistic assumption because it means' that the system can 
serve more customers than are expected to arrive), it can be 
shown that 
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or 
P. = —, •— for 1 > c 
1 c! 
/  ~\  1~C T r-
=  ( t) •— for 1 > c 
c ! 
Again using the property that the sum of probabilities 
adds up to 1, we find that 
C _J. - CO JL 
IT + 5T . T i=0 i=c+l c 
i-c 
i=c+l c 
C  I  C  0 0  
.=o  ^^  iXl J h -x-c T 
This calculation of Pq is rather complex. But in our model, 
a> 
T < 1 and, therefore, the series ^ converges. This 
i=c+l 
property renders the determination of Pq easier. Therefore, 
for practical purposes. 
c 1 1 -1 
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It is interesting to note that if the number of servicing 
facilities is infinite, i.e., c = then 
^0 = „ ^  i = ^ = e ^ 
Since c = 0°, it necessarily means that i < c and in this case 
-T p. = -—e for 0 < i < c 
1 il -
and this is a Poisson distribution. 
For calculation purposes the following are more conveni­
ent: 
(a) P. = ÎP. T for i < c, and 1 1 1-1 -
(b) P. = T'P. T for i > c. 
1 1-1 -
Applications in Agriculture 
Few applications of queuing theory in agriculture have 
been reported. Cox, Glickstein and Greene (22) applied the 
theory in determining livestock unloading facilities. They 
simulated conditions for a ninety-minute period by Monte Carlo 
method at a facility for various livestock volumes and calcu­
lated the probabilities for different i's for three and four 
dock unloading facilities. According to them, the management 
could assign conditions as it wished to meet and determine the 
cost. This was to be done by assigning costs of extra dock 
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facilities and of manpower requirements to unload or service 
in certain time intervals at each level the management was 
interested in. It would have been helpful if an actual calcu­
lation of how it is to be done was given by them. Lu (60) 
applied the queuing theory to determine the optimum checkout 
facilities at a nationally known chain food store in Detroit 
under given conditions. His study is based on the assumption 
that the (t) followed a poisson distribution and that the 
service was exponentially distributed. 
Simmons (91) attempted to determine appropriate plant 
loading facilities for fleet milk distribution trucks through 
the use of this theory under the conditions of poisson proba­
bility distribution of arrivals, variable average arrival 
rates, constant service times and a first-come-first-served 
discipline. He estimated the total waiting time as: 
= 2y(i-X) 
where 
E(w) = estimated waiting time, 
X = average arrival rate in trucks per minute, 
and 
y = average loading time in trucks per minute. 
He found that the estimates of waiting time were different 
under the two assumptions of constant arrival rate and differ­
ent arrival rates for each hour. 
Through the use of two illustrations, we shall attempt 
to demonstrate the practical applications of single and multi­
channel queues in the agricultural industry. Later we shall 
mention some other areas where the theory could be applied. 
Illustration of the application of a single-channel model in 
agriculture 
The following example, though simple, will serve to 
indicate the situations where we could use this model. 
An Agricultural University in India has a fleet of fifty 
tractors which, during use, break down and require repairs. 
Let us assume the following: 
a. The average rate of breakdown is one tractor per day. 
b. The University has only one service station with a 
squad of machinists and repairmen. The station can 
service only one tractor at a time and with the given 
size of the squad, can repair, on an average, two 
tractors a day. 
c. The University loses 55 rupees a day in case a 
tractor stands idle for one day. 
d. All the assumptions made in the single-channel queu­
ing model on pages 238 and 239 hold good in this case. 
e. Y(C) is the level of servicing coefficient such that 
Y(C) = .5 + .OIC for C > 50 rupees where C is the 
weekly cost of maintaining the service facilities to 
keep Y at y{C) level. 
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f. 6 < Y* If we do not make this assumption, the system 
will be congested to infinity. 
The problem is to find whether the university should main­
tain its servicing facilities at the present level or change 
its present capacity of repairing two tractors per day without 
increasing the number of channels. If the capacity has to be 
changed, what should be the extent of this change? In other 
words, the problem is to find that value of y which would 
minimize the sum of costs of repairs in terms of waiting costs 
(where tractors have to wait to get repair) and the cost of 
actually repairing the tractors. 
We can proceed in the following manner. 
9 = 1 =  a v e r a g e  n u m b e r  o f  b r e a k d o w n s  p e r  d a y  
Y = average number of tractors that can be 
repaired in a day 
= 2 
T = f = I 
E(i) = i = expected number of tractors waiting to 
be repaired 
1 
2 
1-T T 1 
^ - 2 
= 1 
It is apparent that as x, the ratio of arrivals to the 
servicing facilities, increases, the value of E(i) increases 
As T approaches 1, E(i), the number of tractors in waiting, 
would approach infinity. 
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The probabilities of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,... tractors waiting 
in the line are; 
Po 
Pi 
P2 
P3 = 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
8 
16 
Under our assumptions, only one would be serviced at a 
time and the rest would be waiting. Therefore, the proba­
bilities of 1, 2, 3, 4,..' tractors being in the system (those 
being serviced plus those waiting to get service) are given 
below: 
Number of tractors in the system Probability 
1 1 2 
1 
4 
_1 
8 
16 
In our example, 9=1. We have assumed, for practicality, 
that 0 < y. This would mean that y(C) > 1 and that the optimum 
solution should satisfy this condition. 
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Substituting the equation of y{C) in the above, we have 
.5+ .OIC > 1, or C>50 rupees. 
The average loss (costs) to the university per day due 
to non-repair of tractors = E(i)«costs per day for each i 
= 1*rupees 55 = Rupees 55. 
(2 
The daily cost of maintaining the service facilities = y. 
n 
Therefore, the total costs per day to the university = 55 + y. 
C Let us call these costs K. K = 55 + y. 
Under the existing circumstances, 
Y(C) = 2 = .5 + .OIC or C = Rupees 150. 
Therefore, the value of K under the present service facilities 
is = 55 + = Rupees 76.5 approximately. 
Our object is to find a value of yfC) that would minimize 
the expected value of K. 
E(K) c E(i)«costs per day for each i + y 
e 
Y(C) 
e 
Y(C) 
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E(K) = 55 
.Ole - .5 
Our objective is to minimize E(K) with respect to C. 
Therefore, we take the derivative of E(K) with respect to C 
and set it equal to zero. 
dE(K) _ (-55) (.01) . 1 _ , 
Tc (.QIC - .5)2 + 7 - ° 
or (.Old - .5)2 = 3.85 
or .OOOieZ - .OIC + .25 = 3.85 
or C2 - lOOC - 3600 = 0 
Solving this quadratic equation, we get 
C = Rupees 246 approximately. 
This means that yfC) should be such that 
C = Rs 246, 
Y(C) = .5 + (.01) (246) = 2.96 = 3. 
This suggests that y should be increased from 2 to 3. 
C = 246 and y = 3, 
For 
K = 
1 
3 
1 - I 
55 + 246 
or 
K = Rs 62.7. 
For Y = 3, K = 62.7 rupees. 
For y = 2, K = 76.5 rupees. 
Therefore, the total costs per day to the university 
would be less if the repair squad and facilities are increased 
to the extent that three tractors could be repaired per day. 
It is important to keep in mind that optimum size of 
repair facilities depends not only on the costs of servicing, 
but also on the loss due to the tractor standing idle. For 
example, if the loss due to one tractor standing idle was only 
Rupees 15 per day to the university, then 
^ " .OIC - .5 7 • 
Taking and setting it to equal to zero, we have: 
" ' 1 5  + 1 = 0  
or 
or 
and 
(.OIC - .5)2 7 
C2 - lOOC - 8000 = 0 
C = 152 rupees approximately 
optimal value of y(C) = .5 + .OIC 
= .5 + 1.52 
=  2 . 0 2 .  
This suggests that if loss due to a tractor standing idle 
were 15 rupees, the present capacity of servicing facility was 
optimum and, therefore, should be maintained at the existing 
level. 
Illustration of application of a multiple-channel model in 
agriculture 
Sugar cane is a cash crop. A large part of sugar cane 
grown in India is converted into sugar in the factories. There 
it is the responsibility of the producer to deliver the cane 
at one of the collection centers of the factory. Usually 
there are a few weighing machines and a large number of carts 
and trucks at the station. As a consequence, the farmer has 
to wait for a long time to get his produce weighed and get 
the weight slip which is brought to the cashier to receive 
payment for the delivered cane. 
Let us assume that the sugar factory has five weighing 
stations. Let the rate of arrivals be 100 carts and/or trucks 
per hour. Let the rate of servicing be 25 carts and/or trucks 
per hour. Then 
c = 
0 = 
Y = 
T = 
T = 
The management of the sugar factory wants to take a 
decision ragarding installation of additional weighing facili 
ties. Under the assumptions that we made previously for the 
5 
100 
25 
100 
25 
4 
5 
?5G 
multi-channel queuing model. 
0 -
5 i 
j.!T 
-1  
1 + iill + lili. + NT + (4) 5 
21 31 4! 5! 
=  . 0 2 5 7  
P i  =  ( 4 ) ( P q )  =  ( 4 ) ( . 0 2 5 7 )  =  . 1 0 2 8  
P z  = (I-) ( P i )  =  . 2 0 5 8  
5 - ( c )  ( P l + )  
( | )  ( P s )  
. 2 1 9 5 2  
. 1 7 5 6 1 6  
(^) (Pe) =  . 1 4 1  
Average number of «> 
arrivals in the system = I iP^ 
i=0 
=  ( 0 ) P o  +  ( l ) P i  +  ( 2 ) P 2  +  
= 13 approximately. 
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Average number 
of those waiting 
at any given time = Improbability of one waiting 
+ 2"Probability of two waiting 
4- * # 
=  ( 1  x P e )  +  ( 2 )  ( P 7 )  +  • • •  
= 5 approx ima tely. 
Average number of 
arrivals b e i n g  s e r v i c e d  =  1 3 - 5  =  8  
Average waiting , _ _ 
time for each farmer = (P5) + (^) (Pg) + (^) ( P 7 )  +  •  
= .23 hours approximately 
= 14 minutes. 
We can make similar calculations for c = 6, 1, 8, ••• . 
Depending on the value that the management attaches to 
the reduction in waiting time of the farmer and cost of 
installing and operating the additional weighing machines, 
optimal value of c can be calculated in a manner similar to 
that used in the single-channel example. 
Summary 
Arrival and servicing rates are the backbones of queuing 
models. These rates can be measured and probabilities of a 
given number of arrivals and probability that a given time 
will be required to service can be calculated. Mathematical 
analysis used in finding out the characteristics of waiting 
lines is rather complex. Monte Carlo methods can be used with 
advantage to these problems of queuing. 
Queuing problems are a special case of Inventory Control. 
However, there is a basic difference in the analysis of the 
two because the latter are not waiting line problems and vari­
ous states do not occur randomly. "In any case where something 
requires some kind of service from one of a limited number of 
facilities and where there is a cost associated with any delay 
caused by the something's having to wait for a facility we 
will have to use waiting line analysis rather than the other 
inventory models" (69, p. 397). 
The two applications endeavour to demonstrate the way 
in which the problems can be solved with the help of queuing 
theory. It can be applied to several types of problems in 
agriculture. Repairs and maintenance analysis, problems of 
loading and unloading, production and shipment of seed, and 
manufacture of feed are some of the areas. In industries akin 
to agriculture, e.g., tractor and implements manufacture and 
fertilizer production, theory of queues can be applied exactly 
in the same manner as in other industries. Due to its very 
nature of waiting^ it is likely that the theory may not inter­
est small farmers. 
A great variety of models to handle diversified situa­
tions have been developed and a decision maker may find one to 
suit his requirements. Wherever the problem involves a flow 
of persons or things through various stages or points, queuing 
theory can be applied. 
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SUÎ-IMARY AND CONCLUSIONS (Epilogue) 
From an humble beginning during the First World War, the 
operations research today has grown into a highly sophisticated 
science. Its use now requires a knowledge of advanced mathe­
matical analysis and operation. Advancements in computer 
science have rendered operations research more operational and 
useful. 
Though increasingly used in business management and other 
areas, operations research is still very much defense-oriented. 
It should not be forgotten, however, that along with defense, 
bread and butter, shelter and clothing are also essential for 
survival. Wars are not won or lost just with military hard­
ware. The power of endurance of people to the war and its 
after-effects are equally important. 
It is, therefore, high time that these tools of opera­
tions research, primarily developed for defense, were applied 
to management and decision-making in other fields directly 
affecting welfare of mankind. Mr. A. M. Mood (72) , in his 
presidential address to the Operations Research Society of 
America, remarked, "I believe our talents are too much monopo­
lized by the defense business. That business is showing some 
signs of diminishing so that mere survival demands that we 
diversify. More importantly, we wish our Society to be a 
growing viable activity and hence to find itself useful in 
whatever area of human affairs it can make a significant 
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contribution.... There are important areas in which we are 
making little or no contribution and in which operations 
analysis has the potential to make quite salient contribu­
tions." These important areas, as pointed out by Mood were 
education, health, welfare, urban affairs and agriculture. 
Applications of operations research techniques in the field of 
agriculture has been the theme of this study. 
Application of operations research to problems of 
decision making in agriculture is hardly twenty years old. 
One does come across some works where study of problems allied 
to agriculture is a by-product of research for defense pur­
poses. The objective of "Nuclear War and Soil Erosion; Some 
Problems and Prospects" by Katz (51), for example, highlights 
some of what was presently understood about soil erosion in 
order to provide a backdrop for further sustantive investiga­
tions and considerations that were more directly applicable to 
postulated post-attack situation. The primary objective, thus, 
was the effect of nuclear war as related to the problems of 
soil erosion. The work had nothing to do with the problems of 
decision making in agriculture. As mentioned earlier, our 
study concerns itself with the sole objective of examining the 
suitability of operations research techniques for decision 
making in agriculture industry. 
Perhaps the first and the most widely used techniques in 
agriculture is linear programming. A few applications of 
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non-linear programming have been done. Game theory, simula­
tion, time-network analysis, queuing theory, inventory control 
and other techniques have been sparingly applied. "Evaluation 
of alternative operations research techniques is an endless 
task far beyond the scope of a single paper or a single 
person" (47, p. 1417). If not endless, it is, to say the 
least, ambitious and stupendous. This study was, therefore, 
confined to applications of game theory, linear fractional 
functionals programming, time-network analysis and queuing 
theory. 
The most common applications of game theory in agricul­
ture are of games against 'nature'. The author found that the 
four principles of choice used—viz., Wald's criterion. 
Savage's regret principle, Hurwicz' optimism-pessimism method, 
and Laplace's criterion—were rather unsatisfactory for these 
types of games. Hurwicz' criterion involved subjectivity and 
Laplace's principle assumes complete ignorance on the part of 
the farmer. Wald's method implied extreme pessimism, whereas 
regret principle was based on high optimism. The last two 
criteria represent the two extremes. In light of these draw­
backs, the author has devised and suggested the criterion of 
'benefit'. It is a blend of Wald's and regret criteria, being 
neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic. From the applica­
tions carried out it seems to hold promise. 
The underlying assumption in game theory is that every 
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player tries to do the worst to his opponents. In the models 
of 'games against nature', therefore, we base our conclusions 
on this premise. In reality 'nature' is not an opponent of 
the farmer and does not try to do worst to him. The assump­
tion, therefore, is unrealistic, the conclusions may be 
invalid and the suitability of models to make production 
decisions seems questionable. The model could, however, be 
applied with advantage by the farmer in making decisions 
regarding purchasing his requirements, marketing his products, 
size of the warehouse to be constructed, etc. 
The applicability of mathematical programming in agricul­
ture cannot be overemphasized. Linear, dynamic and recursive 
programming have been used to widely varying problems. Range 
X analysis can help the farmer in deciding upon the best farm 
plan for a given set of resources, within what limits can an 
activity be varied without affecting the optimality of the 
original solution, to determine the grain mix that can meet 
all nutrient requirements of the animal at least cost, and 
similar problems. A newer technique of linear fractional 
functionals programming holds great promise in its application 
to agriculture when the objective is to maximize returns per 
hour of family labor or hired labor or both, or the farmer is 
interested in optimizing returns per dollar of investment. 
The technique can also be used in planning at the state or 
national level to determine the optimum plan to maximize per 
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capita income in agriculture or for the economy as a whole. 
Given the out-of-door nature of farm work, proper 
scheduling of operations is important. Time-network analysis 
can help a farmer not only in planning ahead, but also in 
making evaluations at every stage of planning and production 
and obviating future sources of trouble. When fully developed, 
cost and time-cost analysis applications of PERT would be 
useful in agriculture. Their primary asset is simplicity and 
low cost. 
Theory of queues has been applied to problems of waiting 
lines and inventory controls in industries. In agriculture, 
its use may be rather limited to large firms. In addition to 
problems of waiting for loading and unloading, repairs and 
maintenance analysis, we can use it for firms that manufacture 
tractors and other agricultural machinery. The manufacture 
and shipment of these machines may follow a certain proba­
bility distribution which can be determined through studies of 
frequencies. Likewise, the arrival of orders for the machines 
will also be according to a certain distribution. The manu­
facturers can cut the time for which the farmer has to wait to 
get their product because they might lose their market if he 
has to wait too long. Within the factory, we can use this 
theory to cut the costs if, during its manufacture, the 
machine has to wait for a process. Similar applications can 
be made in seed and fertilizer industry. Let us take the seed 
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industry, for example. Seeds for corn, wheat and other crops 
are produced during the season. However, the orders for them 
are huge at their sowing time and almost nil after that. Many 
of these orders will arrive simultaneously. Here again the 
problem of receiving the orders for seeds and shipping them 
may be formulated as a queuing problem. For a small farmer, 
as a decision maker, the theory may not be very useful. 
There are several techniques of operations research 
other than those mentioned above. Here we shall mention them 
and point out some of the areas allied to agriculture where 
they can be or have been applied. Burt (15) has suggested how 
income tax aspects of farm investment and growth can be 
analyzed through dynamic programming. Applications of this 
tool would be helpful in finding out factors significantly 
responsible for acceleration or retardation of the growth of a 
farm firm. For example, to test the extent of effect of risk 
on the expansion of a farm, a stochastic dynamic programming 
model can be used. Integer programming has realistic 
applications in determination of optimum number of hogs to be 
raised or cattle to be fed because the solutions of these in 
terms of fractions of hogs or cattle are simply meaningless. 
Decomposition principle has potential in the areas of regional 
and inter-regional competition. For example, it can be used 
to find such optimal solutions at the farm level that are 
consistent with the optimum at the district, county, state or 
the national level. 
Replacement models, as the name itself suggests, can be 
applied to determine an optimal replacement policy for a 
tractor or machine, livestock and other assets of this nature. 
Some interesting and useful applications of inventory control 
models have been done in agriculture. One such example is 
"Price and Productive Uncertainties in Dynamic Planning" by 
Hurter and Moses (44) . Their model assumes a single farmer 
decision maker and incorporates inter-temporal and inter-
spatial considerations. First, production and sale of one 
commodity in a single market are considered. Then the authors 
introduce production and price uncertainties and use chance 
constrained method in solving it. The analysis then is 
extended to several commodities and several markets. 
Sensitivity analysis is a good tool to partly overcome 
the problem of uncertainty in farming. Before some irrigation 
or multi-purpose river project is undertaken, it needs to be 
evaluated in terms of its expected costs and pay-offs. 
Changes in pay-offs due to cost variations can be found out 
and different ranges in which a given cost structure is 
optimal can be calculated for appropriate decision. 
Zusman and Amiad (112) have demonstrated how simulation 
can be used for farm planning under conditions of weather 
uncertainty. Simulation techniques provide a trial and error 
method and have an advantage that "...once a simulation program 
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has been developed for one farm, it may be adapted to other 
farms with only slight modifications" (112, p. 594). It is 
especially useful for areas where farms are more or less 
homogeneous. 
Forecasting techniques can be used for several purposes. 
Projections of demand for and supply of agricultural commodi­
ties would be an important application. These projections can 
be used for extrapolation of agricultural prices. Use of 
forecasting techniques for weather conditions is helpful to 
farmers. Three recent studies by Rand Corporation have 
attempted to study economic gains from storm warning (26), 
the utility of weather forecasting for the raisin industry 
(54), and how economic decisions are related to weather 
information (78). 
Markovian analysis can be applied to the study of dynamic 
changes in the structure of agriculture, e.g., farm size, 
production functions, land ownership patterns, etc., to help 
the policy maker in evaluating the effects of their policies 
on agriculture and modify them in the light of results. Levy 
(59) has shown how uncertainty of agricultural production 
function can be incorporated into a model of economic growth 
and then he describes an investment decision in agriculture 
using dynamic programming in Markov chains. 
The utility and applicability of operations research 
techniques in agriculture or in any other sector of the 
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economy depends on its structure and level of development. 
For example, agriculture in India is entirely different from 
that in the United States both in structure and technology. 
The problems of Indian agriculture are low productivity, small 
size of holdings getting still smaller. American agriculture 
is highly mechanized, the size of the farm is increasing, the 
percentage of population engaged in agriculture is decreasing 
and smaller numbers of farmers are producing increasingly 
larger quantities of food and other agricultural commodities. 
Therefore, one technique may be useful to Indian agriculture, 
but may need some modifications before it can be applied to 
American agriculture and vice versa. In the United States and 
other developed nations there are business firms that use 
computers to solve the problems of individual farmers. This 
facility does not exist in most of the developing countries 
and, therefore, it is possible that some problems requiring 
the use of computers may not be solved. But this should not 
be taken as a serious drawback. For example, in India, where 
an average farmer carries on subsistence farming on a small 
size of holding with meager resources, a computer may neither 
be required nor be feasible for him (because of high costs) 
for preparing farm plans. This could be taken care of by 
calculators. His farm plan would be rather simple because of 
the features of Indian agriculture mentioned above. 
The progress of operations research has been phenomenal. 
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New tools are being developed at a fast pace and the applica­
tions of the existing tools are being tried under different 
sets of assumptions. Several of these assumptions may be 
realistic in agriculture. As this study indicates, most of 
these tools can be used with advantage in all the four fields 
of agricultural economic activities, viz., production, con­
sumption, exchange and distribution. 
Of course, the final decision still lies with the man and, 
therefore, human element is still the most significant part of 
the decision making process. It is necessary that these power­
ful tools are used judiciously. Indiscriminate use may lead to 
disaster. A tool, at best, is only as good as its user. 
But there is no doubt that the future would see increas­
ing and diversified applications of operations research 
techniques in agriculture and other industries. One cannot 
help agreeing with Burt in that "Potential applications of 
operations research in farm management are probably far greater 
than we realize. If growth of linear programming uses over 
the past decade is any indication of what to expect in the 
future for other techniques, operations research is still in 
its infancy as far as farm management is concerned" (15, 
p. 1426). I would go one step further and broaden the scope 
of his statement by substituting 'agricultural industry' for 
'farm management'. 
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